WIP: feat: Autocrypt2

Cargo.lock

@@ -1378,6 +1378,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "futures",
  "futures-lite",
  "hex",
+ "hkdf",
  "http-body-util",
  "humansize",
  "hyper",
@@ -1710,7 +1711,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "libc",
  "option-ext",
  "redox_users",
- "windows-sys 0.59.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.1",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2733,7 +2734,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "hyper",
  "libc",
  "pin-project-lite",
- "socket2 0.5.9",
+ "socket2 0.6.3",
  "tokio",
  "tower-service",
  "tracing",
@@ -3880,7 +3881,7 @@ version = "0.50.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "7957b9740744892f114936ab4a57b3f487491bbeafaf8083688b16841a4240e5"
 dependencies = [
- "windows-sys 0.59.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.1",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -5281,7 +5282,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "errno",
  "libc",
  "linux-raw-sys 0.12.1",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.1",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -6147,7 +6148,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "getrandom 0.3.3",
  "once_cell",
  "rustix 1.1.4",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.1",
 ]
 
 [[package]]

Cargo.toml

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ format-flowed = { path = "./format-flowed" }
 ratelimit = { path = "./deltachat-ratelimit" }
 
 anyhow = { workspace = true }
+astral-tokio-tar = { version = "0.6.2", default-features = false }
 async-broadcast = "0.7.2"
 async-channel = { workspace = true }
 async-imap = { version = "0.11.1", default-features = false, features = ["runtime-tokio", "compress"] }
@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ fd-lock = "4"
 futures-lite = { workspace = true }
 futures = { workspace = true }
 hex = "0.4.0"
+hkdf = { version = "0.12", default-features = false }
 http-body-util = "0.1.3"
 humansize = "2"
 hyper = "1"
@@ -103,7 +105,6 @@ thiserror = { workspace = true }
 tokio-io-timeout = "1.2.1"
 tokio-rustls = { version = "0.26.2", default-features = false, features = ["aws-lc-rs", "tls12"] }
 tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.17", features = ["fs"] }
-astral-tokio-tar = { version = "0.6.2", default-features = false }
 tokio-util = { workspace = true }
 tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["fs", "rt-multi-thread", "macros"] }
 toml = "0.9"

src/config.rs

@@ -477,6 +477,10 @@ pub enum Config {
     /// and incoming unencrypted messages are not fetched and not processed.
     #[strum(props(default = "1"))]
     ForceEncryption,
+
+    /// Generate Autocrypt 2 instead of Autocrypt 1 key.
+    #[strum(props(default = "1"))]
+    Autocrypt2,
 }
 
 impl Config {

src/context.rs

@@ -1033,6 +1033,10 @@ impl Context {
                 .await?
                 .to_string(),
         );
+        res.insert(
+            "autocrypt2",
+            self.get_config_bool(Config::Autocrypt2).await?.to_string(),
+        );
 
         let elapsed = time_elapsed(&self.creation_time);
         res.insert("uptime", duration_to_str(elapsed));

src/key.rs

@@ -17,10 +17,12 @@ use pgp::packet::{
     SubpacketData,
 };
 use pgp::ser::Serialize;
+use pgp::types::Timestamp as PgpTimestamp;
 use pgp::types::{CompressionAlgorithm, KeyDetails, KeyVersion};
 use rand_old::thread_rng;
 use tokio::runtime::Handle;
 
+use crate::config::Config;
 use crate::context::Context;
 use crate::events::EventType;
 use crate::log::LogExt;
@@ -147,7 +149,7 @@ pub(crate) fn secret_key_to_public_key(
         };
 
