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In multi-device case `vg-request-with-auth` left on IMAP may result in situation when Bob joins the group, then leaves it, then second Alice device comes online and processes `vg-request-with-auth` again and adds Bob back. So we should IMAP-delete `vg-request-with-auth`. Another device will know the Bob's key from Autocrypt-Gossip. It's not a problem if Alice loses state (restores from an old backup) or goes offline for long before sending `vg-member-added`, anyway it may not be delivered by the server, rather Bob should retry sending SecureJoin messages as he is a part which wants to join, so let's not solve this for now.
1594 lines
62 KiB
Rust
1594 lines
62 KiB
Rust
//! Implementation of [SecureJoin protocols](https://securejoin.delta.chat/).
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use anyhow::{ensure, Context as _, Error, Result};
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use percent_encoding::{utf8_percent_encode, NON_ALPHANUMERIC};
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use crate::aheader::EncryptPreference;
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use crate::chat::{self, get_chat_id_by_grpid, Chat, ChatId, ChatIdBlocked, ProtectionStatus};
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use crate::chatlist_events;
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use crate::config::Config;
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use crate::constants::{Blocked, Chattype, NON_ALPHANUMERIC_WITHOUT_DOT};
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use crate::contact::{Contact, ContactId, Origin};
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use crate::context::Context;
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use crate::e2ee::ensure_secret_key_exists;
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use crate::events::EventType;
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use crate::headerdef::HeaderDef;
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use crate::key::{load_self_public_key, DcKey, Fingerprint};
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use crate::message::{Message, Viewtype};
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use crate::mimeparser::{MimeMessage, SystemMessage};
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use crate::param::Param;
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use crate::peerstate::Peerstate;
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use crate::qr::check_qr;
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use crate::securejoin::bob::JoinerProgress;
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use crate::stock_str;
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use crate::sync::Sync::*;
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use crate::token;
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use crate::tools::time;
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mod bob;
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mod bobstate;
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mod qrinvite;
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pub(crate) use bobstate::BobState;
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use qrinvite::QrInvite;
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use crate::token::Namespace;
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fn inviter_progress(context: &Context, contact_id: ContactId, progress: usize) {
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debug_assert!(
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progress <= 1000,
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"value in range 0..1000 expected with: 0=error, 1..999=progress, 1000=success"
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);
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context.emit_event(EventType::SecurejoinInviterProgress {
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contact_id,
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progress,
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});
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}
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/// Generates a Secure Join QR code.
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///
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/// With `group` set to `None` this generates a setup-contact QR code, with `group` set to a
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/// [`ChatId`] generates a join-group QR code for the given chat.
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pub async fn get_securejoin_qr(context: &Context, group: Option<ChatId>) -> Result<String> {
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/*=======================================================
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==== Alice - the inviter side ====
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==== Step 1 in "Setup verified contact" protocol ====
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=======================================================*/
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ensure_secret_key_exists(context).await.ok();
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let chat = match group {
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Some(id) => {
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let chat = Chat::load_from_db(context, id).await?;
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ensure!(
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chat.typ == Chattype::Group,
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"Can't generate SecureJoin QR code for 1:1 chat {id}"
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);
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ensure!(
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!chat.grpid.is_empty(),
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"Can't generate SecureJoin QR code for ad-hoc group {id}"
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);
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Some(chat)
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}
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None => None,
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};
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let grpid = chat.as_ref().map(|c| c.grpid.as_str());
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let sync_token = token::lookup(context, Namespace::InviteNumber, grpid)
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.await?
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.is_none();
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// invitenumber will be used to allow starting the handshake,
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// auth will be used to verify the fingerprint
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let invitenumber = token::lookup_or_new(context, Namespace::InviteNumber, grpid).await?;
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let auth = token::lookup_or_new(context, Namespace::Auth, grpid).await?;
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let self_addr = context.get_primary_self_addr().await?;
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let self_name = context
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.get_config(Config::Displayname)
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.await?
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.unwrap_or_default();
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let fingerprint = get_self_fingerprint(context).await?;
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let self_addr_urlencoded =
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utf8_percent_encode(&self_addr, NON_ALPHANUMERIC_WITHOUT_DOT).to_string();
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let self_name_urlencoded =
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utf8_percent_encode(&self_name, NON_ALPHANUMERIC_WITHOUT_DOT).to_string();
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let qr = if let Some(chat) = chat {
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// parameters used: a=g=x=i=s=
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let group_name = chat.get_name();
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let group_name_urlencoded = utf8_percent_encode(group_name, NON_ALPHANUMERIC).to_string();
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if sync_token {
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context
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.sync_qr_code_tokens(Some(chat.grpid.as_str()))
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.await?;
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context.scheduler.interrupt_inbox().await;
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}
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format!(
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"https://i.delta.chat/#{}&a={}&g={}&x={}&i={}&s={}",
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fingerprint.hex(),
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self_addr_urlencoded,
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&group_name_urlencoded,
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&chat.grpid,
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&invitenumber,
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&auth,
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)
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} else {
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// parameters used: a=n=i=s=
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if sync_token {
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context.sync_qr_code_tokens(None).await?;
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context.scheduler.interrupt_inbox().await;
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}
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format!(
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"https://i.delta.chat/#{}&a={}&n={}&i={}&s={}",
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fingerprint.hex(),
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self_addr_urlencoded,
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self_name_urlencoded,
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&invitenumber,
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&auth,
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)
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};
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info!(context, "Generated QR code.");
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Ok(qr)
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}
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async fn get_self_fingerprint(context: &Context) -> Result<Fingerprint> {
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let key = load_self_public_key(context)
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.await
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.context("Failed to load key")?;
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Ok(key.dc_fingerprint())
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}
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/// Take a scanned QR-code and do the setup-contact/join-group/invite handshake.
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///
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/// This is the start of the process for the joiner. See the module and ffi documentation
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/// for more details.
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///
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/// The function returns immediately and the handshake will run in background.
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pub async fn join_securejoin(context: &Context, qr: &str) -> Result<ChatId> {
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securejoin(context, qr).await.map_err(|err| {
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warn!(context, "Fatal joiner error: {:#}", err);
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// The user just scanned this QR code so has context on what failed.
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error!(context, "QR process failed");
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err
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})
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}
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async fn securejoin(context: &Context, qr: &str) -> Result<ChatId> {
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/*========================================================
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==== Bob - the joiner's side =====
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==== Step 2 in "Setup verified contact" protocol =====
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========================================================*/
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info!(context, "Requesting secure-join ...",);
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let qr_scan = check_qr(context, qr).await?;
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let invite = QrInvite::try_from(qr_scan)?;
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bob::start_protocol(context, invite).await
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}
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/// Send handshake message from Alice's device;
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/// Bob's handshake messages are sent in `BobState::send_handshake_message()`.
