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fix(mbedtls): validate cert header extent before reading it in bundle check
esp_crt_check_bundle() read the 4-byte certificate header (name_len, key_len) via esp_crt_get_len() after only checking that the cert's start offset lies inside the bundle, so a crafted bundle whose first or last certificate starts within the final 3 bytes caused a transient out-of-bounds read of up to 3 bytes before the extent check rejected it. Require the whole header to lie inside the bundle before reading it.
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@@ -438,6 +438,9 @@ static bool esp_crt_check_bundle(const uint8_t* const x509_bundle, const size_t
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// Check all offsets for consistency with certificate data
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < num_certs - 1; ++i) {
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const uint32_t off = offsets[i];
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if (unlikely((uint64_t)off + CRT_HEADER_SIZE > bundle_size)) {
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return false;
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}
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cert_t cert = x509_bundle + off;
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// The next offset in the list must point to right after the current cert
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const uint32_t expected_next_offset = off + esp_crt_get_len(cert);
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@@ -450,7 +453,7 @@ static bool esp_crt_check_bundle(const uint8_t* const x509_bundle, const size_t
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// The loop above stops at num_certs - 1, so the final certificate's extent is never
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// validated; check it explicitly so its key data cannot run past the bundle (CWE-125).
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const uint32_t last_off = offsets[num_certs - 1];
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if (unlikely(last_off >= bundle_size)) {
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if (unlikely((uint64_t)last_off + CRT_HEADER_SIZE > bundle_size)) {
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return false;
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}
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const uint32_t last_len = esp_crt_get_len(x509_bundle + last_off);
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