Laukik Hase c9f6efb976 fix(esp_tee): Harden the TEE secure services against REE manipulation ...

- `bootloader_flash_execute_command_common`: whitelist the flash command
   opcodes the REE actually uses; reject the rest
- `spi_flash_hal_* services`: a forged `host->driver` could hijack TEE
   control flow since the HAL dispatches through it, so swap
   `host->driver` to a TEE-rodata vtable around each HAL call
- Deny partition table and bootloader writes by default and permit
  bootloader writes only when explicitly enabled via
  `CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_DANGEROUS_WRITE_ALLOWED` option
- Protect the TEE-assigned interrupt pin configuration against REE
- Validate nested DS context pointers in start/finish_sign and bound
  the result copy to the SoC max signature size
- Fix the stack usage in service dispatcher argument parsing

2026-06-10 12:02:34 +05:30

..

private

fix(esp_tee): Harden the TEE secure services against REE manipulation

2026-06-10 12:02:34 +05:30

esp_tee.h

refactor(esp_tee): Simplify service call ASM routine

2025-02-25 17:18:08 +05:30