         Ok(vec![
-            Subpacket::regular(SubpacketData::SignatureCreationTime(timestamp))?,
+            Subpacket::critical(SubpacketData::SignatureCreationTime(timestamp))?,
             Subpacket::regular(SubpacketData::IssuerFingerprint(
                 signed_secret_key.fingerprint(),
             ))?,
@@ -461,9 +463,16 @@ async fn generate_keypair(context: &Context) -> Result<SignedSecretKey> {
         None => {
             let start = tools::Time::now();
             info!(context, "Generating keypair.");
-            let keypair = Handle::current()
-                .spawn_blocking(move || crate::pgp::create_keypair(addr))
-                .await??;
+            let keypair = if context.get_config_bool(Config::Autocrypt2).await? {
+                let now = PgpTimestamp::now();
+                Handle::current()
+                    .spawn_blocking(move || crate::pgp::autocrypt2::create_autocrypt2_keypair(now))
+                    .await??
+            } else {
+                Handle::current()
+                    .spawn_blocking(move || crate::pgp::create_keypair(addr))
+                    .await??
+            };
 
             store_self_keypair(context, &keypair).await?;
             info!(

src/pgp.rs

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ use tokio::runtime::Handle;
 
 use crate::key::{DcKey, Fingerprint};
 
+pub(crate) mod autocrypt2;
+
 /// Preferred symmetric encryption algorithm.
 const SYMMETRIC_KEY_ALGORITHM: SymmetricKeyAlgorithm = SymmetricKeyAlgorithm::AES128;
 

