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fix(esp_srp): reject SRP client public key when A mod N is zero

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This commit is contained in:
Ashish Sharma
2026-04-08 18:15:00 +08:00
parent 1edd95fa44
commit 39b56cbdba
7 changed files with 571 additions and 8 deletions
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25
components/protocomm/src/crypto/srp6a/esp_srp.c
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@@ -461,6 +461,10 @@ cleanup:
esp_err_t esp_srp_set_salt_verifier(esp_srp_handle_t *hd, const char *salt, int salt_len,
const char *verifier, int verifier_len)
{
if (!hd || !salt || salt_len <= 0 || !verifier || verifier_len <= 0) {
return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
}
hd->bytes_s = malloc(salt_len);
if (!hd->bytes_s) {
goto error;
@@ -520,6 +524,27 @@ esp_err_t esp_srp_get_session_key(esp_srp_handle_t *hd, char *bytes_A, int len_A
if (! hd->A) {
goto error;
}
/* RFC 5054 Section 2.5.4: abort if A % N == 0
* This prevents an attacker from sending A=0 (or A=k*N) which would
* force the shared secret S to zero, yielding a deterministic session
* key regardless of the password. */
esp_mpi_t *a_mod_n = esp_mpi_new();
if (!a_mod_n) {
goto error;
}
if (esp_mpi_a_mod_b(a_mod_n, hd->A, hd->n) != 0) {
esp_mpi_free(a_mod_n);
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed to compute A mod N");
goto error;
}
int a_mod_n_is_zero = (esp_mpi_cmp_int(a_mod_n, 0) == 0);
esp_mpi_free(a_mod_n);
if (a_mod_n_is_zero) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Rejected client public key: A mod N == 0 (RFC 5054 Section 2.5.4)");
goto error;
}
u = calculate_u(hd, bytes_A, len_A);
if (! u) {
goto error;

12
components/protocomm/src/crypto/srp6a/esp_srp_mpi.c
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2022 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2022-2026 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
@@ -128,6 +128,16 @@ int esp_mpi_a_mul_b_mod_c(esp_mpi_t *result, esp_mpi_t *a, esp_mpi_t *b, esp_mpi
return res;
}
int esp_mpi_a_mod_b(esp_mpi_t *result, const esp_mpi_t *a, const esp_mpi_t *b)
{
return mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(result, a, b);
}
int esp_mpi_cmp_int(const esp_mpi_t *a, int value)
{
return mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(a, value);
}
int esp_mpi_a_add_b_mod_c(esp_mpi_t *result, esp_mpi_t *a, esp_mpi_t *b, esp_mpi_t *c, esp_mpi_ctx_t *ctx)
{
(void) ctx;

4
components/protocomm/src/crypto/srp6a/esp_srp_mpi.h
View File

@@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ int esp_mpi_a_mul_b_mod_c(esp_mpi_t *result, esp_mpi_t *a, esp_mpi_t *b, esp_mpi
int esp_mpi_a_add_b_mod_c(esp_mpi_t *result, esp_mpi_t *a, esp_mpi_t *b, esp_mpi_t *c, esp_mpi_ctx_t *ctx);
int esp_mpi_a_mod_b(esp_mpi_t *result, const esp_mpi_t *a, const esp_mpi_t *b);
int esp_mpi_cmp_int(const esp_mpi_t *a, int value);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

3
components/protocomm/test_apps/main/CMakeLists.txt
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@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
idf_component_register(SRC_DIRS "."
PRIV_INCLUDE_DIRS "."
