change(secure_boot): mark ECDSA based Secure Boot V2 as insecure on affected SoCs

ECDSA based Secure Boot V2 is not functional for certain input vectors on
ESP32-C5/C61/H2/P4 and on the preview targets ESP32-H4/H21. RSA based Secure
Boot V2 is the recommended scheme where the SoC supports it. This issue will be
fixed in a future hardware ECO revision; more details will be shared through the
hardware errata document.

A new hidden Kconfig option SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECDSA_INSECURE marks the affected
mass-production SoCs (ESP32-C5/C61/H2/P4). On these SoCs, when hardware Secure
Boot V2 is enabled, the ECDSA (V2) signing scheme is no longer offered by
default; it must be turned on explicitly via SECURE_BOOT_V2_FORCE_ENABLE_ECDSA
under "Allow potentially insecure options" (CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE). App
signing without hardware Secure Boot is not affected. Note that ESP32-C61 has no
RSA based Secure Boot V2, so it has no Secure Boot scheme enabled by default.

The preview targets ESP32-H4 and ESP32-H21 mark ECDSA Secure Boot V2 as not
supported in their SoC capabilities instead of using the option above. As
ESP32-H4 has no other Secure Boot V2 scheme, Secure Boot is disabled entirely on
it; ESP32-H21 retains RSA based Secure Boot V2.

The security documentation keeps the ECDSA Secure Boot V2 content visible and
adds a warning describing the limitation (including that ECDSA Secure Boot V2 on
ESP32-C61 is not recommended for production). CI apps that exercise ECDSA Secure
Boot V2 on the affected SoCs set CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_FORCE_ENABLE_ECDSA
accordingly.

components/bootloader/Kconfig.projbuild

@@ -478,6 +478,18 @@ menu "Security features"
         default y
         depends on SOC_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECC
 
+    # ECDSA based Secure Boot V2 is not functional for certain input vectors on these
+    # SoCs. The scheme stays available but, for hardware Secure Boot, must be explicitly
+    # turned on via SECURE_BOOT_V2_FORCE_ENABLE_ECDSA under "Allow potentially insecure
+    # options" (CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE).
+    #
+    # TODO: IDF-15721 - drop a SoC from this list once a fixing hardware ECO revision
+    # ships, gating on the selected minimum chip revision, e.g.:
+    #     default y if IDF_TARGET_ESP32C5 && ESP32C5_REV_MIN_FULL < <fixed_rev>
+    config SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECDSA_INSECURE
+        bool
+        default y if IDF_TARGET_ESP32C5 || IDF_TARGET_ESP32C61 || IDF_TARGET_ESP32H2 || IDF_TARGET_ESP32P4
+
     config SECURE_BOOT_V1_SUPPORTED
         bool
         default y
@@ -549,6 +561,10 @@ menu "Security features"
         config SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_V2_SCHEME
             bool "ECDSA (V2)"
             depends on SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECC_SUPPORTED && (SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_NO_SECURE_BOOT || SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED)
+            # On the affected SoCs (SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECDSA_INSECURE), hardware Secure Boot with ECDSA
+            # is offered only when SECURE_BOOT_V2_FORCE_ENABLE_ECDSA is explicitly set. App signing
+            # without hardware Secure Boot is not affected by this gate.
+            depends on !SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED || (!SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECDSA_INSECURE || SECURE_BOOT_V2_FORCE_ENABLE_ECDSA)
             help
                 For Secure boot V2 (e.g., ESP32-C2 SoC), appends ECDSA based signature block to the application.
                 Refer to documentation before enabling.
@@ -931,6 +947,19 @@ menu "Security features"
         # it's possible for the insecure menu to be disabled but the insecure option
         # to remain on which is very bad.)
 