src/pgp/autocrypt2.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,588 @@
+//! Autocrypt2 implementation.
+use anyhow::Context as _;
+use anyhow::Result;
+use anyhow::bail;
+use anyhow::ensure;
+use anyhow::format_err;
+use hkdf::Hkdf;
+use pgp::composed::SignedKeyDetails;
+use pgp::composed::SignedSecretKey;
+use pgp::composed::SignedSecretSubKey;
+use pgp::crypto::aead::AeadAlgorithm;
+use pgp::crypto::ed25519;
+use pgp::crypto::hash::HashAlgorithm;
+use pgp::crypto::ml_kem768_x25519;
+use pgp::crypto::public_key::PublicKeyAlgorithm;
+use pgp::crypto::sym::SymmetricKeyAlgorithm;
+use pgp::packet::Features;
+use pgp::packet::KeyFlags;
+use pgp::packet::PacketTrait as _;
+use pgp::packet::PubKeyInner;
+use pgp::packet::PublicKey;
+use pgp::packet::PublicSubkey;
+use pgp::packet::SecretKey;
+use pgp::packet::SecretSubkey;
+use pgp::packet::SignatureConfig;
+use pgp::packet::SignatureType;
+use pgp::packet::Subpacket;
+use pgp::packet::SubpacketData;
+use pgp::ser::Serialize as _;
+use pgp::types::Duration as PgpDuration;
+use pgp::types::Ed25519PublicParams;
+use pgp::types::KeyDetails;
+use pgp::types::KeyVersion;
+use pgp::types::MlKem768X25519PublicParams;
+use pgp::types::Password;
+use pgp::types::PlainSecretParams;
+use pgp::types::PublicParams;
+use pgp::types::SecretParams;
+use pgp::types::Timestamp;
+use rand_old::thread_rng;
+use sha2::Digest;
+use sha2::Sha512;
+
+/// Creates an Autocrypt 2 TSK.
+///
+/// <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-autocrypt-openpgp-v2-cert/>
+pub(crate) fn create_autocrypt2_keypair(now: Timestamp) -> Result<SignedSecretKey> {
+    let mut rng = thread_rng();
+
+    // Fake zero timestamp for primary key and fallback key creation.
+    // We do not want to leak the key creation date to contacts.
+    // This is not to be used for rotating subkey timestamps.
+    let zero_timestamp = Timestamp::from_secs(0);
+
+    let public_key_algorithm = PublicKeyAlgorithm::Ed25519;
+
+    let primary_key_packet = {
+        let ed25519_secret = ed25519::SecretKey::generate(&mut rng, ed25519::Mode::Ed25519);
+        let public_params = PublicParams::Ed25519(Ed25519PublicParams::from(&ed25519_secret));
+        let secret_params = SecretParams::Plain(PlainSecretParams::Ed25519(ed25519_secret));
+
+        let pubkey_inner = PubKeyInner::new(
+            KeyVersion::V6,
+            public_key_algorithm,
+            zero_timestamp,
+            None,
+            public_params,
+        )?;
+        let pubkey = PublicKey::from_inner(pubkey_inner)?;
+        SecretKey::new(pubkey, secret_params)?
+    };
+
+    let details = {
+        let mut signature_config =
+            SignatureConfig::from_key(&mut rng, &primary_key_packet, SignatureType::Key)?;
+        let mut keyflags = KeyFlags::default();
+        keyflags.set_certify(true);
+        keyflags.set_sign(true);
+
+        let mut features = Features::default();
+        features.set_seipd_v1(true);
+        features.set_seipd_v2(true);
+
+        signature_config.hashed_subpackets = vec![
+            Subpacket::critical(SubpacketData::SignatureCreationTime(now))?,
+            Subpacket::regular(SubpacketData::KeyFlags(keyflags))?,
+            Subpacket::regular(SubpacketData::Features(features))?,
+            Subpacket::regular(SubpacketData::IssuerFingerprint(
+                primary_key_packet.fingerprint(),
+            ))?,
+            Subpacket::regular(SubpacketData::PreferredAeadAlgorithms(smallvec![(
+                SymmetricKeyAlgorithm::AES256,
+                AeadAlgorithm::Ocb
+            )]))?,
+        ];
+
+        let signature = signature_config.sign_key(
+            &primary_key_packet,
+            &Password::empty(),
+            &primary_key_packet.public_key(),
+        )?;
+
+        SignedKeyDetails {
+            revocation_signatures: vec![],
+            direct_signatures: vec![signature],
+            users: vec![],
+            user_attributes: vec![],
+        }
+    };
+
+    let fallback_subkey_packet = {
+        let ml_kem_secret = ml_kem768_x25519::SecretKey::generate(&mut rng);
+        let public_params =
+            PublicParams::MlKem768X25519(MlKem768X25519PublicParams::from(&ml_kem_secret));
+        let secret_params = SecretParams::Plain(PlainSecretParams::MlKem768X25519(ml_kem_secret));
+
+        let pubkey_inner = PubKeyInner::new(
+            KeyVersion::V6,
+            PublicKeyAlgorithm::MlKem768X25519,
+            zero_timestamp,
+            None,
+            public_params,
+        )?;
