fix(esp_tee): Harden the TEE secure services against REE manipulation

- `bootloader_flash_execute_command_common`: whitelist the flash command
   opcodes the REE actually uses; reject the rest
- `spi_flash_hal_* services`: a forged `host->driver` could hijack TEE
   control flow since the HAL dispatches through it, so swap
   `host->driver` to a TEE-rodata vtable around each HAL call
- Deny partition table and bootloader writes by default and permit
  bootloader writes only when explicitly enabled via
  `CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_DANGEROUS_WRITE_ALLOWED` option
- Protect the TEE-assigned interrupt pin configuration against REE
- Validate nested DS context pointers in start/finish_sign and bound
  the result copy to the SoC max signature size
- Fix the stack usage in service dispatcher argument parsing

components/esp_tee/include/private/esp_tee_binary.h

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2026 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
  */
@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TEE_SECURE_INUM    (31)
 #if SOC_INT_CLIC_SUPPORTED
 #define TEE_PASS_INUM      (30)
+/* CLIC: 3 effective priority bits (NLBITS=3), max priority = 7 */
+#define TEE_SECURE_INUM_PRIO    (7)
+#else
+/* PLIC: 4-bit priority field, max priority = 15 */
+#define TEE_SECURE_INUM_PRIO    (15)
 #endif
 
 #define ESP_TEE_M2U_SWITCH_MAGIC  0xfedef