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async fn send_alice_handshake_msg(
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context: &Context,
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contact_id: ContactId,
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step: &str,
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) -> Result<()> {
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let mut msg = Message {
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viewtype: Viewtype::Text,
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text: format!("Secure-Join: {step}"),
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hidden: true,
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..Default::default()
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};
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msg.param.set_cmd(SystemMessage::SecurejoinMessage);
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msg.param.set(Param::Arg, step);
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msg.param.set_int(Param::GuaranteeE2ee, 1);
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chat::send_msg(
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context,
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ChatIdBlocked::get_for_contact(context, contact_id, Blocked::Yes)
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.await?
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.id,
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&mut msg,
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)
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.await?;
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Get an unblocked chat that can be used for info messages.
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async fn info_chat_id(context: &Context, contact_id: ContactId) -> Result<ChatId> {
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let chat_id_blocked = ChatIdBlocked::get_for_contact(context, contact_id, Blocked::Not).await?;
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Ok(chat_id_blocked.id)
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}
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/// Checks fingerprint and marks the contact as forward verified
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/// if fingerprint matches.
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async fn verify_sender_by_fingerprint(
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context: &Context,
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fingerprint: &Fingerprint,
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contact_id: ContactId,
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) -> Result<bool> {
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let contact = Contact::get_by_id(context, contact_id).await?;
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let peerstate = match Peerstate::from_addr(context, contact.get_addr()).await {
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Ok(peerstate) => peerstate,
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Err(err) => {
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warn!(
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context,
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"Failed to sender peerstate for {}: {}",
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contact.get_addr(),
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err
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);
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return Ok(false);
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}
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};
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if let Some(mut peerstate) = peerstate {
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if peerstate
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.public_key_fingerprint
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.as_ref()
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.filter(|&fp| fp == fingerprint)
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.is_some()
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{
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if let Some(public_key) = &peerstate.public_key {
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let verifier = contact.get_addr().to_owned();
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peerstate.set_verified(public_key.clone(), fingerprint.clone(), verifier)?;
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peerstate.prefer_encrypt = EncryptPreference::Mutual;
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peerstate.save_to_db(&context.sql).await?;
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return Ok(true);
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}
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}
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}
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Ok(false)
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}
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/// What to do with a Secure-Join handshake message after it was handled.
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///
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/// This status is returned to [`receive_imf_inner`] which will use it to decide what to do
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/// next with this incoming setup-contact/secure-join handshake message.
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///
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/// [`receive_imf_inner`]: crate::receive_imf::receive_imf_inner
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#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub(crate) enum HandshakeMessage {
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/// The message has been fully handled and should be removed/delete.
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///
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/// This removes the message both locally and on the IMAP server.
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Done,
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/// The message should be ignored/hidden, but not removed/deleted.
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///
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/// This leaves it on the IMAP server. It means other devices on this account can
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/// receive and potentially process this message as well. This is useful for example
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/// when the other device is running the protocol and has the relevant QR-code
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/// information while this device does not have the joiner state ([`BobState`]).
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Ignore,
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/// The message should be further processed by incoming message handling.
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///
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/// This may for example result in a group being created if it is a message which added
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/// us to a group (a `vg-member-added` message).
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Propagate,
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}
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/// Handle incoming secure-join handshake.
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///
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/// This function will update the securejoin state in the database as the protocol
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/// progresses.
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///
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/// A message which results in [`Err`] will be hidden from the user but not deleted, it may
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/// be a valid message for something else we are not aware off. E.g. it could be part of a
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/// handshake performed by another DC app on the same account.
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///
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/// When `handle_securejoin_handshake()` is called, the message is not yet filed in the
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/// database; this is done by `receive_imf()` later on as needed.
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pub(crate) async fn handle_securejoin_handshake(
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context: &Context,
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mime_message: &MimeMessage,
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contact_id: ContactId,
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) -> Result<HandshakeMessage> {
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if contact_id.is_special() {
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return Err(Error::msg("Can not be called with special contact ID"));
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}
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let step = mime_message
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.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoin)
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.context("Not a Secure-Join message")?;
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info!(context, "Received secure-join message {step:?}.");
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let join_vg = step.starts_with("vg-");
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if !matches!(step, "vg-request" | "vc-request") {
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let mut self_found = false;
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let self_fingerprint = load_self_public_key(context).await?.dc_fingerprint();
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for (addr, key) in &mime_message.gossiped_keys {
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if key.dc_fingerprint() == self_fingerprint && context.is_self_addr(addr).await? {
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self_found = true;
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break;
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}
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}
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if !self_found {
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// This message isn't intended for us. Possibly the peer doesn't own the key which the
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// message is signed with but forwarded someone's message to us.
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warn!(context, "Step {step}: No self addr+pubkey gossip found.");
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return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
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}
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}
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match step {
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"vg-request" | "vc-request" => {
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/*=======================================================
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==== Alice - the inviter side ====
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==== Step 3 in "Setup verified contact" protocol ====
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=======================================================*/
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// this message may be unencrypted (Bob, the joiner and the sender, might not have Alice's key yet)
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// it just ensures, we have Bobs key now. If we do _not_ have the key because eg. MitM has removed it,
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// send_message() will fail with the error "End-to-end-encryption unavailable unexpectedly.", so, there is no additional check needed here.
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// verify that the `Secure-Join-Invitenumber:`-header matches invitenumber written to the QR code
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let invitenumber = match mime_message.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoinInvitenumber) {
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Some(n) => n,
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None => {
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warn!(context, "Secure-join denied (invitenumber missing)");
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return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
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}
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};
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if !token::exists(context, token::Namespace::InviteNumber, invitenumber).await? {
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warn!(context, "Secure-join denied (bad invitenumber).");
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return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
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}
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inviter_progress(context, contact_id, 300);
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// for setup-contact, make Alice's one-to-one chat with Bob visible
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// (secure-join-information are shown in the group chat)
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if !join_vg {
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ChatId::create_for_contact(context, contact_id).await?;
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}
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// Alice -> Bob
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send_alice_handshake_msg(
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context,
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contact_id,
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&format!("{}-auth-required", &step.get(..2).unwrap_or_default()),
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)
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.await
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.context("failed sending auth-required handshake message")?;
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Ok(HandshakeMessage::Done)
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}
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"vg-auth-required" | "vc-auth-required" => {
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/*========================================================
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==== Bob - the joiner's side =====
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==== Step 4 in "Setup verified contact" protocol =====
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========================================================*/
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bob::handle_auth_required(context, mime_message).await
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}
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"vg-request-with-auth" | "vc-request-with-auth" => {
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/*==========================================================
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==== Alice - the inviter side ====
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==== Steps 5+6 in "Setup verified contact" protocol ====
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==== Step 6 in "Out-of-band verified groups" protocol ====
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==========================================================*/
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// verify that Secure-Join-Fingerprint:-header matches the fingerprint of Bob
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let Some(fp) = mime_message.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoinFingerprint) else {
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warn!(
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context,
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"Ignoring {step} message because fingerprint is not provided."