+        let public_subkey = PublicSubkey::from_inner(pubkey_inner)?;
+        SecretSubkey::new(public_subkey, secret_params)?
+    };
+
+    let signed_fallback_subkey = {
+        let mut keyflags = KeyFlags::default();
+        keyflags.set_encrypt_storage(true);
+        keyflags.set_encrypt_comms(true);
+
+        let mut signature_config = SignatureConfig::v6(
+            &mut rng,
+            SignatureType::SubkeyBinding,
+            public_key_algorithm,
+            HashAlgorithm::Sha256,
+        )?;
+        signature_config.hashed_subpackets = vec![
+            Subpacket::critical(SubpacketData::SignatureCreationTime(zero_timestamp))?,
+            Subpacket::critical(SubpacketData::KeyFlags(keyflags))?,
+            Subpacket::regular(SubpacketData::IssuerFingerprint(
+                primary_key_packet.fingerprint(),
+            ))?,
+        ];
+        let signature = signature_config.sign_subkey_binding(
+            &primary_key_packet,
+            primary_key_packet.public_key(),
+            &Password::empty(),
+            fallback_subkey_packet.public_key(),
+        )?;
+        SignedSecretSubKey {
+            key: fallback_subkey_packet,
+            signatures: vec![signature],
+        }
+    };
+
+    let rotating_subkey_packet = {
+        let ml_kem_secret = ml_kem768_x25519::SecretKey::generate(&mut rng);
+        let public_params =
+            PublicParams::MlKem768X25519(MlKem768X25519PublicParams::from(&ml_kem_secret));
+        let secret_params = SecretParams::Plain(PlainSecretParams::MlKem768X25519(ml_kem_secret));
+
+        let mut keyflags = KeyFlags::default();
+        keyflags.set_encrypt_comms(true);
+
+        let pubkey_inner = PubKeyInner::new(
+            KeyVersion::V6,
+            PublicKeyAlgorithm::MlKem768X25519,
+            now,
+            None,
+            public_params,
+        )?;
+        let public_subkey = PublicSubkey::from_inner(pubkey_inner)?;
+        SecretSubkey::new(public_subkey, secret_params)?
+    };
+
+    let signed_rotating_subkey = {
+        let mut keyflags = KeyFlags::default();
+        keyflags.set_encrypt_comms(true);
+
+        let mut signature_config = SignatureConfig::v6(
+            &mut rng,
+            SignatureType::SubkeyBinding,
+            public_key_algorithm,
+            HashAlgorithm::Sha256,
+        )?;
+
+        // Expiration duration is 10 days according to
+        // <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-autocrypt-openpgp-v2-cert-02.html#section-2.2-2.6.2.2.1>
+        let expiration_duration = PgpDuration::from_secs(864000);
+        signature_config.hashed_subpackets = vec![
+            Subpacket::critical(SubpacketData::SignatureCreationTime(now))?,
+            Subpacket::critical(SubpacketData::KeyFlags(keyflags))?,
+            // XXX: marking expiration as critical
+            // even though reference implementation does not:
+            // <https://codeberg.org/autocrypt2/autocrypt-v2-cert/issues/53>
+            Subpacket::critical(SubpacketData::KeyExpirationTime(expiration_duration))?,
+            Subpacket::regular(SubpacketData::IssuerFingerprint(
+                primary_key_packet.fingerprint(),
+            ))?,
+        ];
+        let signature = signature_config.sign_subkey_binding(
+            &primary_key_packet,
+            primary_key_packet.public_key(),
+            &Password::empty(),
+            rotating_subkey_packet.public_key(),
+        )?;
+        SignedSecretSubKey {
+            key: rotating_subkey_packet,
+            signatures: vec![signature],
+        }
+    };
+
+    let secret_key = SignedSecretKey {
+        primary_key: primary_key_packet,
+        details,
+        public_subkeys: Vec::new(),
+        secret_subkeys: vec![signed_fallback_subkey, signed_rotating_subkey],
+    };
+
+    secret_key
+        .verify_bindings()
+        .context("Invalid Autocrypt2 key generated")?;
+
+    Ok(secret_key)
+}
+
+/// Returns true if TSK is an Autocrypt 2 TSK.
+///
+/// <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-autocrypt-openpgp-v2-cert-02.html#name-identification-by-tsk-struc>
+fn is_autocrypt2_tsk(tsk: &SignedSecretKey) -> bool {
+    if tsk.primary_key.version() != KeyVersion::V6
+        || tsk.primary_key.algorithm() != PublicKeyAlgorithm::Ed25519
+    {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // Direct key signature.
+    let [direct_key_signature] = &tsk.details.direct_signatures[..] else {
+        return false;
+    };
+