PRIV_REQUIRES cmock mbedtls protocomm protobuf-c test_utils unity)
PRIV_REQUIRES cmock mbedtls nvs_flash protocomm protobuf-c test_utils unity
WHOLE_ARCHIVE)

108
components/protocomm/test_apps/main/app_main.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2025-2026 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense OR CC0-1.0
*/
#include <string.h>
#include "freertos/FreeRTOS.h"
#include "freertos/task.h"
#include "unity.h"
#include "test_utils.h"
#include "memory_checks.h"
#include "esp_newlib.h"
#include "nvs_flash.h"
#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
#if SOC_SHA_SUPPORT_PARALLEL_ENG
#include "sha/sha_parallel_engine.h"
#else
#include "sha/sha_block.h"
#endif
#include "bignum_impl.h"
/* setUp runs before every test */
void setUp(void)
{
#if CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_SHA
// Execute esp_sha operation to allocate internal SHA semaphore (in case of ESP32)
// and initial DMA setup memory which is considered as leaked otherwise
const uint8_t input_buffer[64] = {0};
uint8_t output_buffer[64];
#if SOC_SHA_SUPPORT_SHA1
esp_sha(SHA1, input_buffer, sizeof(input_buffer), output_buffer);
#endif // SOC_SHA_SUPPORT_SHA1
#if SOC_SHA_SUPPORT_SHA256
esp_sha(SHA2_256, input_buffer, sizeof(input_buffer), output_buffer);
#endif // SOC_SHA_SUPPORT_SHA256
#if SOC_SHA_SUPPORT_SHA512
esp_sha(SHA2_512, input_buffer, sizeof(input_buffer), output_buffer);
#endif // SOC_SHA_SUPPORT_SHA512
#endif // CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_SHA
#if defined(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_MPI)
esp_mpi_enable_hardware_hw_op();
esp_mpi_disable_hardware_hw_op();
#endif // CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_MPI
#if SOC_AES_SUPPORTED
// Execute mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc operation to allocate AES interrupt
// allocation memory which is considered as leak otherwise
{
mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx;
const uint8_t aes_key[16] = {0};
uint8_t iv[16] = {0};
const uint8_t plaintext[16] = {0};
uint8_t ciphertext[16];
mbedtls_aes_init(&aes_ctx);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes_ctx, aes_key, 128));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
sizeof(plaintext), iv, plaintext, ciphertext));
const uint8_t plaintext_long[256] = {0};
uint8_t ciphertext_long[256];
memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
sizeof(plaintext_long), iv, plaintext_long, ciphertext_long));
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes_ctx);
}
#endif // SOC_AES_SUPPORTED
test_utils_record_free_mem();
TEST_ESP_OK(test_utils_set_leak_level(50, ESP_LEAK_TYPE_CRITICAL, ESP_COMP_LEAK_GENERAL));
TEST_ESP_OK(test_utils_set_leak_level(50, ESP_LEAK_TYPE_WARNING, ESP_COMP_LEAK_GENERAL));
}
/* tearDown runs after every test */
void tearDown(void)
{
/* some FreeRTOS stuff is cleaned up by idle task */
vTaskDelay(5);
/* clean up some of the newlib's lazy allocations */
esp_reent_cleanup();
/* check if unit test has caused heap corruption in any heap */
TEST_ASSERT_MESSAGE( heap_caps_check_integrity(MALLOC_CAP_INVALID, true), "The test has corrupted the heap");
test_utils_finish_and_evaluate_leaks(test_utils_get_leak_level(ESP_LEAK_TYPE_WARNING, ESP_COMP_LEAK_ALL),
test_utils_get_leak_level(ESP_LEAK_TYPE_CRITICAL, ESP_COMP_LEAK_ALL));
}
static void test_task(void *pvParameters)
{
vTaskDelay(2); /* Delay a bit to let the main task be deleted */
unity_run_menu();
}
void app_main(void)
{
/* Initialize NVS */
esp_err_t ret = nvs_flash_init();
if (ret == ESP_ERR_NVS_NO_FREE_PAGES || ret == ESP_ERR_NVS_NEW_VERSION_FOUND) {
ESP_ERROR_CHECK(nvs_flash_erase());
ret = nvs_flash_init();
}
ESP_ERROR_CHECK(ret);
xTaskCreatePinnedToCore(test_task, "testTask", CONFIG_UNITY_FREERTOS_STACK_SIZE, NULL, CONFIG_UNITY_FREERTOS_PRIORITY, NULL, CONFIG_UNITY_FREERTOS_CPU);
}

7
components/protocomm/test_apps/main/test_protocomm.c
