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fix(receive_imf): remove recursive sql call

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dignifiedquire
2019-07-21 12:56:04 +02:00
parent df5464ea80
commit 69dc237ee3
1 changed files with 53 additions and 59 deletions
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112
src/dc_receive_imf.rs
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@@ -1659,68 +1659,62 @@ unsafe fn check_verified_properties(
let to_ids_str = to_string(to_ids_str_c);
free(to_ids_str_c as *mut libc::c_void);
let ok = context
.sql
.query_map(
format!(
"SELECT c.addr, LENGTH(ps.verified_key_fingerprint) FROM contacts c \
LEFT JOIN acpeerstates ps ON c.addr=ps.addr WHERE c.id IN({}) ",
&to_ids_str,
),
params![],
|row| Ok((row.get::<_, String>(0)?, row.get::<_, i32>(1)?)),
|rows| {
for row in rows {
let (to_addr, mut is_verified) = row?;
let mut peerstate = Peerstate::from_addr(context, &context.sql, &to_addr);
if mimeparser.e2ee_helper.gossipped_addr.contains(&to_addr)
&& peerstate.is_some()
{
let peerstate = peerstate.as_mut().unwrap();
let rows = context.sql.query_map(
format!(
"SELECT c.addr, LENGTH(ps.verified_key_fingerprint) FROM contacts c \
LEFT JOIN acpeerstates ps ON c.addr=ps.addr WHERE c.id IN({}) ",
&to_ids_str,
),
params![],
|row| Ok((row.get::<_, String>(0)?, row.get::<_, i32>(1)?)),
|rows| rows.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>().map_err(Into::into),
);
// if we're here, we know the gossip key is verified:
// - use the gossip-key as verified-key if there is no verified-key
// - OR if the verified-key does not match public-key or gossip-key
// (otherwise a verified key can _only_ be updated through QR scan which might be annoying,
// see https://github.com/nextleap-project/countermitm/issues/46 for a discussion about this point)
if 0 == is_verified
|| peerstate.verified_key_fingerprint
!= peerstate.public_key_fingerprint
&& peerstate.verified_key_fingerprint
!= peerstate.gossip_key_fingerprint
{
info!(
context,
0,
"{} has verfied {}.",
as_str((*contact).addr),
to_addr,
);
let fp = peerstate.gossip_key_fingerprint.clone();
if let Some(fp) = fp {
peerstate.set_verified(0, &fp, 2);
peerstate.save_to_db(&context.sql, false);
is_verified = 1;
}
}
}
if 0 == is_verified {
verify_fail(format!(
"{} is not a member of this verified group",
to_addr
));
cleanup();
return Err(failure::format_err!("not a valid memember").into());
}
if rows.is_err() {
cleanup();
return 0;
}
for (to_addr, mut is_verified) in rows.unwrap().into_iter() {
let mut peerstate = Peerstate::from_addr(context, &context.sql, &to_addr);
if mimeparser.e2ee_helper.gossipped_addr.contains(&to_addr) && peerstate.is_some() {
let peerstate = peerstate.as_mut().unwrap();
// if we're here, we know the gossip key is verified:
// - use the gossip-key as verified-key if there is no verified-key
// - OR if the verified-key does not match public-key or gossip-key
// (otherwise a verified key can _only_ be updated through QR scan which might be annoying,
// see https://github.com/nextleap-project/countermitm/issues/46 for a discussion about this point)
if 0 == is_verified
|| peerstate.verified_key_fingerprint != peerstate.public_key_fingerprint
&& peerstate.verified_key_fingerprint != peerstate.gossip_key_fingerprint
{
info!(
context,
0,
"{} has verfied {}.",
as_str((*contact).addr),
to_addr,
);
let fp = peerstate.gossip_key_fingerprint.clone();
if let Some(fp) = fp {
peerstate.set_verified(0, &fp, 2);
peerstate.save_to_db(&context.sql, false);
is_verified = 1;
}
Ok(())
},
)
.is_ok(); // TODO: Better default
}
}
if 0 == is_verified {
verify_fail(format!(
"{} is not a member of this verified group",
to_addr
));
cleanup();
return 0;
}
}
cleanup();
ok as libc::c_int
1
}
unsafe fn set_better_msg(mime_parser: &dc_mimeparser_t, better_msg: *mut *mut libc::c_char) {