ECDSA based Secure Boot V2 is not functional for certain input vectors on
ESP32-C5/C61/H2/P4 and on the preview targets ESP32-H4/H21. RSA based Secure
Boot V2 is the recommended scheme where the SoC supports it. This issue will be
fixed in a future hardware ECO revision; more details will be shared through the
hardware errata document.
A new hidden Kconfig option SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECDSA_INSECURE marks the affected
mass-production SoCs (ESP32-C5/C61/H2/P4). On these SoCs, when hardware Secure
Boot V2 is enabled, the ECDSA (V2) signing scheme is no longer offered by
default; it must be turned on explicitly via SECURE_BOOT_V2_FORCE_ENABLE_ECDSA
under "Allow potentially insecure options" (CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE). App
signing without hardware Secure Boot is not affected. Note that ESP32-C61 has no
RSA based Secure Boot V2, so it has no Secure Boot scheme enabled by default.
The preview targets ESP32-H4 and ESP32-H21 mark ECDSA Secure Boot V2 as not
supported in their SoC capabilities instead of using the option above. As
ESP32-H4 has no other Secure Boot V2 scheme, Secure Boot is disabled entirely on
it; ESP32-H21 retains RSA based Secure Boot V2.
The security documentation keeps the ECDSA Secure Boot V2 content visible and
adds a warning describing the limitation (including that ECDSA Secure Boot V2 on
ESP32-C61 is not recommended for production). CI apps that exercise ECDSA Secure
Boot V2 on the affected SoCs set CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_FORCE_ENABLE_ECDSA
accordingly.
- When NVS encryption is enabled on SoCs with the HMAC peripheral that have flash encryption
enabled, the HMAC-based NVS encryption scheme is now selected as default instead of the
flash encryption-based scheme.
- If your application previously used the flash encryption-based scheme, you need to manually
configure the NVS encryption scheme to flash encryption from HMAC through ``menuconfig``
or your project's ``sdkconfig`` (i.e., setting ``CONFIG_NVS_SEC_KEY_PROTECT_USING_FLASH_ENC=y``).
This commit global variables such as ESPTOOLPY, ESPSECUREPY, ESPEFUSEPY,
ESPMONITOR and ESPTOOLPY_CHIP from the project_include.cmake file of
esptool_py component. All other components which use these variables
have been updated to fetch the same from esptool_py component's
properties.
Removed
- target markers. Now must use target as parametrization in esp-idf
- host test markers. Now will be automatically added with linux target and qemu marker
- Secure boot V2 verification failed when multiple keys are used to sign the bootloader
and the application is signed with a key other than the first key that is used to
sign the bootloader.
- The issue was introduced as a regression from the commit `ff16ce43`.
- Added a QEMU test for recreating the issue.
- Made SECURE_BOOT_FLASH_BOOTLOADER_DEFAULT independent of SECURE_BOOT_BUILD_SIGNED_BINARIES.
Add a test app to verify the working of the application when
SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT is selected in the menuconfig
and the application is not signed
The following two functions in bootloader_support are private now:
* esp_secure_boot_verify_sbv2_signature_block()
* esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block()
They have been moved into private header files
inside bootloader_private/
* Removed bootloader_reset_reason.h and
bootloader_common_get_reset_reason() completely.
Alternative in ROM component is available.
* made esp_efuse.h independent of target-specific rom header
This updates the minimal supported version of CMake to 3.16, which in turn enables us to use more CMake features and have a cleaner build system.
This is the version that provides most new features and also the one we use in our latest docker image for CI.
This commit updates the visibility of various header files and cleans up
some unnecessary inclusions. Also, this commit removes certain header
include paths which were maintained for backward compatibility.