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);
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return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
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};
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let fingerprint: Fingerprint = fp.parse()?;
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if !encrypted_and_signed(context, mime_message, &fingerprint) {
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warn!(
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context,
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"Ignoring {step} message because the message is not encrypted."
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);
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return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
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}
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if !verify_sender_by_fingerprint(context, &fingerprint, contact_id).await? {
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warn!(
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context,
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"Ignoring {step} message because of fingerprint mismatch."
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);
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return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
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}
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info!(context, "Fingerprint verified.",);
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// verify that the `Secure-Join-Auth:`-header matches the secret written to the QR code
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let Some(auth) = mime_message.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoinAuth) else {
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warn!(
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context,
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"Ignoring {step} message because of missing auth code."
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);
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return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
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};
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let Some(grpid) = token::auth_foreign_key(context, auth).await? else {
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warn!(
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context,
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"Ignoring {step} message because of invalid auth code."
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);
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return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
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};
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let group_chat_id = match grpid.as_str() {
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"" => None,
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id => {
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let Some((chat_id, ..)) = get_chat_id_by_grpid(context, id).await? else {
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warn!(context, "Ignoring {step} message: unknown grpid {id}.",);
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return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
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};
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Some(chat_id)
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}
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};
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let contact_addr = Contact::get_by_id(context, contact_id)
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.await?
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.get_addr()
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.to_owned();
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let backward_verified = true;
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let fingerprint_found = mark_peer_as_verified(
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context,
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fingerprint.clone(),
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contact_addr,
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backward_verified,
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)
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.await?;
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if !fingerprint_found {
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warn!(
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context,
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"Ignoring {step} message because of the failure to find matching peerstate."
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);
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return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
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}
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contact_id.regossip_keys(context).await?;
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ContactId::scaleup_origin(context, &[contact_id], Origin::SecurejoinInvited).await?;
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info!(context, "Auth verified.",);
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context.emit_event(EventType::ContactsChanged(Some(contact_id)));
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inviter_progress(context, contact_id, 600);
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if let Some(group_chat_id) = group_chat_id {
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// Join group.
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secure_connection_established(
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context,
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contact_id,
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group_chat_id,
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mime_message.timestamp_sent,
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)
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.await?;
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chat::add_contact_to_chat_ex(context, Nosync, group_chat_id, contact_id, true)
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.await?;
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inviter_progress(context, contact_id, 800);
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inviter_progress(context, contact_id, 1000);
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// IMAP-delete the message to avoid handling it by another device and adding the
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// member twice. Another device will know the member's key from Autocrypt-Gossip.
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Ok(HandshakeMessage::Done)
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} else {
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// Setup verified contact.
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|
secure_connection_established(
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context,
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contact_id,
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|
info_chat_id(context, contact_id).await?,
|
|
mime_message.timestamp_sent,
|
|
)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
send_alice_handshake_msg(context, contact_id, "vc-contact-confirm")
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|
.await
|
|
.context("failed sending vc-contact-confirm message")?;
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|
|
inviter_progress(context, contact_id, 1000);
|
|
Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore) // "Done" would delete the message and break multi-device (the key from Autocrypt-header is needed)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*=======================================================
|
|
==== Bob - the joiner's side ====
|
|
==== Step 7 in "Setup verified contact" protocol ====
|
|
=======================================================*/
|
|
"vc-contact-confirm" => {
|
|
if let Some(mut bobstate) = BobState::from_db(&context.sql).await? {
|
|
if !bobstate.is_msg_expected(context, step) {
|
|
warn!(context, "Unexpected vc-contact-confirm.");
|
|
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bobstate.step_contact_confirm(context).await?;
|
|
bobstate.emit_progress(context, JoinerProgress::Succeeded);
|
|
}
|
|
Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore)
|
|
}
|
|
"vg-member-added" => {
|
|
let Some(member_added) = mime_message.get_header(HeaderDef::ChatGroupMemberAdded)
|
|
else {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
context,
|
|
"vg-member-added without Chat-Group-Member-Added header."
|
|
);
|
|
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Propagate);
|
|
};
|
|
if !context.is_self_addr(member_added).await? {
|
|
info!(
|
|
context,
|
|
"Member {member_added} added by unrelated SecureJoin process."
|
|
);
|
|
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Propagate);
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(mut bobstate) = BobState::from_db(&context.sql).await? {
|
|
if !bobstate.is_msg_expected(context, step) {
|
|
warn!(context, "Unexpected vg-member-added.");
|
|
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Propagate);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bobstate.step_contact_confirm(context).await?;
|
|
bobstate.emit_progress(context, JoinerProgress::Succeeded);
|
|
}
|
|
Ok(HandshakeMessage::Propagate)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
"vg-member-added-received" | "vc-contact-confirm-received" => {
|
|
// Deprecated steps, delete them immediately.
|
|
Ok(HandshakeMessage::Done)
|
|
}
|
|
_ => {
|
|
warn!(context, "invalid step: {}", step);
|
|
Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Observe self-sent Securejoin message.
|
|
///
|
|
/// In a multi-device-setup, there may be other devices that "see" the handshake messages.
|
|
/// If we see self-sent messages encrypted+signed correctly with our key,
|
|
/// we can make some conclusions of it.
|
|
///
|
|
/// If we see self-sent {vc,vg}-request-with-auth,
|
|
/// we know that we are Bob (joiner-observer)
|
|
/// that just marked peer (Alice) as forward-verified
|
|
/// either after receiving {vc,vg}-auth-required
|
|
/// or immediately after scanning the QR-code
|
|
/// if the key was already known.
|
|
///
|
|
/// If we see self-sent vc-contact-confirm or vg-member-added message,
|
|
/// we know that we are Alice (inviter-observer)
|
|
/// that just marked peer (Bob) as forward (and backward)-verified
|
|
/// in response to correct vc-request-with-auth message.
|
|
///
|
|
/// In both cases we can mark the peer as forward-verified.
