fix(secure_boot): range-check ECDSA r,s in bootloader before ROM verify

This commit is contained in:
harshal.patil
2026-06-12 17:51:31 +05:30
parent 6d25d74aa6
commit c19a35990f
3 changed files with 109 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@@ -362,8 +362,7 @@ ets_efuse_secure_boot_fast_wake_enabled = 0x40000830;
ets_emsa_pss_verify = 0x40000834;
ets_rsa_pss_verify = 0x40000838;
_rom_ets_ecdsa_verify = 0x4000083c;
ets_secure_boot_verify_bootloader_with_keys = 0x40000840;
ets_secure_boot_verify_signature = 0x40000844;
_rom_ets_secure_boot_verify_signature = 0x40000844;
ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests = 0x40000848;
ets_secure_boot_revoke_public_key_digest = 0x4000084c;

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@@ -6,12 +6,15 @@
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "sdkconfig.h"
#include "esp_rom_caps.h"
#if ESP_ROM_ECDSA_VERIFY_PATCH
#include "soc/soc_caps.h"
#include "esp_fault_internal.h"
#include "hal/ecc_ll.h"
#include "rom/ecdsa.h"
#define VALID_MAGIC_OK 0x6A6A6A6AU
@@ -69,6 +72,19 @@ static bool ecdsa_scalars_in_range(const uint32_t *r, const uint32_t *s, const u
return true;
}
// TODO: IDF-15721
/*
* Runtime gate that decides whether the ROM ECDSA verification routines
* (ets_ecdsa_verify / ets_secure_boot_verify_signature) need the software patch
* in this file, or whether the ROM implementation is safe to call directly.
*
* When a future revision of one of these chips ships a ROM with these ECDSA
* verification issues fixed, add a ROM-version check here (e.g. compare the
* _rom_eco_version symbol against the first fixed ROM ECO version for that
* target) and return false for the fixed ROMs, so they skip the patch and jump
* straight to the _rom_ routine.
*/
extern int _rom_ets_ecdsa_verify(const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *sig,
ECDSA_CURVE curve_id, const uint8_t *image_digest,
uint8_t *verified_digest);
@@ -113,6 +129,9 @@ int ets_ecdsa_verify(const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *sig,
ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(ok && ret_status == VALID_MAGIC_OK);
ecc_ll_power_up();
ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(ecc_ll_mem_force_pd_is_clear());
int ret = _rom_ets_ecdsa_verify(key, sig, curve_id, image_digest, verified_digest);
if (ret == 1) {
@@ -125,4 +144,88 @@ int ets_ecdsa_verify(const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *sig,
return 0;
}
#if CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED || CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_NO_SECURE_BOOT
#include "rom/secure_boot.h"
#if CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_V2_SCHEME
static bool esp_rom_ecdsa_scalars_in_range(const uint8_t *r_le, const uint8_t *s_le, size_t component_len)
{
const uint32_t *n;
int words;
switch (component_len) {
case 24: n = ecdsa_n_p192; words = 6; break;
case 32: n = ecdsa_n_p256; words = 8; break;
#if SOC_ECDSA_SUPPORT_CURVE_P384
case 48: n = ecdsa_n_p384; words = 12; break;
#endif
default: return false;
}
uint32_t r[12] = { 0 };
uint32_t s[12] = { 0 };
memcpy(r, r_le, component_len);
memcpy(s, s_le, component_len);
uint32_t result = VALID_MAGIC_FAIL;
bool ok = ecdsa_scalars_in_range(r, s, n, words, &result);
if (!ok || result != VALID_MAGIC_OK) {
return false;
}
ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(ok && result == VALID_MAGIC_OK);
return true;
}
static bool esp_rom_ecdsa_sig_block_in_range(const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *block)
{
if (block->magic_byte != ETS_SECURE_BOOT_V2_SIGNATURE_MAGIC) {
return true;
}
size_t component_len;
switch (block->ecdsa.key.curve_id) {
case ECDSA_CURVE_P256: component_len = 32; break;
#if SOC_ECDSA_SUPPORT_CURVE_P384
case ECDSA_CURVE_P384: component_len = 48; break;
#endif
default: return false;
}
return esp_rom_ecdsa_scalars_in_range(&block->ecdsa.signature[0],
&block->ecdsa.signature[component_len],
component_len);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_V2_SCHEME */
extern ets_secure_boot_status_t _rom_ets_secure_boot_verify_signature(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig,
const uint8_t *image_digest,
const ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t *trusted_keys,
uint8_t *verified_digest);
ets_secure_boot_status_t ets_secure_boot_verify_signature(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig,
const uint8_t *image_digest,
const ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t *trusted_keys,
uint8_t *verified_digest)
{
#if CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_V2_SCHEME
volatile ets_secure_boot_status_t range_status = SB_FAILED;
unsigned blocks_in_range = 0;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS; i++) {
if (esp_rom_ecdsa_sig_block_in_range(&sig->block[i])) {
blocks_in_range++;
}
}
if (blocks_in_range == SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS) {
range_status = SB_SUCCESS;
}
if (range_status != SB_SUCCESS) {
return SB_FAILED;
}
ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(range_status == SB_SUCCESS);
ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(blocks_in_range == SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS);
ecc_ll_power_up();
ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(ecc_ll_mem_force_pd_is_clear());
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_V2_SCHEME */
return _rom_ets_secure_boot_verify_signature(sig, image_digest, trusted_keys, verified_digest);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED || CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_NO_SECURE_BOOT */
#endif /* ESP_ROM_ECDSA_VERIFY_PATCH */

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@@ -58,6 +58,11 @@ static inline void ecc_ll_power_up(void)
ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(REG_GET_BIT(PCR_ECC_PD_CTRL_REG, PCR_ECC_MEM_FORCE_PD) == 0);
}
static inline bool ecc_ll_mem_force_pd_is_clear(void)
{
return REG_GET_BIT(PCR_ECC_PD_CTRL_REG, PCR_ECC_MEM_FORCE_PD) == 0;
}
static inline void ecc_ll_power_down(void)
{
REG_CLR_BIT(PCR_ECC_PD_CTRL_REG, PCR_ECC_MEM_FORCE_PU);