ECDSA enable pulses a reset that also holds SHA in reset, and SHA shares
its DMA with AES. Key Manager enable pulses a reset that also covers the
XTS-AES flash encryption key-usage selector. Neither path was serialized
against those victims, so a hardware ECDSA/HMAC/DS operation could
corrupt a concurrent SHA/AES transfer or an in-flight encrypted flash
read.
- Take the SHA/AES lock inside esp_crypto_ecdsa_lock_acquire(), before
MPI, matching the DS lock order (sha_aes < mpi)
- Add esp_crypto_key_mgr_enable_periph_clk_no_reset() and switch ECDSA,
HMAC and DS to it; they only need the key-usage selector writable
- Hold esp_crypto_key_manager_lock across those clock enable/disable
pairs so selector writes stay serialized without resetting KM
The Key Manager hardware peripheral in its current form needs further
design changes before it can be offered as a production feature.
Until a revised peripheral design is available, withdraw ESP-IDF
support for it on all Key Manager capable targets.
Add ESP_KEY_SOURCE_BUFFER and ESP_KEY_SOURCE_PSA key sources so all
hardware backends (DS, ECDSA, secure element) are accessed via PSA
key IDs through a single esp_tls_cfg_t.client_key field.
- Update the Key Manager key types to be generic
- Define a new enum to determine the length of the keys
- Refactor the Key Manager driver support generic key types and key lengths
- Also store key deployment mode in the key recovery info