|
|
pub(crate) async fn observe_securejoin_on_other_device(
|
|
context: &Context,
|
|
mime_message: &MimeMessage,
|
|
contact_id: ContactId,
|
|
) -> Result<HandshakeMessage> {
|
|
if contact_id.is_special() {
|
|
return Err(Error::msg("Can not be called with special contact ID"));
|
|
}
|
|
let step = mime_message
|
|
.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoin)
|
|
.context("Not a Secure-Join message")?;
|
|
info!(context, "Observing secure-join message {step:?}.");
|
|
|
|
if !matches!(
|
|
step,
|
|
"vg-request-with-auth" | "vc-request-with-auth" | "vg-member-added" | "vc-contact-confirm"
|
|
) {
|
|
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
if !encrypted_and_signed(context, mime_message, &get_self_fingerprint(context).await?) {
|
|
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
|
|
context,
|
|
contact_id,
|
|
info_chat_id(context, contact_id).await?,
|
|
"Message not encrypted correctly.",
|
|
)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let addr = Contact::get_by_id(context, contact_id)
|
|
.await?
|
|
.get_addr()
|
|
.to_lowercase();
|
|
|
|
let Some(key) = mime_message.gossiped_keys.get(&addr) else {
|
|
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
|
|
context,
|
|
contact_id,
|
|
info_chat_id(context, contact_id).await?,
|
|
&format!(
|
|
"No gossip header for '{}' at step {}, please update Delta Chat on all \
|
|
your devices.",
|
|
&addr, step,
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let Some(mut peerstate) = Peerstate::from_addr(context, &addr).await? else {
|
|
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
|
|
context,
|
|
contact_id,
|
|
info_chat_id(context, contact_id).await?,
|
|
&format!("No peerstate in db for '{}' at step {}", &addr, step),
|
|
)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let Some(fingerprint) = peerstate.gossip_key_fingerprint.clone() else {
|
|
could_not_establish_secure_connection(
|
|
context,
|
|
contact_id,
|
|
info_chat_id(context, contact_id).await?,
|
|
&format!(
|
|
"No gossip key fingerprint in db for '{}' at step {}",
|
|
&addr, step,
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
return Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
|
|
};
|
|
peerstate.set_verified(key.clone(), fingerprint, addr)?;
|
|
if matches!(step, "vg-member-added" | "vc-contact-confirm") {
|
|
peerstate.backward_verified_key_id =
|
|
Some(context.get_config_i64(Config::KeyId).await?).filter(|&id| id > 0);
|
|
}
|
|
peerstate.prefer_encrypt = EncryptPreference::Mutual;
|
|
peerstate.save_to_db(&context.sql).await?;
|
|
|
|
ChatId::set_protection_for_contact(context, contact_id, mime_message.timestamp_sent).await?;
|
|
|
|
if step == "vg-member-added" {
|
|
inviter_progress(context, contact_id, 800);
|
|
}
|
|
if step == "vg-member-added" || step == "vc-contact-confirm" {
|
|
inviter_progress(context, contact_id, 1000);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if step == "vg-request-with-auth" || step == "vc-request-with-auth" {
|
|
// This actually reflects what happens on the first device (which does the secure
|
|
// join) and causes a subsequent "vg-member-added" message to create an unblocked
|
|
// verified group.
|
|
ChatId::create_for_contact_with_blocked(context, contact_id, Blocked::Not).await?;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if step == "vg-member-added" {
|
|
Ok(HandshakeMessage::Propagate)
|
|
} else {
|
|
Ok(HandshakeMessage::Ignore)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn secure_connection_established(
|
|
context: &Context,
|
|
contact_id: ContactId,
|
|
chat_id: ChatId,
|
|
timestamp: i64,
|
|
) -> Result<()> {
|
|
let private_chat_id = ChatIdBlocked::get_for_contact(context, contact_id, Blocked::Yes)
|
|
.await?
|
|
.id;
|
|
private_chat_id
|
|
.set_protection(
|
|
context,
|
|
ProtectionStatus::Protected,
|
|
timestamp,
|
|
Some(contact_id),
|
|
)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
context.emit_event(EventType::ChatModified(chat_id));
|
|
chatlist_events::emit_chatlist_item_changed(context, chat_id);
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn could_not_establish_secure_connection(
|
|
context: &Context,
|
|
contact_id: ContactId,
|
|
chat_id: ChatId,
|
|
details: &str,
|
|
) -> Result<()> {
|
|
let contact = Contact::get_by_id(context, contact_id).await?;
|
|
let mut msg = stock_str::contact_not_verified(context, &contact).await;
|
|
msg += " (";
|
|
msg += details;
|
|
msg += ")";
|
|
chat::add_info_msg(context, chat_id, &msg, time()).await?;
|
|
warn!(
|
|
context,
|
|
"StockMessage::ContactNotVerified posted to 1:1 chat ({})", details
|
|
);
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Tries to mark peer with provided key fingerprint as verified.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns true if such key was found, false otherwise.
|
|
async fn mark_peer_as_verified(
|
|
context: &Context,
|
|
fingerprint: Fingerprint,
|
|
verifier: String,
|
|
backward_verified: bool,
|
|
) -> Result<bool> {
|
|
let Some(ref mut peerstate) = Peerstate::from_fingerprint(context, &fingerprint).await? else {
|
|
return Ok(false);
|
|
};
|
|
let Some(ref public_key) = peerstate.public_key else {
|
|
return Ok(false);
|
|
};
|
|
peerstate.set_verified(public_key.clone(), fingerprint, verifier)?;
|
|
peerstate.prefer_encrypt = EncryptPreference::Mutual;
|
|
if backward_verified {
|
|
peerstate.backward_verified_key_id =
|
|
Some(context.get_config_i64(Config::KeyId).await?).filter(|&id| id > 0);
|
|
}
|
|
peerstate.save_to_db(&context.sql).await?;
|
|
Ok(true)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ******************************************************************************
|
|
* Tools: Misc.