+        config SECURE_BOOT_V2_FORCE_ENABLE_ECDSA
+            bool "Force enable ECDSA based Secure Boot V2"
+            depends on SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE && SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECDSA_INSECURE
+            default n
+            help
+                ECDSA based Secure Boot V2 is not functional for certain input vectors on this SoC
+                and is therefore not offered by default. Refer to the hardware errata document for
+                details.
+
+                Setting this option re-enables the ECDSA based Secure Boot V2 signing scheme despite
+                the known vulnerability. Only set this option if you fully understand the risk. RSA
+                based Secure Boot V2 is the recommended scheme on SoCs that support it.
+
         config SECURE_BOOT_ALLOW_ROM_BASIC
             bool "Leave ROM BASIC Interpreter available on reset"
             depends on (SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE || SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_MODE_DEVELOPMENT) && IDF_TARGET_ESP32

components/esp_tee/test_apps/tee_cli_app/sdkconfig.ci.release

@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
+# NOTE: This sdkconfig is intended solely for CI build purposes - to verify ESP-TEE
+# builds across various configurations - and is not intended for production use.
+
 # Reducing TEE IRAM size
-# 30KB
-CONFIG_SECURE_TEE_IRAM_SIZE=0x7800
+# 29KB
+CONFIG_SECURE_TEE_IRAM_SIZE=0x7400
 
 # TEE Secure Storage: Release mode
 CONFIG_SECURE_TEE_SEC_STG_MODE_RELEASE=y
@@ -10,7 +13,11 @@ CONFIG_SECURE_TEE_SEC_STG_EFUSE_HMAC_KEY_ID=5
 CONFIG_SECURE_TEE_EXT_FLASH_MEMPROT_SPI1=n
 
 # Secure Boot
-CONFIG_PARTITION_TABLE_OFFSET=0xf000
+CONFIG_PARTITION_TABLE_OFFSET=0xF000
 CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT=y
+# ECDSA Secure Boot V2 is gated behind the insecure option on the affected SoCs
+CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_FORCE_ENABLE_ECDSA=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_V2_SCHEME=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_BUILD_SIGNED_BINARIES=y
-CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNING_KEY="test_keys/secure_boot_signing_key.pem"
+CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNING_KEY="test_keys/secure_boot_signing_key_ecdsa_p256.pem"

components/esp_tee/test_apps/tee_cli_app/sdkconfig.ci.sb_fe

@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+# NOTE: This sdkconfig is intended solely for CI build purposes - to verify ESP-TEE
+# builds across various configurations - and is not intended for production use.
+
 # Increasing TEE I/DRAM sizes
 # 34KB
 CONFIG_SECURE_TEE_IRAM_SIZE=0x8800
@@ -9,8 +12,12 @@ CONFIG_PARTITION_TABLE_OFFSET=0xf000
 
 # Secure Boot
 CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT=y
+# ECDSA Secure Boot V2 is gated behind the insecure option on the affected SoCs
+CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_FORCE_ENABLE_ECDSA=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_V2_SCHEME=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_BUILD_SIGNED_BINARIES=y
-CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNING_KEY="test_keys/secure_boot_signing_key.pem"
+CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNING_KEY="test_keys/secure_boot_signing_key_ecdsa_p256.pem"
 
 # Flash Encryption
 CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENC_ENABLED=y

components/esp_tee/test_apps/tee_cli_app/test_keys/secure_boot_signing_key_ecdsa_p256.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIFFwmnckyThKZQMV40ceAQm8OxwP1aI0dvWt3P9/4VAgoAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAEwMObAE6S2QjA4vYnifYGDO/Jd9Pr9p2CWKxQVTsziuqz2pJxzjcQ
+zJT6Aj30auml+oIGvNwBnhoZ3v5SCyzqOw==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

components/soc/esp32h21/include/soc/Kconfig.soc_caps.in

@@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ config SOC_SECURE_BOOT_V2_RSA
 
 config SOC_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECC
     bool
-    default y
+    default n
 
 config SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS
     int

components/soc/esp32h21/include/soc/soc_caps.h

@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@
 
 /*-------------------------- Secure Boot CAPS----------------------------*/
 #define SOC_SECURE_BOOT_V2_RSA              1
-#define SOC_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECC              1
+#define SOC_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECC              0
 #define SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS   3
 #define SOC_EFUSE_REVOKE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS   1
 #define SOC_SUPPORT_SECURE_BOOT_REVOKE_KEY  1