ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(C) was silently deleted by the optimizer when C is a cached
flag/status already proven by a preceding `if (!C) return/goto`: the compiler
folds C to a constant and drops all three checks, removing the fault-injection
protection with no warning.
ECDSA based Secure Boot V2 is not functional for certain input vectors on
ESP32-C5/C61/H2/P4 and on the preview targets ESP32-H4/H21. RSA based Secure
Boot V2 is the recommended scheme where the SoC supports it. This issue will be
fixed in a future hardware ECO revision; more details will be shared through the
hardware errata document.
A new hidden Kconfig option SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECDSA_INSECURE marks the affected
mass-production SoCs (ESP32-C5/C61/H2/P4). On these SoCs, when hardware Secure
Boot V2 is enabled, the ECDSA (V2) signing scheme is no longer offered by
default; it must be turned on explicitly via SECURE_BOOT_V2_FORCE_ENABLE_ECDSA
under "Allow potentially insecure options" (CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE). App
signing without hardware Secure Boot is not affected. Note that ESP32-C61 has no
RSA based Secure Boot V2, so it has no Secure Boot scheme enabled by default.
The preview targets ESP32-H4 and ESP32-H21 mark ECDSA Secure Boot V2 as not
supported in their SoC capabilities instead of using the option above. As
ESP32-H4 has no other Secure Boot V2 scheme, Secure Boot is disabled entirely on
it; ESP32-H21 retains RSA based Secure Boot V2.
The security documentation keeps the ECDSA Secure Boot V2 content visible and
adds a warning describing the limitation (including that ECDSA Secure Boot V2 on
ESP32-C61 is not recommended for production). CI apps that exercise ECDSA Secure
Boot V2 on the affected SoCs set CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_FORCE_ENABLE_ECDSA
accordingly.
- `bootloader_flash_execute_command_common`: whitelist the flash command
opcodes the REE actually uses; reject the rest
- `spi_flash_hal_* services`: a forged `host->driver` could hijack TEE
control flow since the HAL dispatches through it, so swap
`host->driver` to a TEE-rodata vtable around each HAL call
- Deny partition table and bootloader writes by default and permit
bootloader writes only when explicitly enabled via
`CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_DANGEROUS_WRITE_ALLOWED` option
- Protect the TEE-assigned interrupt pin configuration against REE
- Validate nested DS context pointers in start/finish_sign and bound
the result copy to the SoC max signature size
- Fix the stack usage in service dispatcher argument parsing
A typical scenario is: when XIP on PSRAM enabled, compiler optimization level is Os. Under certain binary layout, boot hangs and backtrace points to `esp_sleep_config_gpio_isolate`.
The root cause is that, during PSRAM initialization, it calls esp_gpio_reserve, which happens to place before the reported function. However, after call, there is no barrier before the clock adjustment in `mspi_timing_enter_low_speed_mode`. The clock gets changed when the cache is still fetching data, resulting in the corrupted data in the end of the cache line.
This commits add spi_flash_disable_cache as a barrier to make sure the cache transactions is finished before the clock switch.
TEE secure-service handlers had two bugs letting REE bypass
pointer-region validation:
1. valid_addr = instead of valid_addr &= in AEAD encrypt/decrypt
and DS sign handlers, clobbering prior failed checks.
Impact: REE writes to TEE DRAM via DS signature output, or reads
TEE DRAM via AEAD output.
2. data->rsa_length dereferenced before data is validated in DS sign
and DS start_sign handlers.
Fix: use &= for subsequent checks, add early return after initial
data pointer check in DS handlers.
- Using PMA, the TEE IRAM is marked as R/X while TEE DRAM is marked as R/W.
Moving the internal memory secure service call table from DRAM to IRAM
makes it immutable.
- Fix intermittent TEE stack underflow test failures
- Fix out-of-bounds access Coverity report from the attestation
component
- Add appropriate checks and asserts for TEE flash memory regions'
sizes
- Increased the TEE stack when secure boot is enabled
- Also, generate a build error when the generated TEE binary image size is
greater than the TEE partition size
- Also fixed an issue where NewLib ROM APIs, when called from TEE, were
using the syscall table located in the REE SRAM. This could be abused
as an attack vector to invoke illegal functions from the TEE.
To prevent this, the syscall table is now switched to the TEE-specific
copy during every M-U mode transition.
This commit reorganizes SPI flash header files to better reflect their
visibility and intended usage:
1. Rename `esp_flash_port/` to `esp_flash_chips/`:
- Better reflects that these headers are for chip driver implementations
- All chip driver headers moved to `esp_flash_chips/` directory
- Added README.md explaining semi-public nature of these headers
2. Move internal headers to `esp_private/`:
- `esp_flash_internal.h` -> `esp_private/esp_flash_internal.h`
- `memspi_host_driver.h` -> `esp_private/memspi_host_driver.h`
3. Move chip driver related headers to `esp_flash_chips/`:
- `esp_private/esp_flash_types.h` -> `esp_flash_chips/esp_flash_types.h`
- `spi_flash/spi_flash_defs.h` -> `esp_flash_chips/spi_flash_defs.h`
- `spi_flash_override.h` -> `esp_flash_chips/spi_flash_override.h`
- All `spi_flash_chip_*.h` headers moved to `esp_flash_chips/`
4. Code improvements:
- Remove unused includes (e.g., `spi_flash_override.h` from `cache_utils.c`)
- Use public API `esp_flash_get_size()` instead of direct member access
- Add `esp_flash_is_quad_mode` to linker.lf for IRAM placement
5. Documentation updates:
- Add README.md in `esp_flash_chips/` explaining semi-public headers
- Update programming guide with warnings about internal headers
- Update both English and Chinese documentation
6. Update all references across the codebase:
- Update includes in `spi_flash` component
- Update `bootloader_support`, `app_update`, `esp_tee`, `espcoredump`
- Update example projects
Breaking changes:
- Headers moved to new locations require include path updates
- `custom_flash_driver` example temporarily disabled until external
components are updated