free_up_channels can only be called once for a started transaction.
Double free will undesirely stop the next picked 2D-DMA transaction on the same channel.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
The initial CVE-2026-6682 fix hardened the exFAT mount path, but the CVE
as reported by runZero is a FAT32 defect in mount_volume() and is
reachable in the default configuration (exFAT and 64-bit LBA disabled).
This corrects the fix.
Root cause: `fasize *= fs->n_fats` is a DWORD multiply with no overflow
guard. A crafted BPB_FATSz32 such as 0x80000001 with NumFATs=2 wraps
`fasize` to 0x00000002. The wrapped (too-small) FAT size places
`fs->database` inside the FAT region, so a forged directory entry yields
an attacker-controlled `finfo.fsize`; a caller using it as a read length
overflows its buffer with attacker-controlled bytes (CVSS 7.6).
Fix: reject per-FAT and reserved+FAT+root system-area sizes that overflow
DWORD before they are used to derive the data-area base. The exFAT
cluster-heap/bitmap 64-bit promotions are retained as defense-in-depth
and relabeled (they are not CVE-2026-6682). SBOM reason updated.
The addend in `emac_hal_ptp_start()` was derived from the floating-point
`config->ptp_req_accuracy_ns` instead of the integer `base_increment`
register that actually drives the sub-second update. The cast to
`uint8_t` loses the fractional part, so the un-corrected addend leaves
the PTP clock running off-rate.
Example: with a 40 MHz XTAL and the default `req_accuracy_ns = 40`,
`base_increment` rounds 85.899 up to 86, leaving the clock +1170 ppm
fast — well outside the IEEE 802.1AS neighborRateRatio limit (~±200
ppm), so strict-1AS bridges refuse asCapable.
Compute the addend from the stored `base_increment` for both rollover
modes: `addend = 2^32 * clk_period_ns / increment_ns`.
Measured on ESP32-P4: neighborRateRatio drops from +1147.5 ppm to
+4.2 ppm, and asCapable is granted.
Co-authored-by: Ondrej Kosta <panzer412@gmail.com>
Document the three runZero "Seven FatFs bugs" CVEs that require no source change
in this component, so vulnerability scanners have their disposition:
- CVE-2026-6684: GPT partition-scan loop DoS. Already fixed upstream in R0.16,
where test_gpt_header() caps the partition-entry count at 128.
- CVE-2026-6686: read of uninitialized clusters after f_lseek() past EOF.
Longstanding, behavioral; not a memory-safety defect and zero-filling every
extended cluster is prohibitively costly on flash.
- CVE-2026-6688: long-filename overflow in downstream callers. Not exposed in
ESP-IDF; vfs_fat.c uses bounded copies and fname is bounded by FF_MAX_LFN.
Reference: https://www.runzero.com/blog/fatfs-bugs/
f_getlabel() extracts the exFAT volume label with a loop bounded by the on-disk
byte dj.dir[XDIR_NumLabel] (0-255):
for (si = di = hs = 0; si < dj.dir[XDIR_NumLabel]; si++)
wc = ld_16(dj.dir + XDIR_Label + si * 2);
The exFAT label field holds at most 11 UTF-16 units (22 bytes). A crafted
directory entry with a larger count both reads past the 22-byte label field and,
through put_utf(... &label[di], 4), writes past the end of the caller-provided
label buffer (the canonical API examples use small fixed stack buffers) -> stack
buffer overflow.
Clamp the character count to the exFAT maximum of 11 before the extraction loop.
Record the CVE in the component SBOM.
Note: f_getlabel() takes no destination-buffer size, so under UTF-8 output
(FF_LFN_UNICODE == 2) 11 units can still expand to up to 34 bytes; the clamp
downgrades this from attacker-unbounded to spec-bounded. ESP-IDF's VFS layer
does not call f_getlabel(); direct callers on untrusted media should size their
buffer accordingly. A complete fix requires an upstream size-aware API change.
Reference: https://www.runzero.com/blog/fatfs-bugs/
After a direct multi-sector disk_read()/disk_write(), FatFs decides whether the
cached sector overlaps the direct-I/O range with:
fp->sect - sect < cc (and the FF_FS_TINY variant fs->winsect - sect < cc)
`sect`, `fp->sect` and `fs->winsect` are unsigned LBA_t. On 32-bit LBA_t builds,
if the cached sector is below `sect`, the subtraction wraps to a huge value that
can still compare `< cc`, so the code computes a bogus large offset:
- in f_write() it mis-copies from the direct write buffer (data corruption);
- in f_read() it is worse: memcpy(rbuff + (wrapped_offset * SS), ...) is an
out-of-bounds WRITE into the caller-supplied read buffer.
