ECDSA enable pulses a reset that also holds SHA in reset, and SHA shares
its DMA with AES. Key Manager enable pulses a reset that also covers the
XTS-AES flash encryption key-usage selector. Neither path was serialized
against those victims, so a hardware ECDSA/HMAC/DS operation could
corrupt a concurrent SHA/AES transfer or an in-flight encrypted flash
read.
- Take the SHA/AES lock inside esp_crypto_ecdsa_lock_acquire(), before
MPI, matching the DS lock order (sha_aes < mpi)
- Add esp_crypto_key_mgr_enable_periph_clk_no_reset() and switch ECDSA,
HMAC and DS to it; they only need the key-usage selector writable
- Hold esp_crypto_key_manager_lock across those clock enable/disable
pairs so selector writes stay serialized without resetting KM
The offset table and the per-cert length fields of the certificate
bundle were read through uint16_t*/uint32_t* casts, which compile to
halfword/word loads at addresses with no alignment guarantee: bundles
supplied via esp_crt_bundle_set() can start anywhere, and cert entries
are byte-packed, so their 16-bit fields land at arbitrary offsets.
On chips with SOC_CPU_MISALIGNED_ACCESS_ON_PMP_MISMATCH_ISSUE (DIG-694:
ESP32-C6/H2/H21) a misaligned load from memory-mapped flash can take a
spurious "Load access fault" when it sits within two instructions of an
access to a differently-permissioned region, observed as a crash in
esp_crt_check_bundle()/CA callback during TLS handshakes with a bundle
that happened to be placed at an odd address.
Extend the CTR test data length to 6433 bytes so the trailing partial
block is exercised with external RAM buffers (which stalls the ESP32-S2
Crypto DMA on an unfixed driver), and add AES-GCM PSRAM tests verified
against internal RAM references.
The ESP32-S2 Crypto DMA in-channel stalls silently when a receive
descriptor list transitions from external to internal RAM. The AES
driver hits this when a PSRAM-output operation has a trailing partial
block, as the internal stream descriptor is linked after the external
RAM data descriptors.
- esp_aes_process_dma(): process the block-aligned part and the partial
block as two separate DMA operations, keeping each descriptor list
uniform
- crypto_dma_ll_reset(): also reset the in-channel (per the TRM receive
reset sequence), otherwise stale state from a preceding external-RAM
operation corrupts the next operation's output
The GCM DMA path is unaffected; it never operates on PSRAM buffers.
esp_crt_check_bundle() read the 4-byte certificate header (name_len,
key_len) via esp_crt_get_len() after only checking that the cert's
start offset lies inside the bundle, so a crafted bundle whose first
or last certificate starts within the final 3 bytes caused a transient
out-of-bounds read of up to 3 bytes before the extent check rejected
it. Require the whole header to lie inside the bundle before reading
it.
The test only runs with MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_PRIME_GEN disabled:
with the constant-time prime generation that is now the default,
RSA-2048 key generation takes over a minute on most targets (~86 s on
ESP32-S3), exceeding the test timeout and starving the task watchdog.
mbedtls 4.1.1 made the small-factor test in prime generation
constant-time (a CT GCD against the product of primes up to 997, run
for every prime candidate). This makes RSA key generation roughly ten
times slower on ESP chips and starves the idle task since the software
GCD never yields, tripping the task watchdog.
Add MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_PRIME_GEN under the new "Security hardening"
menu, default y so the upstream constant-time behavior ships as the
secure default. When disabled, esp_config.h defines
MBEDTLS_MPI_PRIME_SIEVE_VARIABLE_TIME and mbedtls uses the pre-3.6.7
variable-time trial division, restoring key generation performance on
devices where no untrusted co-resident code could time key generation.
