Files
chatmail-core/src/securejoin.rs
2020-10-13 14:59:25 +02:00

1434 lines
52 KiB
Rust

//! Verified contact protocol implementation as [specified by countermitm project](https://countermitm.readthedocs.io/en/stable/new.html#setup-contact-protocol)
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use anyhow::{bail, Error};
use percent_encoding::{utf8_percent_encode, AsciiSet, NON_ALPHANUMERIC};
use crate::aheader::EncryptPreference;
use crate::chat::{self, Chat, ChatId};
use crate::config::*;
use crate::constants::*;
use crate::contact::*;
use crate::context::Context;
use crate::e2ee::*;
use crate::events::EventType;
use crate::headerdef::HeaderDef;
use crate::key::{DcKey, Fingerprint, SignedPublicKey};
use crate::lot::{Lot, LotState};
use crate::message::Message;
use crate::mimeparser::*;
use crate::param::*;
use crate::peerstate::*;
use crate::qr::check_qr;
use crate::sql;
use crate::stock::StockMessage;
use crate::token;
pub const NON_ALPHANUMERIC_WITHOUT_DOT: &AsciiSet = &NON_ALPHANUMERIC.remove(b'.');
macro_rules! joiner_progress {
($context:tt, $contact_id:expr, $progress:expr) => {
assert!(
$progress >= 0 && $progress <= 1000,
"value in range 0..1000 expected with: 0=error, 1..999=progress, 1000=success"
);
$context.emit_event($crate::events::EventType::SecurejoinJoinerProgress {
contact_id: $contact_id,
progress: $progress,
});
};
}
macro_rules! inviter_progress {
($context:tt, $contact_id:expr, $progress:expr) => {
assert!(
$progress >= 0 && $progress <= 1000,
"value in range 0..1000 expected with: 0=error, 1..999=progress, 1000=success"
);
$context.emit_event($crate::events::EventType::SecurejoinInviterProgress {
contact_id: $contact_id,
progress: $progress,
});
};
}
macro_rules! get_qr_attr {
($context:tt, $attr:ident) => {
$context
.bob
.read()
.await
.qr_scan
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.$attr
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
};
}
/// State for setup-contact/secure-join protocol joiner's side.
///
/// The setup-contact protocol needs to carry state for both the inviter (Alice) and the
/// joiner/invitee (Bob). For Alice this state is minimal and in the `tokens` table in the
/// database. For Bob this state is only carried live on the [Context] in this struct.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub(crate) struct Bob {
/// The next message expected by the protocol.
expects: SecureJoinStep,
/// The QR-scanned information of the currently running protocol.
pub qr_scan: Option<Lot>,
}
/// The next message expected by [Bob] in the setup-contact/secure-join protocol.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
enum SecureJoinStep {
/// No setup-contact protocol running.
NotActive,
/// Expecting the auth-required message.
///
/// This corresponds to the `vc-auth-required` or `vg-auth-required` message of step 3d.
AuthRequired,
/// Expecting the contact-confirm message.
///
/// This corresponds to the `vc-contact-confirm` or `vg-member-added` message of step
/// 6b.
ContactConfirm,
}
impl Default for SecureJoinStep {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::NotActive
}
}
pub async fn dc_get_securejoin_qr(context: &Context, group_chat_id: ChatId) -> Option<String> {
/*=======================================================
==== Alice - the inviter side ====
==== Step 1 in "Setup verified contact" protocol ====
=======================================================*/
ensure_secret_key_exists(context).await.ok();
// invitenumber will be used to allow starting the handshake,
// auth will be used to verify the fingerprint
let invitenumber =
token::lookup_or_new(context, token::Namespace::InviteNumber, group_chat_id).await;
let auth = token::lookup_or_new(context, token::Namespace::Auth, group_chat_id).await;
let self_addr = match context.get_config(Config::ConfiguredAddr).await {
Some(addr) => addr,
None => {
error!(context, "Not configured, cannot generate QR code.",);
return None;
}
};
let self_name = context
.get_config(Config::Displayname)
.await
.unwrap_or_default();
let fingerprint: Fingerprint = match get_self_fingerprint(context).await {
Some(fp) => fp,
None => {
return None;
}
};
let self_addr_urlencoded =
utf8_percent_encode(&self_addr, NON_ALPHANUMERIC_WITHOUT_DOT).to_string();
let self_name_urlencoded =
utf8_percent_encode(&self_name, NON_ALPHANUMERIC_WITHOUT_DOT).to_string();
let qr = if !group_chat_id.is_unset() {
// parameters used: a=g=x=i=s=
if let Ok(chat) = Chat::load_from_db(context, group_chat_id).await {
let group_name = chat.get_name();
let group_name_urlencoded =
utf8_percent_encode(&group_name, NON_ALPHANUMERIC).to_string();
Some(format!(
"OPENPGP4FPR:{}#a={}&g={}&x={}&i={}&s={}",
fingerprint.hex(),
self_addr_urlencoded,
&group_name_urlencoded,
&chat.grpid,
&invitenumber,
&auth,
))
} else {
error!(context, "Cannot get QR-code for chat-id {}", group_chat_id,);
return None;
}
} else {
// parameters used: a=n=i=s=
Some(format!(
"OPENPGP4FPR:{}#a={}&n={}&i={}&s={}",
fingerprint.hex(),
self_addr_urlencoded,
self_name_urlencoded,
&invitenumber,
&auth,
))
};
info!(context, "Generated QR code: {}", qr.as_ref().unwrap());
qr
}
async fn get_self_fingerprint(context: &Context) -> Option<Fingerprint> {
match SignedPublicKey::load_self(context).await {
Ok(key) => Some(key.fingerprint()),
Err(_) => {
warn!(context, "get_self_fingerprint(): failed to load key");
None
}
}
}
async fn cleanup(context: &Context, ongoing_allocated: bool) {
let mut bob = context.bob.write().await;
bob.expects = SecureJoinStep::NotActive;
bob.qr_scan = None;
if ongoing_allocated {
context.free_ongoing().await;
}
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum JoinError {
#[error("Unknown QR-code")]
QrCode,
#[error("Aborted by user")]
Aborted,
#[error("Failed to send handshake message")]
SendMessage(#[from] SendMsgError),
// Note that this can currently only occur if there is a bug in the QR/Lot code as this
// is supposed to create a contact for us.