Add an explicit lower-bound check (fp->sect >= sect, resp. fs->winsect >= sect)
before the range test on both the read and write paths and both the FF_FS_TINY
and normal variants, so the condition is exactly "cached sector lies within
[sect, sect + cc)". Record the CVE in the component SBOM.
Reference: https://www.runzero.com/blog/fatfs-bugs/
CVE-2026-6683 is an exFAT divide-by-zero: with NumClusters == 0 the filesystem
object has fs->n_fatent == 2, and the exFAT "percent in use" update in sync_fs()
computes ... * 100 / (fs->n_fatent - 2) -> division by zero.
That vulnerable exFAT PercInUse sync path was introduced in FatFs R0.16 and is
NOT present in this R0.15 release, so the divide-by-zero itself is not reachable
here. As defense-in-depth (and to keep parity with newer releases) reject an
empty exFAT cluster heap at mount time, which is a malformed volume regardless.
Record the CVE disposition in the component SBOM.
Reference: https://www.runzero.com/blog/fatfs-bugs/
The exFAT mount path validates that the media is large enough to hold the
declared cluster heap with:
if (maxlba < (QWORD)fs->database + ncl * fs->csize) ...
`ncl` (DWORD, up to MAX_EXFAT) and `fs->csize` (WORD) are both promoted to
`unsigned int`, so `ncl * fs->csize` is evaluated in 32-bit arithmetic and can
wrap before the QWORD promotion of the sum. A crafted image with a large
NumClusters/SecPerClus can therefore make an undersized volume pass the "size
is large enough" check; subsequent cluster->sector math then addresses media
outside the actual device.
Promote the multiply to 64-bit ((QWORD)ncl * fs->csize). Apply the same
promotion to the bitmap-base computation ((LBA_t)fs->csize * (bcl - 2)), which
has the identical overflow shape. Record the CVE in the component SBOM.
Reference: https://www.runzero.com/blog/fatfs-bugs/
The reassembly buffer must be reset to its origin at the beginning of every
transaction. prov_msg_recv() pulls the PDU type byte (advancing buf->data by
one) and nothing restores it between transactions. Without this reset,
buf->data drifts forward by one byte per received PDU, causing the segment-0
memcpy to write past the end of the statically allocated rx buffer
(PROV_RX_BUF_SIZE), and the XACT_SEG_DATA() offsets used for continuation
segments to be skewed by the accumulated drift.
(cherry picked from commit 2c4acaa2aa)
Co-authored-by: luoxu <luoxu@espressif.com>
Fix multiple wire-format and robustness issues in the DFD client
(dfd_cli.c):
- handle_capabilities: read oob_retrieval_supported as u8 instead of
le32. The server encodes a single byte; le32 over-consumed 3 bytes
of the URL scheme list and could over-read the buffer.
- handle_upload_status: extract upload_progress from bits 0-6 (& 0x7F)
and upload_type from bit 7 (>> 7), matching the server encoding
(progress | BIT(7)). The previous >>1 / &0x01 returned wrong values,
mis-classified in-band vs OOB, and falsely rejected valid OOB
messages with high progress.
- handle_dfd_status: correct the transfer-mode byte layout to
trans_mode bits 0-1, update_policy bit 2, RFU bits 3-7 (previously
read bits 6-7 / 5), and fix the RFU mask to 0xF8. Now matches the
struct bitfield definition and the DFD server.
- handle_dfd_status: report status+phase and return early when
buf->len == 0 (IDLE phase) instead of pulling 10 absent bytes.
- bt_mesh_dfd_cli_distribution_start: encode trans_mode/update_policy
into bits 0-2 so the server decodes them correctly.
- handle_receiver_list: validate buf->len >= entries_cnt * 5 before
the loop, and handle entries_cnt == 0 without relying on calloc(0).
- handle_receiver_status: pass the status value (not the whole union)
to the %d log format, fixing undefined behavior.
- dfd_client_recv_status: drop the dead BLE_MESH_DFD_OP_CAPABILITIES_GET
case (a client-send opcode) from the receive switch.
- bt_mesh_dfd_cli_receivers_add: widen msg_length to uint32_t to avoid
uint16_t overflow that bypassed the PDU size guard; add a NULL check
for the receivers array.
- bt_mesh_dfd_cli_distribution_upload_oob_start: return -EINVAL
instead of -1 for consistency with the rest of the file.
(cherry picked from commit 43137475e1)
Co-authored-by: luoxu <luoxu@espressif.com>
morris
Song Ruo Jing
Xu Si Yu
Mahavir Jain
Euripedes Rocha
Rahul Tank
Hu Rui
Erhan Kurubas
Jiang Jiang Jian
Ondrej Kosta
Wang Meng Yang
Tomáš Rohlínek
Ashish Sharma
muhaidong
Scramble ToolsandOndrej Kosta
Marius Vikhammer
wuzhenghui
Luo Xu