This is a preparation for expiring authentication tokens.
If we make authentication token expire,
we need to generate new authentication tokens each time
QR code screen is opened in the UI,
so authentication token is fresh.
We however don't want to completely invalidate
old authentication codes at the same time,
e.g. they should still be valid for joining groups,
just not result in a verification on the inviter side.
Since a group now can have a lot of authentication tokens,
it is easy to lose track of them
without any way to remove them
as they are not displayed anywhere in the UI.
As a solution, we now remove all
tokens corresponding to a group ID
when one token is withdrawn,
or all non-group tokens
when a single non-group token is withdrawn.
"Reset QR code" option already present
in the UI which works by resetting
current QR code will work without any UI changes,
but will now result in invalidation
of all previously created QR codes and invite links.
- sync declined calls from callee to caller, as usual in all larger
messengers
- introduce the call states "Missed call", "Declined call" and
"Cancelled all" ("Ended call" is gone)
- allow calling end_call()/accept_call() for already ended/accepted
calls, in practise, handling all cornercases is tricky in UI - and the
state needs anyways to be tracked.
- track and show the call duration
the duration calculation depends on local time, but it is displayed only
coarse and is not needed for any state. this can be improved as needed,
timestamps of the corresponding messages are probably better at some
point. or ending device sends its view of the time around. but for the
first throw, it seems good enough
if we finally want that set of states, it can be exposed to a json-info
in a subsequent call, so that the UI can render it more nicely. fallback
strings as follows will stay for now to make adaption in other UI easy,
and for debugging:
<img width="320" alt="IMG_0154"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/09a89bfb-66f4-4184-b05c-e8040b96cf44"
/>
successor of https://github.com/chatmail/core/pull/6650
this PR uses the initial "call messages" (that has a separate viewtype
since #7174) to show all call status.
this is what most other messengers are doing as well. additional "info
messages" after a call are no longer needed.
on the wire, as we cannot pickpack on visible info messages, we use
hidden messages, similar to eg. webxdc status updates.
in future PR, it is planned to allow getting call state as a json, so
that UI can render nicely. it is then decided if we want to translate
the strings in the core.
<img width="320" alt="IMG_0150"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/41ee3fa3-8be4-42c3-8dd9-d20f49881650"
/>
successor of https://github.com/chatmail/core/pull/6650
a dedicated viewtype allows the UI to show a more advanced UI, but even
when using the defaults,
it has the advantage that incoming/outgoing and the date are directly
visible.
successor of https://github.com/chatmail/core/pull/6650
The setting is already removed from the UIs,
but users who had it disabled previously have
no way to enable it. After this change
encryption is effectively always preferred.
UIs now display green checkmark in a profile
if the contact is verified.
Chats with key-contacts cannot become unprotected,
so there is no need to check 1:1 chat.
3 months were proven to be too short some years ago, after that issue,
we went far up to 12 months.
however, 12 months were considered too long after recent discussions :)
so, 6 months seems to be a good compromise.
the warning is still repeated every months and the text is unchanged.
advantage is still that this approach does not require network or
opt-in, and catches really all lazy updaters with few effort, cmp
https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-desktop/issues/5422
Now that the previous commit avoids creating incorrect reverse verification chains, we can do
this. Sure, existing users' dbs aready have verification chains ending with "unknown" roots, but at
least for new users updating `verifier_id` to a known verifier makes sense.
If this happens, mark the contact as verified by an unknown contact instead. This avoids introducing
incorrect reverse chains: if the verifier itself has an unknown verifier, it may be `contact_id`
actually (directly or indirectly) on the other device (which is needed for getting "verified by
unknown contact" in the first place).
Also verify not yet verified contacts w/o setting a verifier for them (in the db it's stored as
`verifier_id=id` though) because we don't know who verified them for another device.
