From a947f4296f869cced1eb5b4518d3a083b6975e84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: link2xt Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2026 17:31:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] refactor(securejoin): do not check for self address in forwarding protection If our key is gossiped, the message is intended for us. The check for address is redundant for incoming messages as if we received the message then it was addressed to us. This whole protection code can eventually be removed as we have intended recipient fingerprints already, it only protects against forwarding of messages sent by old clients. --- src/securejoin.rs | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/securejoin.rs b/src/securejoin.rs index 11640676d..cd36eea25 100644 --- a/src/securejoin.rs +++ b/src/securejoin.rs @@ -450,10 +450,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn handle_securejoin_handshake( ) { let mut self_found = false; let self_fingerprint = load_self_public_key(context).await?.dc_fingerprint(); - for (addr, key) in &mime_message.gossiped_keys { - if key.public_key.dc_fingerprint() == self_fingerprint - && context.is_self_addr(addr).await? - { + for key in mime_message.gossiped_keys.values() { + if key.public_key.dc_fingerprint() == self_fingerprint { self_found = true; break; }