F_SETFL was replacing the whole flags word, so fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, O_APPEND)
made F_GETFL report O_RDONLY|O_APPEND. Keep O_ACCMODE and apply only POSIX
status flags.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
The initial CVE-2026-6682 fix hardened the exFAT mount path, but the CVE
as reported by runZero is a FAT32 defect in mount_volume() and is
reachable in the default configuration (exFAT and 64-bit LBA disabled).
This corrects the fix.
Root cause: `fasize *= fs->n_fats` is a DWORD multiply with no overflow
guard. A crafted BPB_FATSz32 such as 0x80000001 with NumFATs=2 wraps
`fasize` to 0x00000002. The wrapped (too-small) FAT size places
`fs->database` inside the FAT region, so a forged directory entry yields
an attacker-controlled `finfo.fsize`; a caller using it as a read length
overflows its buffer with attacker-controlled bytes (CVSS 7.6).
Fix: reject per-FAT and reserved+FAT+root system-area sizes that overflow
DWORD before they are used to derive the data-area base. The exFAT
cluster-heap/bitmap 64-bit promotions are retained as defense-in-depth
and relabeled (they are not CVE-2026-6682). SBOM reason updated.
Document the three runZero "Seven FatFs bugs" CVEs that require no source change
in this component, so vulnerability scanners have their disposition:
- CVE-2026-6684: GPT partition-scan loop DoS. Already fixed upstream in R0.16,
where test_gpt_header() caps the partition-entry count at 128.
- CVE-2026-6686: read of uninitialized clusters after f_lseek() past EOF.
Longstanding, behavioral; not a memory-safety defect and zero-filling every
extended cluster is prohibitively costly on flash.
- CVE-2026-6688: long-filename overflow in downstream callers. Not exposed in
ESP-IDF; vfs_fat.c uses bounded copies and fname is bounded by FF_MAX_LFN.
Reference: https://www.runzero.com/blog/fatfs-bugs/
f_getlabel() extracts the exFAT volume label with a loop bounded by the on-disk
byte dj.dir[XDIR_NumLabel] (0-255):
for (si = di = hs = 0; si < dj.dir[XDIR_NumLabel]; si++)
wc = ld_16(dj.dir + XDIR_Label + si * 2);
The exFAT label field holds at most 11 UTF-16 units (22 bytes). A crafted
directory entry with a larger count both reads past the 22-byte label field and,
through put_utf(... &label[di], 4), writes past the end of the caller-provided
label buffer (the canonical API examples use small fixed stack buffers) -> stack
buffer overflow.
Clamp the character count to the exFAT maximum of 11 before the extraction loop.
Record the CVE in the component SBOM.
Note: f_getlabel() takes no destination-buffer size, so under UTF-8 output
(FF_LFN_UNICODE == 2) 11 units can still expand to up to 34 bytes; the clamp
downgrades this from attacker-unbounded to spec-bounded. ESP-IDF's VFS layer
does not call f_getlabel(); direct callers on untrusted media should size their
buffer accordingly. A complete fix requires an upstream size-aware API change.
Reference: https://www.runzero.com/blog/fatfs-bugs/
After a direct multi-sector disk_read()/disk_write(), FatFs decides whether the
cached sector overlaps the direct-I/O range with:
fp->sect - sect < cc (and the FF_FS_TINY variant fs->winsect - sect < cc)
`sect`, `fp->sect` and `fs->winsect` are unsigned LBA_t. On 32-bit LBA_t builds,
if the cached sector is below `sect`, the subtraction wraps to a huge value that
can still compare `< cc`, so the code computes a bogus large offset:
- in f_write() it mis-copies from the direct write buffer (data corruption);
- in f_read() it is worse: memcpy(rbuff + (wrapped_offset * SS), ...) is an
out-of-bounds WRITE into the caller-supplied read buffer.