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2018-2023 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2018-2026 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
@@ -1190,8 +1190,3 @@ TEST_CASE("security 1 weak session test", "[PROTOCOMM]")
{
TEST_ASSERT(test_security1_weak_session() == ESP_OK);
}
void app_main(void)
{
unity_run_menu();
}

420
components/protocomm/test_apps/main/test_srp.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2025-2026 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense OR CC0-1.0
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <unity.h>
#include "esp_srp.h"
#include "esp_log.h"
#include "test_utils.h"
#include "esp_rom_crc.h"
static const char *TAG = "srp_test";
// Example username and password
static const char *username = "wifiprov";
static const char *password = "abcd1234";
static const char sec2_salt[] = {
0x03, 0x6e, 0xe0, 0xc7, 0xbc, 0xb9, 0xed, 0xa8, 0x4c, 0x9e, 0xac, 0x97, 0xd9, 0x3d, 0xec, 0xf4
};
static const char sec2_verifier[] = {
0x7c, 0x7c, 0x85, 0x47, 0x65, 0x08, 0x94, 0x6d, 0xd6, 0x36, 0xaf, 0x37, 0xd7, 0xe8, 0x91, 0x43,
0x78, 0xcf, 0xfd, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x59, 0xd2, 0xf8, 0x39, 0x08, 0x12, 0x72, 0x38, 0xde, 0x9e, 0x24,
0xa4, 0x70, 0x26, 0x1c, 0xdf, 0xa9, 0x03, 0xc2, 0xb2, 0x70, 0xe7, 0xb1, 0x32, 0x24, 0xda, 0x11,
0x1d, 0x97, 0x18, 0xdc, 0x60, 0x72, 0x08, 0xcc, 0x9a, 0xc9, 0x0c, 0x48, 0x27, 0xe2, 0xae, 0x89,
0xaa, 0x16, 0x25, 0xb8, 0x04, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0x9b, 0x3a, 0x8f, 0x37, 0xf6, 0xe4, 0x3a, 0x71, 0x2e,
0xe1, 0x27, 0x86, 0x6e, 0xad, 0xce, 0x28, 0xff, 0x54, 0x46, 0x60, 0x1f, 0xb9, 0x96, 0x87, 0xdc,
0x57, 0x40, 0xa7, 0xd4, 0x6c, 0xc9, 0x77, 0x54, 0xdc, 0x16, 0x82, 0xf0, 0xed, 0x35, 0x6a, 0xc4,
0x70, 0xad, 0x3d, 0x90, 0xb5, 0x81, 0x94, 0x70, 0xd7, 0xbc, 0x65, 0xb2, 0xd5, 0x18, 0xe0, 0x2e,
0xc3, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0x68, 0xdd, 0x64, 0x7b, 0xb8, 0xb7, 0x3c, 0x9c, 0xfc, 0x00, 0xd8, 0x71, 0x7e,
0xb7, 0x9a, 0x7c, 0xb1, 0xb7, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x34, 0x29, 0x32, 0x43, 0x3e, 0x00, 0x99, 0xe9,
0x82, 0x94, 0xe3, 0xd8, 0x2a, 0xb0, 0x96, 0x29, 0xb7, 0xdf, 0x0e, 0x5f, 0x08, 0x33, 0x40, 0x76,
0x52, 0x91, 0x32, 0x00, 0x9f, 0x97, 0x2c, 0x89, 0x6c, 0x39, 0x1e, 0xc8, 0x28, 0x05, 0x44, 0x17,
0x3f, 0x68, 0x02, 0x8a, 0x9f, 0x44, 0x61, 0xd1, 0xf5, 0xa1, 0x7e, 0x5a, 0x70, 0xd2, 0xc7, 0x23,
0x81, 0xcb, 0x38, 0x68, 0xe4, 0x2c, 0x20, 0xbc, 0x40, 0x57, 0x76, 0x17, 0xbd, 0x08, 0xb8, 0x96,
0xbc, 0x26, 0xeb, 0x32, 0x46, 0x69, 0x35, 0x05, 0x8c, 0x15, 0x70, 0xd9, 0x1b, 0xe9, 0xbe, 0xcc,
0xa9, 0x38, 0xa6, 0x67, 0xf0, 0xad, 0x50, 0x13, 0x19, 0x72, 0x64, 0xbf, 0x52, 0xc2, 0x34, 0xe2,
0x1b, 0x11, 0x79, 0x74, 0x72, 0xbd, 0x34, 0x5b, 0xb1, 0xe2, 0xfd, 0x66, 0x73, 0xfe, 0x71, 0x64,
0x74, 0xd0, 0x4e, 0xbc, 0x51, 0x24, 0x19, 0x40, 0x87, 0x0e, 0x92, 0x40, 0xe6, 0x21, 0xe7, 0x2d,
0x4e, 0x37, 0x76, 0x2f, 0x2e, 0xe2, 0x68, 0xc7, 0x89, 0xe8, 0x32, 0x13, 0x42, 0x06, 0x84, 0x84,
0x53, 0x4a, 0xb3, 0x0c, 0x1b, 0x4c, 0x8d, 0x1c, 0x51, 0x97, 0x19, 0xab, 0xae, 0x77, 0xff, 0xdb,
0xec, 0xf0, 0x10, 0x95, 0x34, 0x33, 0x6b, 0xcb, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x0f, 0xb9, 0xd8, 0x5f, 0xb8, 0xa0,
0xb8, 0x55, 0x53, 0x3e, 0x70, 0xf7, 0x18, 0xf5, 0xce, 0x7b, 0x4e, 0xbf, 0x27, 0xce, 0xce, 0xa8,
0xb3, 0xbe, 0x40, 0xc5, 0xc5, 0x32, 0x29, 0x3e, 0x71, 0x64, 0x9e, 0xde, 0x8c, 0xf6, 0x75, 0xa1,
0xe6, 0xf6, 0x53, 0xc8, 0x31, 0xa8, 0x78, 0xde, 0x50, 0x40, 0xf7, 0x62, 0xde, 0x36, 0xb2, 0xba
};
static void test_srp_init_and_free(void) {
esp_srp_handle_t *handle = esp_srp_init(ESP_NG_3072);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(handle);
esp_srp_free(handle);
}
static void test_srp_gen_salt_verifier(void) {
char *bytes_salt = NULL;
char *verifier = NULL;
int verifier_len = 0;
esp_err_t err = esp_srp_gen_salt_verifier(username, strlen(username),
password, strlen(password),