#[error("Unknown contact (this is a bug)")]
UnknownContact,
// Note that this can only occur if we failed to create the chat correctly.
#[error("No Chat found for group (this is a bug)")]
MissingChat(#[source] sql::Error),
}
/// Take a scanned QR-code and do the setup-contact/join-group/invite handshake.
///
/// This is the start of the process for the joiner. See the module and ffi documentation
/// for more details.
///
/// When joining a group this will start an "ongoing" process and will block until the
/// process is completed, the [ChatId] for the new group is not known any sooner. When
/// verifying a contact this returns immediately.
pub async fn dc_join_securejoin(context: &Context, qr: &str) -> Result<ChatId, JoinError> {
if context.alloc_ongoing().await.is_err() {
cleanup(&context, false).await;
return Err(JoinError::Aborted);
}
securejoin(context, qr).await
}
async fn securejoin(context: &Context, qr: &str) -> Result<ChatId, JoinError> {
/*========================================================
==== Bob - the joiner's side =====
==== Step 2 in "Setup verified contact" protocol =====
========================================================*/
info!(context, "Requesting secure-join ...",);
ensure_secret_key_exists(context).await.ok();
let qr_scan = check_qr(context, &qr).await;
if qr_scan.state != LotState::QrAskVerifyContact && qr_scan.state != LotState::QrAskVerifyGroup
{
error!(context, "Unknown QR code.",);
cleanup(&context, true).await;
return Err(JoinError::QrCode);
}
let contact_chat_id = match chat::create_by_contact_id(context, qr_scan.id).await {
Ok(chat_id) => chat_id,
Err(_) => {
error!(context, "Unknown contact.");
cleanup(&context, true).await;
return Err(JoinError::UnknownContact);
}
};
if context.shall_stop_ongoing().await {
cleanup(&context, true).await;
return Err(JoinError::Aborted);
}
let join_vg = qr_scan.get_state() == LotState::QrAskVerifyGroup;
{
let mut bob = context.bob.write().await;
bob.qr_scan = Some(qr_scan);
}
if fingerprint_equals_sender(
context,
context
.bob
.read()
.await
.qr_scan
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.fingerprint
.as_ref()
.unwrap(),
contact_chat_id,
)
.await
{
// the scanned fingerprint matches Alice's key,
// we can proceed to step 4b) directly and save two mails
info!(context, "Taking protocol shortcut.");
context.bob.write().await.expects = SecureJoinStep::ContactConfirm;
joiner_progress!(
context,
chat_id_2_contact_id(context, contact_chat_id).await,
400
);
let own_fingerprint = get_self_fingerprint(context).await;
// Bob -> Alice
if let Err(err) = send_handshake_msg(
context,
contact_chat_id,
if join_vg {
"vg-request-with-auth"
} else {
"vc-request-with-auth"
},
get_qr_attr!(context, auth).to_string(),
own_fingerprint,
if join_vg {
get_qr_attr!(context, text2).to_string()
} else {
"".to_string()
},
)
.await
{
error!(context, "failed to send handshake message: {}", err);
cleanup(&context, true).await;
return Err(JoinError::SendMessage(err));
}
} else {
context.bob.write().await.expects = SecureJoinStep::AuthRequired;
// Bob -> Alice
if let Err(err) = send_handshake_msg(
context,
contact_chat_id,
if join_vg { "vg-request" } else { "vc-request" },
get_qr_attr!(context, invitenumber),
None,
"",
)
.await
{
error!(context, "failed to send handshake message: {}", err);
cleanup(&context, true).await;
return Err(JoinError::SendMessage(err));
}
}
if join_vg {
// for a group-join, wait until the secure-join is done and the group is created
while !context.shall_stop_ongoing().await {
async_std::task::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
}
// handle_securejoin_handshake() calls Context::stop_ongoing before the group chat
// is created (it is created after handle_securejoin_handshake() returns by
// dc_receive_imf()). As a hack we just wait a bit for it to appear.
let start = Instant::now();
let chatid = loop {
{
let bob = context.bob.read().await;
let grpid = bob.qr_scan.as_ref().unwrap().text2.as_ref().unwrap();
match chat::get_chat_id_by_grpid(context, grpid).await {
Ok((chatid, _is_protected, _blocked)) => break chatid,
Err(err) => {
if start.elapsed() > Duration::from_secs(7) {
return Err(JoinError::MissingChat(err));
}
}
}
}
async_std::task::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
};
cleanup(&context, true).await;
Ok(chatid)
} else {
// for a one-to-one-chat, the chat is already known, return the chat-id,
// the verification runs in background
context.free_ongoing().await;
Ok(contact_chat_id)
}
}
/// Error for [send_handshake_msg].