- esp_tls_mbedtls: require cert when PSA-backed server/client key is set
- esp_tls_mbedtls: drop redundant pk_init/x509_crt_init (calloc handles it)
- psa SE driver: copy callbacks/opaque_key by value (no lifetime coupling)
- psa SE driver: replace atomic CAS with simple null check on register
- psa SE driver: use sig_len from sign callback with bounds validation
- psa SE driver: validate pubkey_len returned by export_pubkey callback
- psa SE driver: check hash sub-alg in RSA PKCS1V15 branch of validate_request
- psa SE driver: align secure_element_register_callbacks doc with value-copy impl
- esp_https_server: initialize server_key in HTTPD_SSL_CONFIG_DEFAULT
- mbedtls: move SECURE_ELEMENT_DRIVER_ENABLED to esp_config.h for parity
with ESP_ECDSA_DRIVER_ENABLED; drop target_compile_definitions
- docs: fix esp_tls_cfg_t -> esp_http_client_config_t cross-reference
- docs: check psa_import_key() status in ESP-TLS PSA example
- hints/error_output: point at CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SECURE_ELEMENT_DRIVER_ENABLED
(cherry picked from commit 08b567ef3b)
Add generic secure element PSA driver with runtime callback registration.
Consolidate Kconfig into single MBEDTLS_SECURE_ELEMENT_DRIVER_ENABLED option.
Closes https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/issues/18388
(cherry picked from commit 1c20f525b4)
esp_crypto_shared_gdma_done() polled the AXI RX raw interrupt status
(in_done) but never cleared it, so after the first transfer the set bit
made every subsequent call return immediately without waiting.
Prevent signature verification failures on targets that do not round hardware words
to 16-word boundaries (e.g. ESP32-S3, ESP32-C6, and ESP32-P4), where exponent blinding
can cause `num_words` to vary between calls, leading to reuse of an incorrectly sized
cached `Rinv`.
Perform modulo reduction on the base before size checks to allow RSA-4096
CRT (2048-bit exponentiations) to use the hardware accelerator instead of
falling back to software. Fix input validation, negative zero sign issues,
and early memory cleanup paths in esp_mpi_exp_mod()
Audited every esp_* PSA driver against its corresponding software driver in
mbedtls/library (psa_crypto_cipher.c, psa_crypto_aead.c, psa_crypto_mac.c,
psa_crypto_hash.c, psa_crypto_ecp.c, psa_crypto_rsa.c) and fixed gaps in
workflow ownership, error-path cleanup, sensitive-data wiping, and BAD_STATE
gating per the PSA Crypto API spec.
esp_aes (cipher): fix padding oracle in cipher_finish by replacing leaky
branches with mbedtls_ct_* primitives; abort wipes the driver-level ctx,
not just the inner mbedtls_aes_context; setup routes errors through abort.
esp_aes_gcm (AEAD): zeroize the 16-byte full_tag scratch; restore the
*output_length = finish_output_size assignment that the SW reference keeps
for future ciphers; NULL the inner ctx pointer after free in abort; gate
update/finish on a live ctx with PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE.
esp_ecdsa: keep abort-at-exit in the one-shot wrappers so the stack-copy
of the hash (needed for little-endian byte order on HW) is wiped per
PSA spec 6.3.3, drop the over-defensive public-key qx/qy wipes that the
SW driver does not perform.
esp_cmac / esp_hmac_transparent / esp_hmac_opaque (MAC): make abort
idempotent, route setup errors through abort, gate update/finish/
verify_finish on PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE, wipe M_last and intermediate hmac[]
buffers on completion or HW failure. HMAC opaque gains alg + computed
fields to mirror the SW psa_crypto_mac.c state machine. HMAC transparent
explicitly aborts the inner SHA context before reusing it for the outer
hash.
esp_sha: switch the per-op live indicator to (sha_ctx != NULL) so the
public esp_sha_operation_type_t enum keeps its original ordinal values;
free + NULL sha_ctx on every error path; gate update/finish/clone on a
live ctx; wipe per-algorithm core/parallel-engine scratch buffers
(W[], A[], state) on HW-engine failure.
esp_md5: replace bare memset in abort with mbedtls_platform_zeroize.
esp_rsa_ds: complete() no longer frees sig_buffer (abort owns that);
start() routes failures through abort; asymmetric_decrypt funnels all
cleanup through a single exit: label. RSA-DS utilities wipe the
decrypted-plaintext scratch on v15 / OAEP unpad failure.