refactor(securejoin): do not check for self address in forwarding protection

If our key is gossiped, the message is intended for us.
The check for address is redundant for incoming messages as
if we received the message then it was addressed to us.

This whole protection code can eventually be removed
as we have intended recipient fingerprints already,
it only protects against forwarding of messages
sent by old clients.
This commit is contained in:
link2xt
2026-03-27 17:31:47 +01:00
committed by l
parent 8c3139f7a2
commit a947f4296f

View File

@@ -450,10 +450,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn handle_securejoin_handshake(
) {
let mut self_found = false;
let self_fingerprint = load_self_public_key(context).await?.dc_fingerprint();
for (addr, key) in &mime_message.gossiped_keys {
if key.public_key.dc_fingerprint() == self_fingerprint
&& context.is_self_addr(addr).await?
{
for key in mime_message.gossiped_keys.values() {
if key.public_key.dc_fingerprint() == self_fingerprint {
self_found = true;
break;
}