&bytes_salt, 16, &verifier, &verifier_len);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(bytes_salt);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(verifier);
// Verify salt length is as requested
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(16, 16);
// Verify verifier length is correct for 3072-bit SRP
TEST_ASSERT_GREATER_THAN(0, verifier_len);
// Log the generated salt and verifier for debugging
ESP_LOG_BUFFER_HEXDUMP("Generated Salt", bytes_salt, 16, ESP_LOG_INFO);
ESP_LOG_BUFFER_HEXDUMP("Generated Verifier", verifier, verifier_len, ESP_LOG_INFO);
free(bytes_salt);
free(verifier);
}
static void test_srp_set_salt_verifier(void) {
esp_srp_handle_t *handle = esp_srp_init(ESP_NG_3072);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(handle);
esp_err_t err = esp_srp_set_salt_verifier(handle, sec2_salt, sizeof(sec2_salt),
sec2_verifier, sizeof(sec2_verifier));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
char *bytes_B = NULL;
int len_B = 0;
err = esp_srp_srv_pubkey_from_salt_verifier(handle, &bytes_B, &len_B);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
// Verify B length is correct for 3072-bit SRP (384 bytes)
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(384, len_B);
esp_srp_free(handle);
}
static void test_srp_srv_pubkey(void) {
esp_srp_handle_t *handle = esp_srp_init(ESP_NG_3072);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(handle);
char *bytes_B = NULL;
int len_B = 0;
char *bytes_salt = NULL;
esp_err_t err = esp_srp_srv_pubkey(handle, username, strlen(username),
password, strlen(password), 16,
&bytes_B, &len_B, &bytes_salt);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(bytes_B);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(bytes_salt);
// Verify salt and B length
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(16, 16);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(384, len_B);
// Log for debugging
ESP_LOG_BUFFER_HEXDUMP("Generated Salt", bytes_salt, 16, ESP_LOG_INFO);
ESP_LOG_BUFFER_HEXDUMP("Generated Server Public Key B", bytes_B, len_B, ESP_LOG_INFO);
esp_srp_free(handle);
}
static void test_srp_get_session_key(void) {
esp_srp_handle_t *handle = esp_srp_init(ESP_NG_3072);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(handle);
char *bytes_B = NULL;
int len_B = 0;
char *bytes_salt = NULL;
esp_err_t err = esp_srp_srv_pubkey(handle, username, strlen(username),
password, strlen(password), 16,
&bytes_B, &len_B, &bytes_salt);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
// In a real scenario, bytes_A would be from client
// For testing purposes, we use bytes_B as a convenient value (server talks to itself)
char *bytes_key = NULL;
uint16_t len_key = 0;
err = esp_srp_get_session_key(handle, bytes_B, len_B, &bytes_key, &len_key);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(bytes_key);
// Verify session key length (SHA512 hash)
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(64, len_key);
// Log session key for debugging
ESP_LOG_BUFFER_HEXDUMP("Session Key", bytes_key, len_key, ESP_LOG_INFO);
esp_srp_free(handle);
}
static void test_srp_exchange_proofs(void) {
esp_srp_handle_t *handle = esp_srp_init(ESP_NG_3072);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(handle);
char *bytes_B = NULL;
int len_B = 0;
char *bytes_salt = NULL;
esp_err_t err = esp_srp_srv_pubkey(handle, username, strlen(username),
password, strlen(password), 16,
&bytes_B, &len_B, &bytes_salt);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
char *bytes_key = NULL;
uint16_t len_key = 0;
err = esp_srp_get_session_key(handle, bytes_B, len_B, &bytes_key, &len_key);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
// In a real environment, bytes_user_proof would be calculated by the client
// For our test, we'll generate zeros - this simulates an authentication failure scenario
char bytes_user_proof[64] = {0}; // Example proof
char bytes_host_proof[64] = {0};
// This should fail since user proof is zeros and doesn't match expected value