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
fn encrypted_and_signed(
|
|
context: &Context,
|
|
mimeparser: &MimeMessage,
|
|
expected_fingerprint: &Fingerprint,
|
|
) -> bool {
|
|
if !mimeparser.was_encrypted() {
|
|
warn!(context, "Message not encrypted.",);
|
|
false
|
|
} else if !mimeparser.signatures.contains(expected_fingerprint) {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
context,
|
|
"Message does not match expected fingerprint {}.", expected_fingerprint,
|
|
);
|
|
false
|
|
} else {
|
|
true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tests {
|
|
use deltachat_contact_tools::{ContactAddress, EmailAddress};
|
|
|
|
use super::*;
|
|
use crate::chat::{remove_contact_from_chat, CantSendReason};
|
|
use crate::chatlist::Chatlist;
|
|
use crate::constants::{self, Chattype};
|
|
use crate::imex::{imex, ImexMode};
|
|
use crate::receive_imf::receive_imf;
|
|
use crate::stock_str::{self, chat_protection_enabled};
|
|
use crate::test_utils::{get_chat_msg, TimeShiftFalsePositiveNote};
|
|
use crate::test_utils::{TestContext, TestContextManager};
|
|
use crate::tools::SystemTime;
|
|
use std::collections::HashSet;
|
|
use std::time::Duration;
|
|
|
|
#[derive(PartialEq)]
|
|
enum SetupContactCase {
|
|
Normal,
|
|
CheckProtectionTimestamp,
|
|
WrongAliceGossip,
|
|
SecurejoinWaitTimeout,
|
|
AliceIsBot,
|
|
AliceHasName,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn test_setup_contact() {
|
|
test_setup_contact_ex(SetupContactCase::Normal).await
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn test_setup_contact_protection_timestamp() {
|
|
test_setup_contact_ex(SetupContactCase::CheckProtectionTimestamp).await
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn test_setup_contact_wrong_alice_gossip() {
|
|
test_setup_contact_ex(SetupContactCase::WrongAliceGossip).await
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn test_setup_contact_wait_timeout() {
|
|
test_setup_contact_ex(SetupContactCase::SecurejoinWaitTimeout).await
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn test_setup_contact_alice_is_bot() {
|
|
test_setup_contact_ex(SetupContactCase::AliceIsBot).await
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn test_setup_contact_alice_has_name() {
|
|
test_setup_contact_ex(SetupContactCase::AliceHasName).await
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn test_setup_contact_ex(case: SetupContactCase) {
|
|
let _n = TimeShiftFalsePositiveNote;
|
|
|
|
let mut tcm = TestContextManager::new();
|
|
let alice = tcm.alice().await;
|
|
let alice_addr = &alice.get_config(Config::Addr).await.unwrap().unwrap();
|
|
if case == SetupContactCase::AliceHasName {
|
|
alice
|
|
.set_config(Config::Displayname, Some("Alice"))
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
}
|
|
let bob = tcm.bob().await;
|
|
bob.set_config(Config::Displayname, Some("Bob Examplenet"))
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
let alice_auto_submitted_hdr;
|
|
match case {
|
|
SetupContactCase::AliceIsBot => {
|
|
alice.set_config_bool(Config::Bot, true).await.unwrap();
|
|
alice_auto_submitted_hdr = "Auto-Submitted: auto-generated";
|
|
}
|
|
_ => alice_auto_submitted_hdr = "Auto-Submitted: auto-replied",
|
|
};
|
|
for t in [&alice, &bob] {
|
|
t.set_config_bool(Config::VerifiedOneOnOneChats, true)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
Chatlist::try_load(&alice, 0, None, None)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.len(),
|
|
0
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
Chatlist::try_load(&bob, 0, None, None).await.unwrap().len(),
|
|
0
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Step 1: Generate QR-code, ChatId(0) indicates setup-contact
|
|
let qr = get_securejoin_qr(&alice.ctx, None).await.unwrap();
|
|
// We want Bob to learn Alice's name from their messages, not from the QR code.
|
|
alice
|
|
.set_config(Config::Displayname, Some("Alice Exampleorg"))
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// Step 2: Bob scans QR-code, sends vc-request
|
|
join_securejoin(&bob.ctx, &qr).await.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
Chatlist::try_load(&bob, 0, None, None).await.unwrap().len(),
|
|
1
|
|
);
|
|
let contact_alice_id = Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&bob.ctx, alice_addr, Origin::Unknown)
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("Error looking up contact")
|
|
.expect("Contact not found");
|
|
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
assert!(!sent.payload.contains("Bob Examplenet"));
|
|
assert_eq!(sent.recipient(), EmailAddress::new(alice_addr).unwrap());
|
|
let msg = alice.parse_msg(&sent).await;
|
|
assert!(!msg.was_encrypted());
|
|
assert_eq!(msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(), "vc-request");
|
|
assert!(msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoinInvitenumber).is_some());
|
|
assert!(msg.get_header(HeaderDef::AutoSubmitted).is_none());
|
|
|
|
// Step 3: Alice receives vc-request, sends vc-auth-required
|
|
alice.recv_msg_trash(&sent).await;
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
Chatlist::try_load(&alice, 0, None, None)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.len(),
|
|
1
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let sent = alice.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
assert!(sent.payload.contains(alice_auto_submitted_hdr));
|
|
assert!(!sent.payload.contains("Alice Exampleorg"));
|
|
let msg = bob.parse_msg(&sent).await;
|
|
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
|
|
"vc-auth-required"
|
|
);
|
|
let bob_chat = bob.create_chat(&alice).await;
|
|
assert_eq!(bob_chat.can_send(&bob).await.unwrap(), false);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
bob_chat.why_cant_send(&bob).await.unwrap(),
|
|
Some(CantSendReason::SecurejoinWait)
|
|
);
|
|
if case == SetupContactCase::SecurejoinWaitTimeout {
|
|
SystemTime::shift(Duration::from_secs(constants::SECUREJOIN_WAIT_TIMEOUT));
|
|
assert_eq!(bob_chat.can_send(&bob).await.unwrap(), true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Step 4: Bob receives vc-auth-required, sends vc-request-with-auth
|
|
bob.recv_msg_trash(&sent).await;
|
|
let bob_chat = bob.create_chat(&alice).await;
|
|
assert_eq!(bob_chat.can_send(&bob).await.unwrap(), true);
|
|
|
|
// Check Bob emitted the JoinerProgress event.
|
|
let event = bob
|
|
.evtracker
|
|
.get_matching(|evt| matches!(evt, EventType::SecurejoinJoinerProgress { .. }))
|
|
.await;
|
|
match event {
|
|
EventType::SecurejoinJoinerProgress {
|
|
contact_id,
|
|
progress,
|
|
} => {
|
|
let alice_contact_id =
|
|
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&bob.ctx, alice_addr, Origin::Unknown)
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("Error looking up contact")
|
|
.expect("Contact not found");
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_id, alice_contact_id);
|
|
assert_eq!(progress, 400);
|
|
}
|
|
_ => unreachable!(),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check Bob sent the right message.