///
/// Wrapping the [anyhow::Error] means we can "impl From" more easily on errors from this
/// function.
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("Failed sending handshake message")]
pub struct SendMsgError(#[from] anyhow::Error);
async fn send_handshake_msg(
context: &Context,
contact_chat_id: ChatId,
step: &str,
param2: impl AsRef<str>,
fingerprint: Option<Fingerprint>,
grpid: impl AsRef<str>,
) -> Result<(), SendMsgError> {
let mut msg = Message::default();
msg.viewtype = Viewtype::Text;
msg.text = Some(format!("Secure-Join: {}", step));
msg.hidden = true;
msg.param.set_cmd(SystemMessage::SecurejoinMessage);
if step.is_empty() {
msg.param.remove(Param::Arg);
} else {
msg.param.set(Param::Arg, step);
}
if !param2.as_ref().is_empty() {
msg.param.set(Param::Arg2, param2);
}
if let Some(fp) = fingerprint {
msg.param.set(Param::Arg3, fp.hex());
}
if !grpid.as_ref().is_empty() {
msg.param.set(Param::Arg4, grpid.as_ref());
}
if step == "vg-request" || step == "vc-request" {
msg.param.set_int(Param::ForcePlaintext, 1);
} else {
msg.param.set_int(Param::GuaranteeE2ee, 1);
}
chat::send_msg(context, contact_chat_id, &mut msg).await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn chat_id_2_contact_id(context: &Context, contact_chat_id: ChatId) -> u32 {
if let [contact_id] = chat::get_chat_contacts(context, contact_chat_id).await[..] {
contact_id
} else {
0
}
}
async fn fingerprint_equals_sender(
context: &Context,
fingerprint: &Fingerprint,
contact_chat_id: ChatId,
) -> bool {
if let [contact_id] = chat::get_chat_contacts(context, contact_chat_id).await[..] {
if let Ok(contact) = Contact::load_from_db(context, contact_id).await {
let peerstate = match Peerstate::from_addr(context, contact.get_addr()).await {
Ok(peerstate) => peerstate,
Err(err) => {
warn!(
context,
"Failed to sender peerstate for {}: {}",
contact.get_addr(),
err
);
return false;
}
};
if let Some(peerstate) = peerstate {
if peerstate.public_key_fingerprint.is_some()
&& fingerprint == peerstate.public_key_fingerprint.as_ref().unwrap()
{
return true;
}
}
}
}
false
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub(crate) enum HandshakeError {
#[error("Can not be called with special contact ID")]
SpecialContactId,
#[error("Not a Secure-Join message")]
NotSecureJoinMsg,
#[error("Failed to look up or create chat for contact #{contact_id}")]
NoChat {
contact_id: u32,
#[source]
cause: Error,
},
#[error("Chat for group {group} not found")]
ChatNotFound { group: String },
#[error("No configured self address found")]
NoSelfAddr,
#[error("Failed to send message")]
MsgSendFailed(#[from] SendMsgError),
#[error("Failed to parse fingerprint")]
BadFingerprint(#[from] crate::key::FingerprintError),
}
/// What to do with a Secure-Join handshake message after it was handled.
pub(crate) enum HandshakeMessage {
/// The message has been fully handled and should be removed/delete.
Done,
/// The message should be ignored/hidden, but not removed/deleted.
Ignore,
/// The message should be further processed by incoming message handling.
Propagate,
}
/// Handle incoming secure-join handshake.
///
/// This function will update the securejoin state in [Context::bob]
/// and also terminate the ongoing process using
/// [Context::stop_ongoing] as required by the protocol.
///
/// A message which results in [Err] will be hidden from the user but
/// not deleted, it may be a valid message for something else we are
/// not aware off. E.g. it could be part of a handshake performed by
/// another DC app on the same account.
///
/// When handle_securejoin_handshake() is called,
/// the message is not yet filed in the database;
/// this is done by receive_imf() later on as needed.