err = esp_srp_exchange_proofs(handle, (char *)username, strlen(username),
bytes_user_proof, bytes_host_proof);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_FAIL, err);
esp_srp_free(handle);
}
// Add test for error handling with invalid parameters
static void test_srp_error_handling(void) {
esp_srp_handle_t *handle = esp_srp_init(ESP_NG_3072);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(handle);
// Test with NULL salt
esp_err_t err = esp_srp_set_salt_verifier(handle, NULL, sizeof(sec2_salt),
sec2_verifier, sizeof(sec2_verifier));
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
// Test with zero salt length
err = esp_srp_set_salt_verifier(handle, sec2_salt, 0,
sec2_verifier, sizeof(sec2_verifier));
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
// Test with NULL verifier
err = esp_srp_set_salt_verifier(handle, sec2_salt, sizeof(sec2_salt),
NULL, sizeof(sec2_verifier));
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
// Test with zero verifier length
err = esp_srp_set_salt_verifier(handle, sec2_salt, sizeof(sec2_salt),
sec2_verifier, 0);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
esp_srp_free(handle);
}
// Test verifier calculation consistency
static void test_srp_verifier_consistency(void) {
char *bytes_salt1 = NULL;
char *verifier1 = NULL;
int verifier_len1 = 0;
// Generate first salt/verifier pair
esp_err_t err = esp_srp_gen_salt_verifier(username, strlen(username),
password, strlen(password),
&bytes_salt1, 16, &verifier1, &verifier_len1);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
// Generate second salt/verifier pair
char *bytes_salt2 = NULL;
char *verifier2 = NULL;
int verifier_len2 = 0;
err = esp_srp_gen_salt_verifier(username, strlen(username),
password, strlen(password),
&bytes_salt2, 16, &verifier2, &verifier_len2);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
// Salts should be different (randomly generated)
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(0, memcmp(bytes_salt1, bytes_salt2, 16));
// Verifiers should also be different since they depend on the salt
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(0, memcmp(verifier1, verifier2, verifier_len1));
free(bytes_salt1);
free(verifier1);
free(bytes_salt2);
free(verifier2);
}
static void test_srp_pubkey_randomness(void) {
// Use two separate handles to avoid leaking internal state
// (calling srv_pubkey twice on the same handle overwrites hd->b, hd->B, hd->bytes_B)
esp_srp_handle_t *handle1 = esp_srp_init(ESP_NG_3072);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(handle1);
esp_err_t err = esp_srp_set_salt_verifier(handle1, sec2_salt, sizeof(sec2_salt),
sec2_verifier, sizeof(sec2_verifier));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
char *bytes_B1 = NULL;
int len_B1 = 0;
err = esp_srp_srv_pubkey_from_salt_verifier(handle1, &bytes_B1, &len_B1);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(bytes_B1);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(384, len_B1);
// Copy B1 before freeing handle1 (bytes_B1 is owned by handle1)
char B1_copy[384];
memcpy(B1_copy, bytes_B1, len_B1);
esp_srp_free(handle1);
esp_srp_handle_t *handle2 = esp_srp_init(ESP_NG_3072);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(handle2);
err = esp_srp_set_salt_verifier(handle2, sec2_salt, sizeof(sec2_salt),
sec2_verifier, sizeof(sec2_verifier));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
char *bytes_B2 = NULL;
int len_B2 = 0;
err = esp_srp_srv_pubkey_from_salt_verifier(handle2, &bytes_B2, &len_B2);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(bytes_B2);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(384, len_B2);
// Keys should be different due to random b generation
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(0, memcmp(B1_copy, bytes_B2, len_B1));
uint32_t crc1 = esp_rom_crc32_le(0, (uint8_t*)B1_copy, len_B1);
uint32_t crc2 = esp_rom_crc32_le(0, (uint8_t*)bytes_B2, len_B2);
ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Public key CRCs: %" PRIu32 ", %" PRIu32 " (should be different)", crc1, crc2);
esp_srp_free(handle2);
}
TEST_CASE("SRP init and free test", "[SRP]")
{
test_srp_init_and_free();
}
TEST_CASE("SRP generate salt and verifier test", "[SRP]")
{
test_srp_gen_salt_verifier();
}
TEST_CASE("SRP set salt and verifier test", "[SRP]")
{
test_srp_set_salt_verifier();
}
TEST_CASE("SRP server public key test", "[SRP]")
{
test_srp_srv_pubkey();
}
TEST_CASE("SRP get session key test", "[SRP]")
{
test_srp_get_session_key();
}
TEST_CASE("SRP exchange proofs test", "[SRP]")
{
test_srp_exchange_proofs();
}
TEST_CASE("SRP error handling test", "[SRP]")
{
test_srp_error_handling();
}
TEST_CASE("SRP verifier consistency test", "[SRP]")
{
test_srp_verifier_consistency();
}
TEST_CASE("SRP public key randomness test", "[SRP]")
{
test_srp_pubkey_randomness();
}
/* RFC 5054 Section 2.5.4: server MUST abort if A % N == 0
* Helper to set up a server-side SRP handle ready for session key derivation */
static esp_srp_handle_t *setup_srp_server(void)
{
esp_srp_handle_t *handle = esp_srp_init(ESP_NG_3072);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(handle);
char *bytes_B = NULL;
int len_B = 0;
char *bytes_salt = NULL;
esp_err_t err = esp_srp_srv_pubkey(handle, username, strlen(username),
password, strlen(password), 16,
&bytes_B, &len_B, &bytes_salt);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_OK, err);
return handle;
}
static void test_srp_reject_A_zero(void)
{
esp_srp_handle_t *handle = setup_srp_server();
/* A = 0: attacker sends all-zero public key */
char zero_A[384] = {0};
char *bytes_key = NULL;
uint16_t len_key = 0;
esp_err_t err = esp_srp_get_session_key(handle, zero_A, sizeof(zero_A),
&bytes_key, &len_key);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_FAIL, err);
TEST_ASSERT_NULL(bytes_key);
esp_srp_free(handle);
}
/* SRP 3072-bit prime N (same as N_3072 in esp_srp.c) */
static const char test_N_3072[] = {
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6,
0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05,
0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB,
0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04,
0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B,
0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F,
0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18,
0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10,
0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33,
0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64, 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A,
0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7,
0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D,
0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B, 0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64,
0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64, 0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C,
0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C, 0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2,
0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31, 0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E,
0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x3A, 0xD2, 0xCA, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
static void test_srp_reject_A_equal_N(void)
{
esp_srp_handle_t *handle = setup_srp_server();
/* A = N: attacker sends the prime itself (N mod N == 0) */
char *bytes_key = NULL;
uint16_t len_key = 0;
esp_err_t err = esp_srp_get_session_key(handle, (char *)test_N_3072,
sizeof(test_N_3072),
&bytes_key, &len_key);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(ESP_FAIL, err);
TEST_ASSERT_NULL(bytes_key);
esp_srp_free(handle);
}
TEST_CASE("SRP reject A=0 (RFC 5054 2.5.4)", "[SRP]")
{
test_srp_reject_A_zero();
}
TEST_CASE("SRP reject A=N (RFC 5054 2.5.4)", "[SRP]")
{
test_srp_reject_A_equal_N();
}