|
|
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
assert!(sent.payload.contains("Auto-Submitted: auto-replied"));
|
|
assert!(!sent.payload.contains("Bob Examplenet"));
|
|
let mut msg = alice.parse_msg(&sent).await;
|
|
let vc_request_with_auth_ts_sent = msg
|
|
.get_header(HeaderDef::Date)
|
|
.and_then(|value| mailparse::dateparse(value).ok())
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
|
|
"vc-request-with-auth"
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoinAuth).is_some());
|
|
let bob_fp = load_self_public_key(&bob.ctx)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.dc_fingerprint();
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
*msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoinFingerprint).unwrap(),
|
|
bob_fp.hex()
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
if case == SetupContactCase::WrongAliceGossip {
|
|
let wrong_pubkey = load_self_public_key(&bob).await.unwrap();
|
|
let alice_pubkey = msg
|
|
.gossiped_keys
|
|
.insert(alice_addr.to_string(), wrong_pubkey)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
let contact_bob = alice.add_or_lookup_contact(&bob).await;
|
|
let handshake_msg = handle_securejoin_handshake(&alice, &msg, contact_bob.id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(handshake_msg, HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await.unwrap(), false);
|
|
|
|
msg.gossiped_keys
|
|
.insert(alice_addr.to_string(), alice_pubkey)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
let handshake_msg = handle_securejoin_handshake(&alice, &msg, contact_bob.id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(handshake_msg, HandshakeMessage::Ignore);
|
|
assert!(contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await.unwrap());
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Alice should not yet have Bob verified
|
|
let contact_bob_id =
|
|
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&alice.ctx, "bob@example.net", Origin::Unknown)
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("Error looking up contact")
|
|
.expect("Contact not found");
|
|
let contact_bob = Contact::get_by_id(&alice.ctx, contact_bob_id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await.unwrap(), false);
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_bob.get_authname(), "");
|
|
|
|
if case == SetupContactCase::CheckProtectionTimestamp {
|
|
SystemTime::shift(Duration::from_secs(3600));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Step 5+6: Alice receives vc-request-with-auth, sends vc-contact-confirm
|
|
alice.recv_msg_trash(&sent).await;
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await.unwrap(), true);
|
|
let contact_bob = Contact::get_by_id(&alice.ctx, contact_bob_id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_bob.get_authname(), "Bob Examplenet");
|
|
assert!(contact_bob.get_name().is_empty());
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_bob.is_bot(), false);
|
|
|
|
// exactly one one-to-one chat should be visible for both now
|
|
// (check this before calling alice.create_chat() explicitly below)
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
Chatlist::try_load(&alice, 0, None, None)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.len(),
|
|
1
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
Chatlist::try_load(&bob, 0, None, None).await.unwrap().len(),
|
|
1
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Check Alice got the verified message in her 1:1 chat.
|
|
{
|
|
let chat = alice.create_chat(&bob).await;
|
|
let msg = get_chat_msg(&alice, chat.get_id(), 0, 1).await;
|
|
assert!(msg.is_info());
|
|
let expected_text = chat_protection_enabled(&alice).await;
|
|
assert_eq!(msg.get_text(), expected_text);
|
|
if case == SetupContactCase::CheckProtectionTimestamp {
|
|
assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_sort, vc_request_with_auth_ts_sent + 1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Make sure Alice hasn't yet sent their name to Bob.
|
|
let contact_alice = Contact::get_by_id(&bob.ctx, contact_alice_id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
match case {
|
|
SetupContactCase::AliceHasName => assert_eq!(contact_alice.get_authname(), "Alice"),
|
|
_ => assert_eq!(contact_alice.get_authname(), ""),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Check Alice sent the right message to Bob.
|
|
let sent = alice.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
assert!(sent.payload.contains(alice_auto_submitted_hdr));
|
|
assert!(!sent.payload.contains("Alice Exampleorg"));
|
|
let msg = bob.parse_msg(&sent).await;
|
|
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
|
|
"vc-contact-confirm"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Bob should not yet have Alice verified
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_alice.is_verified(&bob.ctx).await.unwrap(), false);
|
|
|
|
// Step 7: Bob receives vc-contact-confirm
|
|
bob.recv_msg_trash(&sent).await;
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_alice.is_verified(&bob.ctx).await.unwrap(), true);
|
|
let contact_alice = Contact::get_by_id(&bob.ctx, contact_alice_id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_alice.get_authname(), "Alice Exampleorg");
|
|
assert!(contact_alice.get_name().is_empty());
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_alice.is_bot(), case == SetupContactCase::AliceIsBot);
|
|
|
|
if case != SetupContactCase::SecurejoinWaitTimeout {
|
|
// Later we check that the timeout message isn't added to the already protected chat.
|
|
SystemTime::shift(Duration::from_secs(constants::SECUREJOIN_WAIT_TIMEOUT + 1));
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
bob_chat
|
|
.check_securejoin_wait(&bob, constants::SECUREJOIN_WAIT_TIMEOUT)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap(),
|
|
0
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check Bob got expected info messages in his 1:1 chat.
|
|
let msg_cnt: usize = match case {
|
|
SetupContactCase::SecurejoinWaitTimeout => 3,
|
|
_ => 2,
|
|
};
|
|
let mut i = 0..msg_cnt;
|
|
let msg = get_chat_msg(&bob, bob_chat.get_id(), i.next().unwrap(), msg_cnt).await;
|
|
assert!(msg.is_info());
|
|
assert_eq!(msg.get_text(), stock_str::securejoin_wait(&bob).await);
|
|
if case == SetupContactCase::SecurejoinWaitTimeout {
|
|
let msg = get_chat_msg(&bob, bob_chat.get_id(), i.next().unwrap(), msg_cnt).await;
|
|
assert!(msg.is_info());
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
msg.get_text(),
|
|
stock_str::securejoin_wait_timeout(&bob).await
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
let msg = get_chat_msg(&bob, bob_chat.get_id(), i.next().unwrap(), msg_cnt).await;
|
|
assert!(msg.is_info());
|
|
assert_eq!(msg.get_text(), chat_protection_enabled(&bob).await);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn test_setup_contact_bad_qr() {
|
|
let bob = TestContext::new_bob().await;
|
|
let ret = join_securejoin(&bob.ctx, "not a qr code").await;
|
|
assert!(ret.is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn test_setup_contact_bob_knows_alice() -> Result<()> {
|
|
let mut tcm = TestContextManager::new();
|
|
let alice = tcm.alice().await;
|
|
let bob = tcm.bob().await;
|
|
|
|
// Ensure Bob knows Alice_FP
|
|
let alice_pubkey = load_self_public_key(&alice.ctx).await?;
|
|
let peerstate = Peerstate {
|
|
addr: "alice@example.org".into(),
|
|
last_seen: 10,
|
|
last_seen_autocrypt: 10,
|
|
prefer_encrypt: EncryptPreference::Mutual,
|
|
public_key: Some(alice_pubkey.clone()),
|
|
public_key_fingerprint: Some(alice_pubkey.dc_fingerprint()),
|
|
gossip_key: Some(alice_pubkey.clone()),
|
|
gossip_timestamp: 10,
|
|
gossip_key_fingerprint: Some(alice_pubkey.dc_fingerprint()),
|
|
verified_key: None,
|
|
verified_key_fingerprint: None,
|
|
verifier: None,
|
|
secondary_verified_key: None,
|
|
secondary_verified_key_fingerprint: None,
|
|
secondary_verifier: None,
|
|
backward_verified_key_id: None,
|
|
fingerprint_changed: false,
|
|
};
|
|
peerstate.save_to_db(&bob.ctx.sql).await?;
|
|
|
|
// Step 1: Generate QR-code, ChatId(0) indicates setup-contact
|
|
let qr = get_securejoin_qr(&alice.ctx, None).await?;
|
|
|
|
// Step 2+4: Bob scans QR-code, sends vc-request-with-auth, skipping vc-request
|
|
join_securejoin(&bob.ctx, &qr).await.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// Check Bob emitted the JoinerProgress event.