+    let Some(features) = direct_key_signature.features() else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    // SEIPDv2 feature is required according to
+    // <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-autocrypt-openpgp-v2-cert-02.html#section-2.2-2.2.2.4.1>
+    if !features.seipd_v2() {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // Primary key must have certification (0x01) and signing (0x02) flags.
+    let dks_key_flags = direct_key_signature.key_flags();
+    if !dks_key_flags.certify() || !dks_key_flags.sign() {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // No expiration:
+    // <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-autocrypt-openpgp-v2-cert-02.html#section-2.2-2.2.2.6.1>
+    // No key expiration (<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9580.html#name-key-expiration-time>)
+    // and no signature expiration (<https://docs.rs/pgp/latest/pgp/packet/struct.Signature.html#method.signature_expiration_time>).
+    //
+    // XXX: spec should say explicitly that both key expiration and signature expiration should not be there
+    if direct_key_signature
+        .key_expiration_time()
+        .is_some_and(|duration| duration.as_secs() != 0)
+        || direct_key_signature
+            .signature_expiration_time()
+            .is_some_and(|duration| duration.as_secs() != 0)
+    {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if !(tsk.details.revocation_signatures.is_empty()
+        && tsk.details.users.is_empty()
+        && tsk.details.user_attributes.is_empty())
+    {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if !tsk.public_subkeys.is_empty() {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // TODO: check all rotating subkeys
+    // Subkeys may overlap, as long as subkey is not expired, it does not need to be deleted.
+    let [ref fallback_subkey, .., ref rotating_subkey] = tsk.secret_subkeys[..] else {
+        return false;
+    };
+
+    let [ref fallback_subkey_signature] = fallback_subkey.signatures[..] else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    let fallback_subkey_flags = fallback_subkey_signature.key_flags();
+    if !fallback_subkey_flags.encrypt_comms() || !fallback_subkey_flags.encrypt_storage() {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if fallback_subkey_signature
+        .key_expiration_time()
+        .is_some_and(|duration| duration.as_secs() != 0)
+    {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    let [ref rotating_subkey_signature] = rotating_subkey.signatures[..] else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    let rotating_subkey_flags = rotating_subkey_signature.key_flags();
+    // Rotating subkey can be used to encrypt communications, but not storage:
+    // <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-autocrypt-openpgp-v2-cert-02.html#section-2.2-2.6.2.3.1>
+    if !rotating_subkey_flags.encrypt_comms() || rotating_subkey_flags.encrypt_storage() {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if rotating_subkey_signature
+        .key_expiration_time()
+        .is_none_or(|duration| duration.as_secs() == 0)
+    {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    true
+}
+
+fn normalize_x25519_scalar(m: &mut [u8]) {
+    // From decodeScalar25519 in <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748/#section-5>
+    m[0] &= 248;
+    m[31] &= 127;
+    m[31] |= 64;
+}
+
+/// Generates new rotating subkey from a previous one.
+///
+/// <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-autocrypt-openpgp-v2-cert-02.html#section-4.1.1>
+fn ratchet(mut tsk: SignedSecretKey) -> Result<SignedSecretKey> {
+    // Extract the last rotating subkey.
+    // Other rotating subkeys do not matter.
+    // This corresponds to
+    // <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-autocrypt-openpgp-v2-cert-02.html#section-4.1.1-6.2.1>
+    let [ref _fallback_subkey, .., ref rotating_subkey] = tsk.secret_subkeys[..] else {
+        bail!("Cannot extract last rotating subkey");
+    };
+    let [ref rotating_subkey_signature] = rotating_subkey.signatures[..] else {
+        bail!("Rotating subkey must have exactly one signature");
+    };
+    let rotating_subkey_flags = rotating_subkey_signature.key_flags();
+    // We do not search for the latest-expiring subkey
+    // with the ability to encrypt communications.
+    // It must be the last one by convention.
+    // TODO: write TSK structure explicitly in the specification.
+    let max_rd: u32 = rotating_subkey_signature
+        .key_expiration_time()
+        .context("Last subkey is not expiring")?