#[allow(clippy::indexing_slicing)]
pub(crate) async fn handle_securejoin_handshake(
context: &Context,
mime_message: &MimeMessage,
contact_id: u32,
) -> Result<HandshakeMessage, HandshakeError> {
if contact_id <= DC_CONTACT_ID_LAST_SPECIAL {
return Err(HandshakeError::SpecialContactId);
}
let step = mime_message
.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin)
.ok_or(HandshakeError::NotSecureJoinMsg)?;
info!(
context,
">>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> secure-join message \'{}\' received", step,
);
let contact_chat_id =
match chat::create_or_lookup_by_contact_id(context, contact_id, Blocked::Not).await {
Ok((chat_id, blocked)) => {
if blocked != Blocked::Not {
chat_id.unblock(context).await;
}
chat_id
}
Err(err) => {
return Err(HandshakeError::NoChat {
contact_id,
cause: err,
});
}
};
let join_vg = step.starts_with("vg-");
match step.as_str() {
"vg-request" | "vc-request" => {
/*=======================================================
==== Alice - the inviter side ====
==== Step 3 in "Setup verified contact" protocol ====
=======================================================*/
// this message may be unencrypted (Bob, the joiner and the sender, might not have Alice's key yet)
// it just ensures, we have Bobs key now. If we do _not_ have the key because eg. MitM has removed it,
// send_message() will fail with the error "End-to-end-encryption unavailable unexpectedly.", so, there is no additional check needed here.
// verify that the `Secure-Join-Invitenumber:`-header matches invitenumber written to the QR code
let invitenumber = match mime_message.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoinInvitenumber) {
Some(n) => n,
None => {
warn!(context, "Secure-join denied (invitenumber missing)");
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
};
if !token::exists(context, token::Namespace::InviteNumber, &invitenumber).await {
warn!(context, "Secure-join denied (bad invitenumber).");
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
info!(context, "Secure-join requested.",);
inviter_progress!(context, contact_id, 300);
// Alice -> Bob
send_handshake_msg(
context,
contact_chat_id,
&format!("{}-auth-required", &step[..2]),
"",
None,
"",
)
.await?;
Ok(HandshakeMessage::Done)
}
"vg-auth-required" | "vc-auth-required" => {
/*========================================================
==== Bob - the joiner's side =====
==== Step 4 in "Setup verified contact" protocol =====
========================================================*/
// verify that Alice's Autocrypt key and fingerprint matches the QR-code
let cond = {
let bob = context.bob.read().await;
let scan = bob.qr_scan.as_ref();
scan.is_none()
|| bob.expects != SecureJoinStep::AuthRequired
|| join_vg && scan.unwrap().state != LotState::QrAskVerifyGroup
};
if cond {
warn!(context, "auth-required message out of sync.");
// no error, just aborted somehow or a mail from another handshake
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
let scanned_fingerprint_of_alice: Fingerprint =
get_qr_attr!(context, fingerprint).clone();
let auth = get_qr_attr!(context, auth).to_string();
if !encrypted_and_signed(context, mime_message, Some(&scanned_fingerprint_of_alice)) {
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
context,
contact_chat_id,
if mime_message.was_encrypted() {
"No valid signature."
} else {
"Not encrypted."
},
)
.await;
context.stop_ongoing().await;
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
if !fingerprint_equals_sender(context, &scanned_fingerprint_of_alice, contact_chat_id)
.await
{
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
context,
contact_chat_id,
"Fingerprint mismatch on joiner-side.",
)
.await;
context.stop_ongoing().await;
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
info!(context, "Fingerprint verified.",);
let own_fingerprint = get_self_fingerprint(context).await.unwrap();
joiner_progress!(context, contact_id, 400);
context.bob.write().await.expects = SecureJoinStep::ContactConfirm;
// Bob -> Alice
send_handshake_msg(
context,
contact_chat_id,
&format!("{}-request-with-auth", &step[..2]),
auth,
Some(own_fingerprint),
if join_vg {
get_qr_attr!(context, text2).to_string()
} else {
"".to_string()
},
)
.await?;
Ok(HandshakeMessage::Done)
}
"vg-request-with-auth" | "vc-request-with-auth" => {
/*==========================================================
==== Alice - the inviter side ====
==== Steps 5+6 in "Setup verified contact" protocol ====
==== Step 6 in "Out-of-band verified groups" protocol ====
==========================================================*/
// verify that Secure-Join-Fingerprint:-header matches the fingerprint of Bob
let fingerprint: Fingerprint = match mime_message.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoinFingerprint)
{
Some(fp) => fp.parse()?,
None => {
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
context,
contact_chat_id,
"Fingerprint not provided.",
)
.await;
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
};
if !encrypted_and_signed(context, mime_message, Some(&fingerprint)) {
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
context,
contact_chat_id,
"Auth not encrypted.",
)
.await;
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
if !fingerprint_equals_sender(context, &fingerprint, contact_chat_id).await {
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
context,
contact_chat_id,
"Fingerprint mismatch on inviter-side.",
)
.await;
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
info!(context, "Fingerprint verified.",);
// verify that the `Secure-Join-Auth:`-header matches the secret written to the QR code
let auth_0 = match mime_message.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoinAuth) {
Some(auth) => auth,
None => {
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
context,
contact_chat_id,
"Auth not provided.",
)
.await;
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
};
if !token::exists(context, token::Namespace::Auth, &auth_0).await {
could_not_establish_secure_connection(context, contact_chat_id, "Auth invalid.")