|
|
let event = bob
|
|
.evtracker
|
|
.get_matching(|evt| matches!(evt, EventType::SecurejoinJoinerProgress { .. }))
|
|
.await;
|
|
match event {
|
|
EventType::SecurejoinJoinerProgress {
|
|
contact_id,
|
|
progress,
|
|
} => {
|
|
let alice_contact_id =
|
|
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&bob.ctx, "alice@example.org", Origin::Unknown)
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("Error looking up contact")
|
|
.expect("Contact not found");
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_id, alice_contact_id);
|
|
assert_eq!(progress, 400);
|
|
}
|
|
_ => unreachable!(),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check Bob sent the right handshake message.
|
|
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
let msg = alice.parse_msg(&sent).await;
|
|
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
|
|
"vc-request-with-auth"
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoinAuth).is_some());
|
|
let bob_fp = load_self_public_key(&bob.ctx).await?.dc_fingerprint();
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
*msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoinFingerprint).unwrap(),
|
|
bob_fp.hex()
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Alice should not yet have Bob verified
|
|
let (contact_bob_id, _modified) = Contact::add_or_lookup(
|
|
&alice.ctx,
|
|
"",
|
|
&ContactAddress::new("bob@example.net")?,
|
|
Origin::ManuallyCreated,
|
|
)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
let contact_bob = Contact::get_by_id(&alice.ctx, contact_bob_id).await?;
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await?, false);
|
|
|
|
// Step 5+6: Alice receives vc-request-with-auth, sends vc-contact-confirm
|
|
alice.recv_msg_trash(&sent).await;
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await?, true);
|
|
|
|
let sent = alice.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
let msg = bob.parse_msg(&sent).await;
|
|
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
|
|
"vc-contact-confirm"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Bob should not yet have Alice verified
|
|
let contact_alice_id =
|
|
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&bob.ctx, "alice@example.org", Origin::Unknown)
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("Error looking up contact")
|
|
.expect("Contact not found");
|
|
let contact_alice = Contact::get_by_id(&bob.ctx, contact_alice_id).await?;
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_bob.is_verified(&bob.ctx).await?, false);
|
|
|
|
// Step 7: Bob receives vc-contact-confirm
|
|
bob.recv_msg_trash(&sent).await;
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_alice.is_verified(&bob.ctx).await?, true);
|
|
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn test_setup_contact_concurrent_calls() -> Result<()> {
|
|
let mut tcm = TestContextManager::new();
|
|
let alice = tcm.alice().await;
|
|
let bob = tcm.bob().await;
|
|
|
|
// do a scan that is not working as claire is never responding
|
|
let qr_stale = "OPENPGP4FPR:1234567890123456789012345678901234567890#a=claire%40foo.de&n=&i=12345678901&s=23456789012";
|
|
let claire_id = join_securejoin(&bob, qr_stale).await?;
|
|
let chat = Chat::load_from_db(&bob, claire_id).await?;
|
|
assert!(!claire_id.is_special());
|
|
assert_eq!(chat.typ, Chattype::Single);
|
|
assert!(bob.pop_sent_msg().await.payload().contains("claire@foo.de"));
|
|
|
|
// subsequent scans shall abort existing ones or run concurrently -
|
|
// but they must not fail as otherwise the whole qr scanning becomes unusable until restart.
|
|
let qr = get_securejoin_qr(&alice, None).await?;
|
|
let alice_id = join_securejoin(&bob, &qr).await?;
|
|
let chat = Chat::load_from_db(&bob, alice_id).await?;
|
|
assert!(!alice_id.is_special());
|
|
assert_eq!(chat.typ, Chattype::Single);
|
|
assert_ne!(claire_id, alice_id);
|
|
assert!(bob
|
|
.pop_sent_msg()
|
|
.await
|
|
.payload()
|
|
.contains("alice@example.org"));
|
|
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn test_secure_join() -> Result<()> {
|
|
let mut tcm = TestContextManager::new();
|
|
let alice = tcm.alice().await;
|
|
let bob = tcm.bob().await;
|
|
|
|
// We start with empty chatlists.
|
|
assert_eq!(Chatlist::try_load(&alice, 0, None, None).await?.len(), 0);
|
|
assert_eq!(Chatlist::try_load(&bob, 0, None, None).await?.len(), 0);
|
|
|
|
let alice_chatid =
|
|
chat::create_group_chat(&alice.ctx, ProtectionStatus::Protected, "the chat").await?;
|
|
|
|
// Step 1: Generate QR-code, secure-join implied by chatid
|
|
let qr = get_securejoin_qr(&alice.ctx, Some(alice_chatid))
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// Step 2: Bob scans QR-code, sends vg-request
|
|
let bob_chatid = join_securejoin(&bob.ctx, &qr).await?;
|
|
assert_eq!(Chatlist::try_load(&bob, 0, None, None).await?.len(), 1);
|
|
|
|
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
sent.recipient(),
|
|
EmailAddress::new("alice@example.org").unwrap()
|
|
);
|
|
let msg = alice.parse_msg(&sent).await;
|
|
assert!(!msg.was_encrypted());
|
|
assert_eq!(msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(), "vg-request");
|
|
assert!(msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoinInvitenumber).is_some());
|
|
assert!(msg.get_header(HeaderDef::AutoSubmitted).is_none());
|
|
|
|
// Old Delta Chat core sent `Secure-Join-Group` header in `vg-request`,
|
|
// but it was only used by Alice in `vg-request-with-auth`.
|
|
// New Delta Chat versions do not use `Secure-Join-Group` header at all
|
|
// and it is deprecated.
|
|
// Now `Secure-Join-Group` header
|
|
// is only sent in `vg-request-with-auth` for compatibility.
