fix(provisioning): fix incorrect AES-GCM IV usage in security2 scheme

Using same IV in AES-GCM across multiple invocation of
encryption/decryption operations can pose a security risk. It can help
to reveal co-relation between different plaintexts.

This commit introduces a change to use part of IV as a monotonic
counter, which must be incremented after every AES-GCM invocation
on both the client and the device side.

Concept of patch version for a security scheme has been introduced here
which can help to differentiate a protocol behavior for the provisioning
entity. The security patch version will be available in the JSON
response for `proto-ver` endpoint request with the field
`sec_patch_ver`.

Please refer to documentation for more details on the changes required
on the provisioning entity side (e.g., PhoneApps).

components/protocomm/src/common/protocomm.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2018-2022 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2018-2025 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
  */
@@ -426,3 +426,15 @@ esp_err_t protocomm_unset_version(protocomm_t *pc, const char *ep_name)
 
     return protocomm_remove_endpoint(pc, ep_name);
 }
+
+esp_err_t protocomm_get_sec_version(protocomm_t *pc, int *sec_ver, uint8_t *sec_patch_ver)
+{
+    if (pc == NULL || sec_ver == NULL || sec_patch_ver == NULL) {
+        return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
+    }
+
+    *sec_ver = pc->sec->ver;
+    *sec_patch_ver = pc->sec->patch_ver;
+
+    return ESP_OK;
+}