.await;
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
if mark_peer_as_verified(context, &fingerprint).await.is_err() {
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
context,
contact_chat_id,
"Fingerprint mismatch on inviter-side.",
)
.await;
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
Contact::scaleup_origin_by_id(context, contact_id, Origin::SecurejoinInvited).await;
info!(context, "Auth verified.",);
secure_connection_established(context, contact_chat_id).await;
emit_event!(context, EventType::ContactsChanged(Some(contact_id)));
inviter_progress!(context, contact_id, 600);
if join_vg {
// the vg-member-added message is special:
// this is a normal Chat-Group-Member-Added message
// with an additional Secure-Join header
let field_grpid = match mime_message.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoinGroup) {
Some(s) => s.as_str(),
None => {
warn!(context, "Missing Secure-Join-Group header");
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
};
match chat::get_chat_id_by_grpid(context, field_grpid).await {
Ok((group_chat_id, _, _)) => {
if let Err(err) =
chat::add_contact_to_chat_ex(context, group_chat_id, contact_id, true)
.await
{
error!(context, "failed to add contact: {}", err);
}
}
Err(err) => {
error!(context, "Chat {} not found: {}", &field_grpid, err);
return Err(HandshakeError::ChatNotFound {
group: field_grpid.to_string(),
});
}
}
} else {
// Alice -> Bob
send_handshake_msg(
context,
contact_chat_id,
"vc-contact-confirm",
"",
Some(fingerprint),
"",
)
.await?;
inviter_progress!(context, contact_id, 1000);
}
Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore) // "Done" would delete the message and break multi-device (the key from Autocrypt-header is needed)
}
"vg-member-added" | "vc-contact-confirm" => {
/*=======================================================
==== Bob - the joiner's side ====
==== Step 7 in "Setup verified contact" protocol ====
=======================================================*/
let abort_retval = if join_vg {
HandshakeMessage::Propagate
} else {
HandshakeMessage::Ignore
};
if context.bob.read().await.expects != SecureJoinStep::ContactConfirm {
info!(context, "Message belongs to a different handshake.",);
return Ok(abort_retval);
}
let cond = {
let bob = context.bob.read().await;
let scan = bob.qr_scan.as_ref();
scan.is_none() || (join_vg && scan.unwrap().state != LotState::QrAskVerifyGroup)
};
if cond {
warn!(
context,
"Message out of sync or belongs to a different handshake.",
);
return Ok(abort_retval);
}
let scanned_fingerprint_of_alice: Fingerprint =
get_qr_attr!(context, fingerprint).clone();
let vg_expect_encrypted = if join_vg {
let group_id = get_qr_attr!(context, text2).to_string();
// This is buggy, is_protected_group will always be
// false since the group is created by receive_imf by
// the very handshake message we're handling now. But
// only after we have returned. It does not impact
// the security invariants of secure-join however.
let (_, is_protected_group, _) = chat::get_chat_id_by_grpid(context, &group_id)
.await
.unwrap_or((ChatId::new(0), false, Blocked::Not));
// when joining a non-verified group
// the vg-member-added message may be unencrypted
// when not all group members have keys or prefer encryption.
// So only expect encryption if this is a verified group
is_protected_group
} else {
// setup contact is always encrypted
true
};
if vg_expect_encrypted
&& !encrypted_and_signed(context, mime_message, Some(&scanned_fingerprint_of_alice))
{
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
context,
contact_chat_id,
"Contact confirm message not encrypted.",
)
.await;
return Ok(abort_retval);
}
if mark_peer_as_verified(context, &scanned_fingerprint_of_alice)
.await
.is_err()
{
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
context,
contact_chat_id,
"Fingerprint mismatch on joiner-side.",
)
.await;
return Ok(abort_retval);
}
Contact::scaleup_origin_by_id(context, contact_id, Origin::SecurejoinJoined).await;
emit_event!(context, EventType::ContactsChanged(None));
let cg_member_added = mime_message
.get(HeaderDef::ChatGroupMemberAdded)
.map(|s| s.as_str())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "");
if join_vg
&& !context
.is_self_addr(cg_member_added)
.await
.map_err(|_| HandshakeError::NoSelfAddr)?
{
info!(context, "Message belongs to a different handshake (scaled up contact anyway to allow creation of group).");
return Ok(abort_retval);
}
secure_connection_established(context, contact_chat_id).await;
context.bob.write().await.expects = SecureJoinStep::NotActive;
// Bob -> Alice
send_handshake_msg(
context,
contact_chat_id,
if join_vg {
"vg-member-added-received"
} else {
"vc-contact-confirm-received" // only for observe_securejoin_on_other_device()
},
"",
Some(scanned_fingerprint_of_alice),
"",
)
.await?;
context.stop_ongoing().await;
Ok(if join_vg {
HandshakeMessage::Propagate
} else {
HandshakeMessage::Ignore // "Done" deletes the message and breaks multi-device
})
}
"vg-member-added-received" | "vc-contact-confirm-received" => {
/*==========================================================
==== Alice - the inviter side ====
==== Step 8 in "Out-of-band verified groups" protocol ====
==========================================================*/
if let Ok(contact) = Contact::get_by_id(context, contact_id).await {
if contact.is_verified(context).await == VerifiedStatus::Unverified {
warn!(context, "{} invalid.", step);
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
if join_vg {
// Responsible for showing "$Bob securely joined $group" message
inviter_progress!(context, contact_id, 800);
inviter_progress!(context, contact_id, 1000);
let field_grpid = mime_message
.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoinGroup)
.map(|s| s.as_str())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "");
if let Err(err) = chat::get_chat_id_by_grpid(context, &field_grpid).await {
warn!(context, "Failed to lookup chat_id from grpid: {}", err);
return Err(HandshakeError::ChatNotFound {
group: field_grpid.to_string(),
});
}
}
Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore) // "Done" deletes the message and breaks multi-device
} else {
warn!(context, "{} invalid.", step);
Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore)
}
}
_ => {
warn!(context, "invalid step: {}", step);
Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore)
}
}
}
/// observe_securejoin_on_other_device() must be called when a self-sent securejoin message is seen.
