Added an API to verify the bootloader and app image before revoking the key in Secure Boot V2.
This will help in preventing the device to be bricked if the bootloader/application cannot be
verified by any other keys in efuse
The following two functions in bootloader_support are private now:
* esp_secure_boot_verify_sbv2_signature_block()
* esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block()
They have been moved into private header files
inside bootloader_private/
* Removed bootloader_reset_reason.h and
bootloader_common_get_reset_reason() completely.
Alternative in ROM component is available.
* made esp_efuse.h independent of target-specific rom header
1) Fix build issue in mbedtls
2) skip the public headers check in IDF
3)Update Kconfig Macros
4)Remove deprecated config options
5) Update the sha API according to new nomenclature
6) Update mbedtls_rsa_init usage
7) Include mbedtls/build_info.h instead of mbedtls/config.h
8) Dont include check_config.h
9) Add additional error message in esp_blufi_api.h
This commit fixes issue where empty (unprogrammed) digest slot out of
multiple supported (e.g. 3 for ESP32-C3) could cause issue in
workflow enablement process.
Notes:
1. This issue was applicable for chips supporting "secure-boot-v2"
scheme with multiple digests slots
2. This issue was affecting only manual workflow, where digest of
public was pre-flashed in efuse
3. Change in "flash_encrypt.c" is only for additional safety purpose
As this mode uses the public keys attached to the existing app's signatures to
verify the next app, checking that a signature block is found on boot prevents
the possibility of deploying a non-updatable device from the factory.