+        .as_secs();
+    let min_rd: u32 = max_rd / 2;
+    ensure!(
+        rotating_subkey_flags.encrypt_comms(),
+        "Last rotating subkey cannot be used to encrypt communications"
+    );
+
+    let start: u32 = rotating_subkey
+        .created_at()
+        .as_secs()
+        .checked_add(min_rd)
+        .context("Overflow while adding min_rd")?;
+    let mut salt = Vec::from(start.to_be_bytes());
+    rotating_subkey
+        .public_key()
+        .to_writer_with_header(&mut salt)
+        .context("Failed to serialize rotating subkey")?;
+    debug_assert_eq!(
+        salt.len(),
+        4 + rotating_subkey.public_key().write_len_with_header()
+    );
+
+    let SecretParams::Plain(PlainSecretParams::MlKem768X25519(old_ml_kem768_x25519_secret_key)) =
+        rotating_subkey.secret_params()
+    else {
+        bail!("Cannot extract ML-KEM-768 + X25519 secret key");
+    };
+    let mut ikm = Vec::with_capacity(old_ml_kem768_x25519_secret_key.write_len());
+    old_ml_kem768_x25519_secret_key
+        .to_writer(&mut ikm)
+        .context("Failed to serialize IKM")?;
+
+    // <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-autocrypt-openpgp-v2-cert-02.html#section-4.1.1-6.6.1>
+    normalize_x25519_scalar(&mut ikm);
+    debug_assert_eq!(ikm.len(), 96);
+
+    let info = {
+        let mut info = b"Autocrypt_v2_ratchet".to_vec();
+        tsk.primary_key
+            .public_key()
+            .to_writer_with_header(&mut info)
+            .context("Failed to serialize primary key")?;
+        info.extend_from_slice(&max_rd.to_be_bytes());
+        info
+    };
+
+    let hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha512>::new(Some(&salt), &ikm);
+    let mut ks = [0u8; 160];
+    hkdf.expand(&info, &mut ks)
+        .map_err(|_err: hkdf::InvalidLength| {
+            format_err!("HKDF-Expand failed because of invalid output length")
+        })?;
+
+    let new_ml_kem768_x25519_secret_key = {
+        let mut new_x25519 = [0u8; 32];
+        let mut new_ml_kem = [0u8; 64];
+        new_x25519.copy_from_slice(&ks[64..96]);
+        new_ml_kem.copy_from_slice(&ks[96..160]);
+        normalize_x25519_scalar(&mut new_x25519[..]);
+
+        ml_kem768_x25519::SecretKey::try_from_bytes(new_x25519, new_ml_kem)?
+    };
+    let new_rotating_subkey = {
+        let public_params = PublicParams::MlKem768X25519(MlKem768X25519PublicParams::from(
+            &new_ml_kem768_x25519_secret_key,
+        ));
+        let secret_params = SecretParams::Plain(PlainSecretParams::MlKem768X25519(
+            new_ml_kem768_x25519_secret_key,
+        ));
+
+        let pubkey_inner = PubKeyInner::new(
+            KeyVersion::V6,
+            PublicKeyAlgorithm::MlKem768X25519,
+            Timestamp::from_secs(start),
+            None,
+            public_params,
+        )?;
+        let public_subkey = PublicSubkey::from_inner(pubkey_inner)?;
+        SecretSubkey::new(public_subkey, secret_params)?
+    };
+
+    let new_signed_rotating_subkey = {
+        let mut keyflags = KeyFlags::default();
+        keyflags.set_encrypt_comms(true);
+
+        let digest = Sha512::digest(&ks[0..64]);
+        let bssalt = digest[0..16].to_vec();
+
+        let mut signature_config = SignatureConfig::v6_with_salt(
+            SignatureType::SubkeyBinding,
+            tsk.primary_key.algorithm(),
+            HashAlgorithm::Sha256,
+            bssalt,
+        );
+
+        // FIXME
+        let expiration_duration = PgpDuration::from_secs(864000);
+        signature_config.hashed_subpackets = vec![
+            Subpacket::critical(SubpacketData::SignatureCreationTime(Timestamp::from_secs(
+                start,
+            )))?,
+            Subpacket::critical(SubpacketData::KeyFlags(keyflags))?,
+            // XXX: marking expiration as critical
+            // even though reference implementation does not:
+            // <https://codeberg.org/autocrypt2/autocrypt-v2-cert/issues/53>
+            Subpacket::critical(SubpacketData::KeyExpirationTime(expiration_duration))?,
+            Subpacket::regular(SubpacketData::IssuerFingerprint(
+                tsk.primary_key.public_key().fingerprint(),
+            ))?,
+        ];
+        let signature = signature_config.sign_subkey_binding(
+            &tsk.primary_key,
+            tsk.primary_key.public_key(),
+            &Password::empty(),
+            new_rotating_subkey.public_key(),
+        )?;
+        SignedSecretSubKey {
+            key: new_rotating_subkey,