///
/// in a multi-device-setup, there may be other devices that "see" the handshake messages.
/// if the seen messages seen are self-sent messages encrypted+signed correctly with our key,
/// we can make some conclusions of it:
///
/// - if we see the self-sent-message vg-member-added/vc-contact-confirm,
/// we know that we're an inviter-observer.
/// the inviting device has marked a peer as verified on vg-request-with-auth/vc-request-with-auth
/// before sending vg-member-added/vc-contact-confirm - so, if we observe vg-member-added/vc-contact-confirm,
/// we can mark the peer as verified as well.
///
/// - if we see the self-sent-message vg-member-added-received
/// we know that we're an joiner-observer.
/// the joining device has marked the peer as verified on vg-member-added/vc-contact-confirm
/// before sending vg-member-added-received - so, if we observe vg-member-added-received,
/// we can mark the peer as verified as well.
pub(crate) async fn observe_securejoin_on_other_device(
context: &Context,
mime_message: &MimeMessage,
contact_id: u32,
) -> Result<HandshakeMessage, HandshakeError> {
if contact_id <= DC_CONTACT_ID_LAST_SPECIAL {
return Err(HandshakeError::SpecialContactId);
}
let step = mime_message
.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin)
.ok_or(HandshakeError::NotSecureJoinMsg)?;
info!(context, "observing secure-join message \'{}\'", step);
let contact_chat_id =
match chat::create_or_lookup_by_contact_id(context, contact_id, Blocked::Not).await {
Ok((chat_id, blocked)) => {
if blocked != Blocked::Not {
chat_id.unblock(context).await;
}
chat_id
}
Err(err) => {
return Err(HandshakeError::NoChat {
contact_id,
cause: err,
});
}
};
match step.as_str() {
"vg-member-added"
| "vc-contact-confirm"
| "vg-member-added-received"
| "vc-contact-confirm-received" => {
if !encrypted_and_signed(
context,
mime_message,
get_self_fingerprint(context).await.as_ref(),
) {
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
context,
contact_chat_id,
"Message not encrypted correctly.",
)
.await;
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
let fingerprint: Fingerprint = match mime_message.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoinFingerprint)
{
Some(fp) => fp.parse()?,
None => {
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
context,
contact_chat_id,
"Fingerprint not provided, please update Delta Chat on all your devices.",
)
.await;
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
};
if mark_peer_as_verified(context, &fingerprint).await.is_err() {
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
context,
contact_chat_id,
format!("Fingerprint mismatch on observing {}.", step).as_ref(),
)
.await;
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
}
Ok(if step.as_str() == "vg-member-added" {
HandshakeMessage::Propagate
} else {
HandshakeMessage::Ignore
})
}
_ => Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore),
}
}
async fn secure_connection_established(context: &Context, contact_chat_id: ChatId) {
let contact_id: u32 = chat_id_2_contact_id(context, contact_chat_id).await;
let contact = Contact::get_by_id(context, contact_id).await;
let addr = if let Ok(ref contact) = contact {
contact.get_addr()
} else {
"?"
};
let msg = context
.stock_string_repl_str(StockMessage::ContactVerified, addr)
.await;
chat::add_info_msg(context, contact_chat_id, msg).await;
emit_event!(context, EventType::ChatModified(contact_chat_id));
}
async fn could_not_establish_secure_connection(
context: &Context,
contact_chat_id: ChatId,
details: &str,
) {
let contact_id = chat_id_2_contact_id(context, contact_chat_id).await;
let contact = Contact::get_by_id(context, contact_id).await;
let msg = context
.stock_string_repl_str(
StockMessage::ContactNotVerified,
if let Ok(ref contact) = contact {
contact.get_addr()
} else {
"?"
},
)
.await;
chat::add_info_msg(context, contact_chat_id, &msg).await;
error!(context, "{} ({})", &msg, details);
}
async fn mark_peer_as_verified(context: &Context, fingerprint: &Fingerprint) -> Result<(), Error> {
if let Some(ref mut peerstate) =
Peerstate::from_fingerprint(context, &context.sql, fingerprint).await?
{
if peerstate.set_verified(
PeerstateKeyType::PublicKey,
fingerprint,
PeerstateVerifiedStatus::BidirectVerified,
) {
peerstate.prefer_encrypt = EncryptPreference::Mutual;
peerstate.to_save = Some(ToSave::All);
peerstate
.save_to_db(&context.sql, false)
.await
.unwrap_or_default();
return Ok(());
}
}
bail!(
"could not mark peer as verified for fingerprint {}",
fingerprint.hex()
);
}
/* ******************************************************************************
* Tools: Misc.