Add an explicit lower-bound check (fp->sect >= sect, resp. fs->winsect >= sect)
before the range test on both the read and write paths and both the FF_FS_TINY
and normal variants, so the condition is exactly "cached sector lies within
[sect, sect + cc)". Record the CVE in the component SBOM.
Reference: https://www.runzero.com/blog/fatfs-bugs/
The FAT12/16/32 mount path rejects a zero cluster count, but the exFAT path
accepted NumClusters == 0. That yields fs->n_fatent == 2, and sync_fs() later
computes the "percent in use" field as:
... * 100 / (fs->n_fatent - 2)
which is a division by zero (n_fatent - 2 == 0) -> crash. On a device that
syncs during an update this can brick the unit.
Reject ncl == 0 at exFAT mount time, and add a defense-in-depth
`fs->n_fatent > 2` guard around the division in sync_fs() so the divisor can
never be zero even if some future path produces such a filesystem object.
Record the CVE in the component SBOM.
Reference: https://www.runzero.com/blog/fatfs-bugs/
The exFAT mount path validates that the media is large enough to hold the
declared cluster heap with:
if (maxlba < (QWORD)fs->database + ncl * fs->csize) ...
`ncl` (DWORD, up to MAX_EXFAT) and `fs->csize` (WORD) are both promoted to
`unsigned int`, so `ncl * fs->csize` is evaluated in 32-bit arithmetic and can
wrap before the QWORD promotion of the sum. A crafted image with a large
NumClusters/SecPerClus can therefore make an undersized volume pass the "size
is large enough" check; subsequent cluster->sector math then addresses media
outside the actual device.
Promote the multiply to 64-bit ((QWORD)ncl * fs->csize). Apply the same
promotion to the bitmap-base computation ((LBA_t)fs->csize * (bcl - 2)), which
has the identical overflow shape. Record the CVE in the component SBOM.
Reference: https://www.runzero.com/blog/fatfs-bugs/
The vendored FatFs sources are revision R0.16 (FF_DEFINED == 80386, per
components/fatfs/src/ff.h and ff.c) but the SBOM recorded R0.15. Correct the
recorded version so vulnerability tracking matches the actual sources.
Add a new CMake function esp_partition_flash_binary() that provides a
unified API for registering partition data binaries to be flashed. It
replaces the direct esptool_py_flash_target calls scattered across
components (spiffs, fatfs, nvs_flash) with a single function that:
- Resolves partition offset from the partition table automatically
- Determines encryption requirements (auto-detect or ALWAYS_PLAINTEXT)
- Creates per-partition flash targets (e.g. idf.py <partition>-flash)
- Optionally includes the binary in `idf.py flash` via FLASH_IN_PROJECT
On the linux target, the function registers binaries for pre-loading
into the emulated flash. A build-time manifest (linux_flash_data.txt)
is generated via file(GENERATE), and partition_linux.c reads it at
runtime to copy each binary into the memory-mapped flash buffer at
the correct offset.
The partition_ops example is updated to use the new function and
includes a custom_partition with pre-built data to demonstrate the
full workflow, including on the linux target.
The condition filtering attributes lacked parentheses, causing the
'not startswith(_)' guard to only apply to str attributes. Python 3.14's
new __firstlineno__ (int) class attribute leaked into the output.
Also includes ruff auto-formatting fixes (imports, trailing commas,
union type annotations).
Rewrite build_lfn_short_entry_name() and add _gen_numname_suffix() helper
to match the gen_numname() algorithm in ff.c. This fixes:
- chr(order) producing raw binary instead of ASCII digits
- Collision for order >= 10 when str(order) makes the name exceed 8 chars
- Hex suffix with dynamic stem shortening (matching C implementation)
- CRC16-CCITT hash for seq > 5 to reduce collision probability
Also fix LDIR_Name2_SIZE typo in long_filename_utils.py (should be
LDIR_Name3_SIZE), which made the assertion guard too permissive.
Add ShortFilenameGenerationTestCase with 9 unit tests covering single-digit,
multi-digit, hash-based, and collision-free generation scenarios.