+            signatures: vec![signature],
+        }
+    };
+
+    tsk.secret_subkeys.push(new_signed_rotating_subkey);
+    Ok(tsk)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::key;
+    use crate::pgp::DcKey;
+    use crate::test_utils;
+
+    /// Tests creating Autocrypt 2 TSK and detecting it.
+    #[test]
+    fn test_create_autocrypt2_keypair() {
+        let now = Timestamp::now();
+        let keypair = create_autocrypt2_keypair(now).unwrap();
+        assert!(is_autocrypt2_tsk(&keypair));
+
+        // Test that Autocrypt 2 TSK can be serialized and deserialized.
+        let secret_key_bytes = DcKey::to_bytes(&keypair);
+        let signed_secret_key = SignedSecretKey::from_slice(&secret_key_bytes)
+            .expect("Cannot deserialize Autocrypt2 TSK");
+
+        assert!(is_autocrypt2_tsk(&signed_secret_key));
+    }
+
+    /// Tests that the key does not leak creation timestamp.
+    #[test]
+    fn test_tsk_timestamps() {
+        let now = Timestamp::now();
+        let tsk = create_autocrypt2_keypair(now).unwrap();
+
+        // Primary key creation timestamp is zero.
+        assert_eq!(tsk.primary_key.created_at().as_secs(), 0);
+
+        // Primary key direct key signature timestamp is zero.
+        let [ref direct_signature] = tsk.details.direct_signatures[..] else {
+            panic!("Autocrypt 2 TSK must have exactly one direct key signature");
+        };
+
+        // Direct key signature is a real key creation timestamp
+        // and should not be zero.
+        // <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-autocrypt-openpgp-v2-cert-02.html#section-2.2-2.2.2.1.1>
+        // This timestamp from TSK should not leak into the public key however
+        // as we recreate the signature every time relay list is changed:
+        let created_timestamp = direct_signature.created().unwrap();
+        assert_ne!(created_timestamp.as_secs(), 0);
+
+        let fallback_subkey = tsk
+            .secret_subkeys
+            .first()
+            .expect("Fallback subkey not found");
+
+        // Fallback subkey creation timestamp should be zero.
+        // We will not be able to change this timestamp and it should not leak
+        // the profile creation timestamp.
+        assert_eq!(fallback_subkey.key.created_at().as_secs(), 0);
+
+        // Fallback subkey binding signature timestamp must match
+        // the direct key signature timestamp.
+        // TODO: it should be recreated each time Direct Key Signature is recreated.
+        let [ref fallback_subkey_signature] = fallback_subkey.signatures[..] else {
+            panic!("Fallback subkey does not have exactly one binding signature");
+        };
+    }
+
+    /// Tests that Autocrypt 2 TSK detection is not triggered for existing non-AC2 test keys.
+    #[test]
+    fn test_is_autocrypt2_tsk_no_false_positives() {
+        assert!(!is_autocrypt2_tsk(&test_utils::alice_keypair()));
+        assert!(!is_autocrypt2_tsk(&test_utils::bob_keypair()));
+        assert!(!is_autocrypt2_tsk(&test_utils::charlie_keypair()));
+        assert!(!is_autocrypt2_tsk(&test_utils::dom_keypair()));
+        assert!(!is_autocrypt2_tsk(&test_utils::elena_keypair()));
+        assert!(!is_autocrypt2_tsk(&test_utils::pqc_keypair()));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_ratchet() {
+        let now = Timestamp::now();
+        let tsk = create_autocrypt2_keypair(now).unwrap();
+        assert!(is_autocrypt2_tsk(&tsk));
+
+        let new_tsk = ratchet(tsk).expect("Ratchet failed");
+        assert!(is_autocrypt2_tsk(&new_tsk));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_autocrypt2_key_selection() {
+        let now = Timestamp::now();
+        let tsk = create_autocrypt2_keypair(now).unwrap();
+
+        let public_key = key::secret_key_to_public_key(
+            tsk.clone(),
+            now.as_secs(),
+            "alice@example.org",
+            "alice@example.org",
+        )
+        .expect("Failed to convert secret key to public key");
+
+        // For Autocrypt 2 certificate rotating key should be selected for encryption.
+        let pk_for_encryption =
+            crate::pgp::select_pk_for_encryption(now.as_secs(), &public_key).unwrap();
+        let [ref pk_for_encryption_signature] = pk_for_encryption.signatures[..] else {
+            panic!("Selected public key has multiple signatures");
+        };
+        let key_flags = pk_for_encryption_signature.key_flags();
+        assert!(key_flags.encrypt_comms());
+        assert!(!key_flags.encrypt_storage());
+    }
+}