******************************************************************************/
fn encrypted_and_signed(
context: &Context,
mimeparser: &MimeMessage,
expected_fingerprint: Option<&Fingerprint>,
) -> bool {
if !mimeparser.was_encrypted() {
warn!(context, "Message not encrypted.",);
false
} else if let Some(expected_fingerprint) = expected_fingerprint {
if !mimeparser.signatures.contains(expected_fingerprint) {
warn!(
context,
"Message does not match expected fingerprint {}.", expected_fingerprint,
);
false
} else {
true
}
} else {
warn!(context, "Fingerprint for comparison missing.");
false
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::chat;
use crate::chat::ProtectionStatus;
use crate::peerstate::Peerstate;
use crate::test_utils::TestContext;
#[async_std::test]
async fn test_setup_contact() {
let alice = TestContext::new_alice().await;
let bob = TestContext::new_bob().await;
// Generate QR-code, ChatId(0) indicates setup-contact
let qr = dc_get_securejoin_qr(&alice.ctx, ChatId::new(0))
.await
.unwrap();
// Bob scans QR-code, sends vc-request
let bob_chatid = dc_join_securejoin(&bob.ctx, &qr).await.unwrap();
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
assert_eq!(sent.id(), bob_chatid);
assert_eq!(sent.recipient(), "alice@example.com".parse().unwrap());
let msg = alice.parse_msg(&sent).await;
assert!(!msg.was_encrypted());
assert_eq!(msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(), "vc-request");
assert!(msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoinInvitenumber).is_some());
// Alice receives vc-request, sends vc-auth-required
alice.recv_msg(&sent).await;
let sent = alice.pop_sent_msg().await;
let msg = bob.parse_msg(&sent).await;
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
assert_eq!(msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(), "vc-auth-required");
// Bob receives vc-auth-required, sends vc-request-with-auth
bob.recv_msg(&sent).await;
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
let msg = alice.parse_msg(&sent).await;
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
assert_eq!(
msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
"vc-request-with-auth"
);
assert!(msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoinAuth).is_some());
let bob_fp = SignedPublicKey::load_self(&bob.ctx)
.await
.unwrap()
.fingerprint();
assert_eq!(
*msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoinFingerprint).unwrap(),
bob_fp.hex()
);
// Alice should not yet have Bob verified
let contact_bob_id =
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&alice.ctx, "bob@example.net", Origin::Unknown).await;
let contact_bob = Contact::load_from_db(&alice.ctx, contact_bob_id)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await,
VerifiedStatus::Unverified
);
// Alice receives vc-request-with-auth, sends vc-contact-confirm
alice.recv_msg(&sent).await;
assert_eq!(
contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await,
VerifiedStatus::BidirectVerified
);
let sent = alice.pop_sent_msg().await;
let msg = bob.parse_msg(&sent).await;
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
assert_eq!(
msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
"vc-contact-confirm"
);
// Bob should not yet have Alice verified
let contact_alice_id =
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&bob.ctx, "alice@example.com", Origin::Unknown).await;
let contact_alice = Contact::load_from_db(&bob.ctx, contact_alice_id)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
contact_bob.is_verified(&bob.ctx).await,
VerifiedStatus::Unverified
);
// Bob receives vc-contact-confirm, sends vc-contact-confirm-received
bob.recv_msg(&sent).await;
assert_eq!(
contact_alice.is_verified(&bob.ctx).await,
VerifiedStatus::BidirectVerified
);
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
let msg = alice.parse_msg(&sent).await;
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
assert_eq!(
msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
"vc-contact-confirm-received"
);
}
#[async_std::test]
async fn test_setup_contact_bad_qr() {
let bob = TestContext::new_bob().await;
let ret = dc_join_securejoin(&bob.ctx, "not a qr code").await;
assert!(matches!(ret, Err(JoinError::QrCode)));
}
#[async_std::test]
async fn test_setup_contact_bob_knows_alice() {
let alice = TestContext::new_alice().await;
let bob = TestContext::new_bob().await;
// Ensure Bob knows Alice_FP
let alice_pubkey = SignedPublicKey::load_self(&alice.ctx).await.unwrap();
let peerstate = Peerstate {
context: &bob.ctx,
addr: "alice@example.com".into(),
last_seen: 10,
last_seen_autocrypt: 10,
prefer_encrypt: EncryptPreference::Mutual,
public_key: Some(alice_pubkey.clone()),
public_key_fingerprint: Some(alice_pubkey.fingerprint()),
gossip_key: Some(alice_pubkey.clone()),
gossip_timestamp: 10,
gossip_key_fingerprint: Some(alice_pubkey.fingerprint()),
verified_key: None,
verified_key_fingerprint: None,
to_save: Some(ToSave::All),
fingerprint_changed: false,
};
peerstate.save_to_db(&bob.ctx.sql, true).await.unwrap();
// Generate QR-code, ChatId(0) indicates setup-contact
let qr = dc_get_securejoin_qr(&alice.ctx, ChatId::new(0))
.await
.unwrap();
// Bob scans QR-code, sends vc-request-with-auth, skipping vc-request
dc_join_securejoin(&bob.ctx, &qr).await.unwrap();
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
let msg = alice.parse_msg(&sent).await;
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
assert_eq!(
msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
"vc-request-with-auth"
);
assert!(msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoinAuth).is_some());
let bob_fp = SignedPublicKey::load_self(&bob.ctx)
.await
.unwrap()
.fingerprint();
assert_eq!(
*msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoinFingerprint).unwrap(),
bob_fp.hex()
);
// Alice should not yet have Bob verified
let (contact_bob_id, _modified) = Contact::add_or_lookup(
&alice.ctx,
"Bob",
"bob@example.net",
Origin::ManuallyCreated,
)
.await
.unwrap();
let contact_bob = Contact::load_from_db(&alice.ctx, contact_bob_id)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await,
VerifiedStatus::Unverified
);
// Alice receives vc-request-with-auth, sends vc-contact-confirm
alice.recv_msg(&sent).await;
assert_eq!(
contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await,
VerifiedStatus::BidirectVerified
);
let sent = alice.pop_sent_msg().await;
let msg = bob.parse_msg(&sent).await;
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
assert_eq!(
msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
"vc-contact-confirm"
);
// Bob should not yet have Alice verified
let contact_alice_id =
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&bob.ctx, "alice@example.com", Origin::Unknown).await;
let contact_alice = Contact::load_from_db(&bob.ctx, contact_alice_id)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
contact_bob.is_verified(&bob.ctx).await,
VerifiedStatus::Unverified
);
// Bob receives vc-contact-confirm, sends vc-contact-confirm-received
bob.recv_msg(&sent).await;
assert_eq!(
contact_alice.is_verified(&bob.ctx).await,
VerifiedStatus::BidirectVerified
);
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
let msg = alice.parse_msg(&sent).await;
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
assert_eq!(
msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
"vc-contact-confirm-received"
);
}
#[async_std::test]
async fn test_secure_join() {
let alice = TestContext::new_alice().await;
let bob = TestContext::new_bob().await;
let chatid = chat::create_group_chat(&alice.ctx, ProtectionStatus::Protected, "the chat")
.await
.unwrap();
// Generate QR-code, secure-join implied by chatid
let qr = dc_get_securejoin_qr(&alice.ctx, chatid).await.unwrap();
// Bob scans QR-code, sends vg-request; blocks on ongoing process
let joiner = {
let qr = qr.clone();
let ctx = bob.ctx.clone();
async_std::task::spawn(async move { dc_join_securejoin(&ctx, &qr).await.unwrap() })
};
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
assert_eq!(sent.recipient(), "alice@example.com".parse().unwrap());
let msg = alice.parse_msg(&sent).await;
assert!(!msg.was_encrypted());
assert_eq!(msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(), "vg-request");
assert!(msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoinInvitenumber).is_some());
// Alice receives vg-request, sends vg-auth-required
alice.recv_msg(&sent).await;
let sent = alice.pop_sent_msg().await;
let msg = bob.parse_msg(&sent).await;
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
assert_eq!(msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(), "vg-auth-required");
// Bob receives vg-auth-required, sends vg-request-with-auth
bob.recv_msg(&sent).await;
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
let msg = alice.parse_msg(&sent).await;
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
assert_eq!(
msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
"vg-request-with-auth"
);
assert!(msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoinAuth).is_some());
let bob_fp = SignedPublicKey::load_self(&bob.ctx)
.await
.unwrap()
.fingerprint();
assert_eq!(
*msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoinFingerprint).unwrap(),
bob_fp.hex()
);
// Alice should not yet have Bob verified
let contact_bob_id =
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&alice.ctx, "bob@example.net", Origin::Unknown).await;
let contact_bob = Contact::load_from_db(&alice.ctx, contact_bob_id)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await,
VerifiedStatus::Unverified
);
// Alice receives vg-request-with-auth, sends vg-member-added
alice.recv_msg(&sent).await;
assert_eq!(
contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await,
VerifiedStatus::BidirectVerified
);
let sent = alice.pop_sent_msg().await;
let msg = bob.parse_msg(&sent).await;
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
assert_eq!(msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(), "vg-member-added");
// Bob should not yet have Alice verified
let contact_alice_id =
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&bob.ctx, "alice@example.com", Origin::Unknown).await;
let contact_alice = Contact::load_from_db(&bob.ctx, contact_alice_id)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
contact_bob.is_verified(&bob.ctx).await,
VerifiedStatus::Unverified
);
// Bob receives vg-member-added, sends vg-member-added-received
bob.recv_msg(&sent).await;
assert_eq!(
contact_alice.is_verified(&bob.ctx).await,
VerifiedStatus::BidirectVerified
);
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
let msg = alice.parse_msg(&sent).await;
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
assert_eq!(
msg.get(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
"vg-member-added-received"
);
let bob_chatid = joiner.await;
let bob_chat = Chat::load_from_db(&bob.ctx, bob_chatid).await.unwrap();
assert!(bob_chat.is_protected());
}
}