fix(ble/bluedroid): Fix potential CVE-2024-0039 out-of-bounds write in attp_build_value_cmd

- Reference: https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2024-03-01?hl=zh-cn


(cherry picked from commit e1d39f630f)

Co-authored-by: zhanghaipeng <zhanghaipeng@espressif.com>
This commit is contained in:
Zhang Hai Peng
2025-11-27 20:09:11 +08:00
parent a8e2e1fe22
commit c260f37076

View File

@@ -285,57 +285,89 @@ BT_HDR *attp_build_opcode_cmd(UINT8 op_code)
** Returns None.
**
*******************************************************************************/
BT_HDR *attp_build_value_cmd (UINT16 payload_size, UINT8 op_code, UINT16 handle,
UINT16 offset, UINT16 len, UINT8 *p_data)
BT_HDR *attp_build_value_cmd(UINT16 payload_size, UINT8 op_code,
UINT16 handle, UINT16 offset,
UINT16 len, UINT8 *p_data)
{
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL;
UINT8 *p, *pp, pair_len, *p_pair_len;
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL;
UINT8 *p = NULL, *pp = NULL, *p_pair_len = NULL;
size_t pair_len = 0;
size_t size_now = 1; /* track current buffer size including op_code */
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc((UINT16)(sizeof(BT_HDR) + payload_size + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET))) != NULL) {
p = pp = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
#define CHECK_SIZE() \
do { \
if (size_now > payload_size) { \
GATT_TRACE_ERROR("payload size too small"); \
osi_free(p_buf); \
return NULL; \
} \
} while (0)
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, op_code);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_buf->len = 1;
/* allocate buffer with extra space for L2CAP offset */
p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + payload_size + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
if (!p_buf) return NULL;
if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) {
p_pair_len = p;
pair_len = len + 2;
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, pair_len);
p_buf->len += 1;
}
if (op_code != GATT_RSP_READ_BLOB && op_code != GATT_RSP_READ && op_code != GATT_HANDLE_MULTI_VALUE_NOTIF) {
UINT16_TO_STREAM (p, handle);
p_buf->len += 2;
p = pp = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
CHECK_SIZE();
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, op_code);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
/* handle Read By Type response: reserve space for pair_len */
if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) {
p_pair_len = p++;
pair_len = len + 2; /* handle(2 bytes) + value length */
size_now += 1;
CHECK_SIZE();
/* pair_len will be backfilled after value is written */
}
/* write handle if needed */
if (op_code != GATT_RSP_READ_BLOB && op_code != GATT_RSP_READ &&
op_code != GATT_HANDLE_MULTI_VALUE_NOTIF) {
size_now += 2;
CHECK_SIZE();
UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, handle);
}
/* write offset for prepare write requests */
if (op_code == GATT_REQ_PREPARE_WRITE || op_code == GATT_RSP_PREPARE_WRITE) {
size_now += 2;
CHECK_SIZE();
UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, offset);
}
/* write value data, ensure it does not exceed payload_size */
if (len > 0 && p_data != NULL) {
if (payload_size - size_now < len) {
len = payload_size - size_now;
if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) {
pair_len = len + 2;
}
GATT_TRACE_WARNING("attribute value too long, truncated to %d", len);
}
if (op_code == GATT_REQ_PREPARE_WRITE || op_code == GATT_RSP_PREPARE_WRITE ) {
UINT16_TO_STREAM (p, offset);
p_buf->len += 2;
}
size_now += len;
CHECK_SIZE();
if(payload_size < GATT_DEF_BLE_MTU_SIZE || payload_size > GATT_MAX_MTU_SIZE) {
GATT_TRACE_ERROR("invalid payload_size %d", payload_size);
ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_data, len);
}
/* backfill pair_len for Read By Type response */
if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) {
if (pair_len > UINT8_MAX) {
GATT_TRACE_ERROR("pair_len > UINT8_MAX");
osi_free(p_buf);
return NULL;
}
if (len > 0 && p_data != NULL) {
/* ensure data not exceed MTU size */
if (payload_size - p_buf->len < len) {
len = payload_size - p_buf->len;
/* update handle value pair length */
if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) {
*p_pair_len = (len + 2);
}
GATT_TRACE_WARNING("attribute value too long, to be truncated to %d", len);
}
ARRAY_TO_STREAM (p, p_data, len);
p_buf->len += len;
}
*p_pair_len = (UINT8)pair_len;
}
/* update buffer length */
p_buf->len = (UINT16)size_now;
#undef CHECK_SIZE
return p_buf;
}