If we receive a message from non-verified contact
in a non-protected chat with a Chat-Verified header,
there is no need to upgrade the chat
to verified and display an error.
If it was an attack, an attacker could
just not send the Chat-Verified header.
Most of the time, however, it is just
message reordering.
When an invalid webxdc is set as draft, json-rpc's `get_draft` fails,
because `get_webxdc_info` which it calls, fails because the zip reader
can not read a non-zip file. With this change, any error occurring in
`get_webxdc_info` is ignored and the None-variant is returned instead. I
also added a test, that setting invalid xdcs is draft is fine core-wise
and checked that the input field stays responsive when a fake.xdc
produced like in #6826 is added to draft
close#6826
closes#6873 , see there for reasoning.
tested that on iOS already, works like a charm - and was much easier
than expected as @iequidoo already updated `timestamp_rcvd` on status
updates in https://github.com/chatmail/core/pull/5388
~~a test is missing, ordering is not tested at all, will check if that
is doable reasonably easy~~ EDIT: added a test
Fix https://github.com/chatmail/core/issues/6621; I also tested on
Android that the webxdc self-addr actually stays the same when staging a
draft and then sending.
Follow-up to https://github.com/chatmail/core/pull/6704; #6704 made sure
that the webxdc self-addr doesn't change when creating a message and
then sending it. This PR here makes sure that the rfc724_mid (which is
needed to compute the self-addr) is saved when setting a draft, so that
it's loaded properly after a call to get_draft().
cc @adbenitez @r10s @Septias
FuturesUnordered is likely buggy and iroh previously switched
to JoinSet in <https://github.com/n0-computer/iroh/pull/1647>.
We also have reports with logs of background_fetch getting
stuck so apparently task cancellation after timeout does not work
as intended with FuturesUnordered.
Set `rfc724_mid` in `Message::new()`, `Message::new_text()`, and
`Message::default()` instead of when sending the message. This way the
rfc724 mid can be read in the draft stage which makes it more consistent
for bots. Tests had to be adjusted to create multiple messages to get
unique mid, otherwise core would not send the messages out.
this PR scaled avatars using the Triangle-filter,
resulting in often better image quality and smaller files (5%).
it comes at high costs,
therefore, we do not do that unconditionally for each image sent, see
comment in the code
and https://github.com/chatmail/core/pull/6815
---------
Co-authored-by: iequidoo <117991069+iequidoo@users.noreply.github.com>
Revert the biggest part of https://github.com/chatmail/core/pull/6722/
in order to fix#6816. Reopens
https://github.com/chatmail/core/issues/6706.
Rationale for reverting instead of fixing is that it's not trivial to
implement "if the chat is encrypted, can_send() returns true": When
sending a message, in order to check whether to encrypt, we load all
peerstates and check whether all of them can be encrypted to
(`should_encrypt()`). We could do this in `can_send()`, but this would
make it quite slow for groups. With multi-transport, the ways of
checking whether to encrypt will be different, so in order not to do
unnecessary work now, this PR just revert parts of
[https://github.com/chatmail/core/pull/6722/](https://github.com/chatmail/core/pull/6817#),
so that we can make things work nicely when multi-transport is merged.
As a quick mitigation, we could increase the timeout from 15s to
something like 1 minute or 1 day: Long enough that usually securejoin
will finish before, but short enough that it's possible to send to old
chats that had a failed securejoin long in the past.
Move all `configured_*` parameters into a new SQL table `transports`.
All `configured_*` parameters are deprecated; the only exception is
`configured_addr`, which is used to store the address of the primary
transport. Currently, there can only ever be one primary transport (i.e.
the `transports` table only ever has one row); this PR is not supposed
to change DC's behavior in any meaningful way.
This is a preparation for mt.
---------
Co-authored-by: l <link2xt@testrun.org>
In the `test` cfg, introduce `MimeMessage::headers_removed` hash set and `header_exists()` function
returning whether the header exists in any part of the parsed message. `get_header()` shouldn't be
used in tests for checking absense of headers because it returns `None` for removed ("ignored")
headers.
This change simplifies
updating the gossip timestamps
when we receive a message
because we only need to know
the keys received in Autocrypt-Gossip
header and which chat the message is
assigned to.
We no longer need to iterate
over the member list.
This is a preparation
for PGP contacts
and member lists that contain
key fingerprints rather than
email addresses.
This change also removes encryption preference
from Autocrypt-Gossip header.
It SHOULD NOT be gossiped
according to the Autocrypt specification
and we ignore encryption preference anyway
since 1.157.0.
test_gossip_optimization is removed
because it relied on a per-chat gossip_timestamp.
Broadcast lists are encrypted since 1.159.0,
but Autocrypt-Gossip was not disabled.
As Autocrypt-Gossip contains the email address
and the key of the recipient, it should
not be sent to broadcast lists.
this PR moves now advanced/unsupported ASM strings to core, removing
work from translations, esp. as another hint is added which would
require retranslations. it is better to have that just in english, it is
a nerd feature anyways.
moverover, this PR removes special rendering of ASM in the summary,
which might be confusion, but mainly it is now unneeded, dead code
i'll do another android PR that will point to "Add Second Device"
already on ASM generation EDIT: done at
https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-android/pull/3726
targets https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-desktop/issues/4946
it was all the time questionable if not encrypting broadcast lists
rules the issue that recipients may know each other cryptographically.
however, meanwhile with chatmail, unncrypted broadcasts are no longer possible,
and we actively broke workflows eg. from this teacher:
https://support.delta.chat/t/broadcast-funktioniert-nach-update-nicht-meht/3694
this basically reverts commit
7e5907daf2
which was that time added last-minute and without lots discussions :)
let the students get their homework again :)
Primary key is usually used for certification.
It is possible to make a certification- and encryption-
capable key with RSA, but RFC 9580 says
that implementations SHOULD NOT generate RSA keys.
The test works most of the time, but essentially tests that splitting
the public key from a private key
generates the same result.
However, it fails if two signatures are generated
at different seconds.
Closes#6762
fetch_existing option is not enabled in existing clients
and does not work with encrypted messages
without importing the key into a newely created account.
next android/desktop/ios releases won't have the "Show Classic Emails"
option for chatmail.
to avoid issues with user that have set sth else than "All", we ignore
the option alltogether for chatmail profiles.
ftr, i do not expect ppl having that option changed for chatmail much,
it does not make much sense. so this PR is mainly to save our limited
support resources :) (usecase: "look, i am using chatmail to sign up at
SERVICE, but for security reasons i set show=all only when i reset my
password" :)
one could also do that in a migration, however, (a) migrations always
come with some risk, even the easiest ones, and (b) the show_emails
option is subject to change or disappear anyways, subsequent changes are
easier in code than in additional or removed migrations, and (c) it is
really only one line, that does not add much with complexity