|
|
assert!(msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoinGroup).is_none());
|
|
|
|
// Step 3: Alice receives vg-request, sends vg-auth-required
|
|
alice.recv_msg_trash(&sent).await;
|
|
|
|
let sent = alice.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
assert!(sent.payload.contains("Auto-Submitted: auto-replied"));
|
|
let msg = bob.parse_msg(&sent).await;
|
|
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
|
|
"vg-auth-required"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Step 4: Bob receives vg-auth-required, sends vg-request-with-auth
|
|
bob.recv_msg_trash(&sent).await;
|
|
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
|
|
// Check Bob emitted the JoinerProgress event.
|
|
let event = bob
|
|
.evtracker
|
|
.get_matching(|evt| matches!(evt, EventType::SecurejoinJoinerProgress { .. }))
|
|
.await;
|
|
match event {
|
|
EventType::SecurejoinJoinerProgress {
|
|
contact_id,
|
|
progress,
|
|
} => {
|
|
let alice_contact_id =
|
|
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&bob.ctx, "alice@example.org", Origin::Unknown)
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("Error looking up contact")
|
|
.expect("Contact not found");
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_id, alice_contact_id);
|
|
assert_eq!(progress, 400);
|
|
}
|
|
_ => unreachable!(),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check Bob sent the right handshake message.
|
|
assert!(sent.payload.contains("Auto-Submitted: auto-replied"));
|
|
let msg = alice.parse_msg(&sent).await;
|
|
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
|
|
"vg-request-with-auth"
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoinAuth).is_some());
|
|
let bob_fp = load_self_public_key(&bob.ctx).await?.dc_fingerprint();
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
*msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoinFingerprint).unwrap(),
|
|
bob_fp.hex()
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Alice should not yet have Bob verified
|
|
let contact_bob_id =
|
|
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&alice.ctx, "bob@example.net", Origin::Unknown)
|
|
.await?
|
|
.expect("Contact not found");
|
|
let contact_bob = Contact::get_by_id(&alice.ctx, contact_bob_id).await?;
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await?, false);
|
|
|
|
// Step 5+6: Alice receives vg-request-with-auth, sends vg-member-added
|
|
alice.recv_msg_trash(&sent).await;
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await?, true);
|
|
|
|
let sent = alice.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
let msg = bob.parse_msg(&sent).await;
|
|
assert!(msg.was_encrypted());
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
msg.get_header(HeaderDef::SecureJoin).unwrap(),
|
|
"vg-member-added"
|
|
);
|
|
// Formally this message is auto-submitted, but as the member addition is a result of an
|
|
// explicit user action, the Auto-Submitted header shouldn't be present. Otherwise it would
|
|
// be strange to have it in "member-added" messages of verified groups only.
|
|
assert!(msg.get_header(HeaderDef::AutoSubmitted).is_none());
|
|
// This is a two-member group, but Alice must Autocrypt-gossip to her other devices.
|
|
assert!(msg.get_header(HeaderDef::AutocryptGossip).is_some());
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// Now Alice's chat with Bob should still be hidden, the verified message should
|
|
// appear in the group chat.
|
|
|
|
let chat = alice.get_chat(&bob).await;
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
chat.blocked,
|
|
Blocked::Yes,
|
|
"Alice's 1:1 chat with Bob is not hidden"
|
|
);
|
|
// There should be 3 messages in the chat:
|
|
// - The ChatProtectionEnabled message
|
|
// - You added member bob@example.net
|
|
let msg = get_chat_msg(&alice, alice_chatid, 0, 2).await;
|
|
assert!(msg.is_info());
|
|
let expected_text = chat_protection_enabled(&alice).await;
|
|
assert_eq!(msg.get_text(), expected_text);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Bob should not yet have Alice verified
|
|
let contact_alice_id =
|
|
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&bob.ctx, "alice@example.org", Origin::Unknown)
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("Error looking up contact")
|
|
.expect("Contact not found");
|
|
let contact_alice = Contact::get_by_id(&bob.ctx, contact_alice_id).await?;
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_bob.is_verified(&bob.ctx).await?, false);
|
|
|
|
// Step 7: Bob receives vg-member-added
|
|
bob.recv_msg(&sent).await;
|
|
{
|
|
// Bob has Alice verified, message shows up in the group chat.
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_alice.is_verified(&bob.ctx).await?, true);
|
|
let chat = bob.get_chat(&alice).await;
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
chat.blocked,
|
|
Blocked::Yes,
|
|
"Bob's 1:1 chat with Alice is not hidden"
|
|
);
|
|
for item in chat::get_chat_msgs(&bob.ctx, bob_chatid).await.unwrap() {
|
|
if let chat::ChatItem::Message { msg_id } = item {
|
|
let msg = Message::load_from_db(&bob.ctx, msg_id).await.unwrap();
|
|
let text = msg.get_text();
|
|
println!("msg {msg_id} text: {text}");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let bob_chat = Chat::load_from_db(&bob.ctx, bob_chatid).await?;
|
|
assert!(bob_chat.is_protected());
|
|
assert!(bob_chat.typ == Chattype::Group);
|
|
|
|
// On this "happy path", Alice and Bob get only a group-chat where all information are added to.
|
|
// The one-to-one chats are used internally for the hidden handshake messages,
|
|
// however, should not be visible in the UIs.
|
|
assert_eq!(Chatlist::try_load(&alice, 0, None, None).await?.len(), 1);
|
|
assert_eq!(Chatlist::try_load(&bob, 0, None, None).await?.len(), 1);
|
|
|
|
// If Bob then sends a direct message to alice, however, the one-to-one with Alice should appear.
|
|
let bobs_chat_with_alice = bob.create_chat(&alice).await;
|
|
let sent = bob.send_text(bobs_chat_with_alice.id, "Hello").await;
|
|
alice.recv_msg(&sent).await;
|
|
assert_eq!(Chatlist::try_load(&alice, 0, None, None).await?.len(), 2);
|
|
assert_eq!(Chatlist::try_load(&bob, 0, None, None).await?.len(), 2);
|
|
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn test_adhoc_group_no_qr() -> Result<()> {
|
|
let alice = TestContext::new_alice().await;
|
|
|
|
let mime = br#"Subject: First thread
|
|
Message-ID: first@example.org
|
|
To: Alice <alice@example.org>, Bob <bob@example.net>
|
|
From: Claire <claire@example.org>
|
|
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed; delsp=no
|
|
|
|
First thread."#;
|
|
|
|
receive_imf(&alice, mime, false).await?;
|
|
let msg = alice.get_last_msg().await;
|
|
let chat_id = msg.chat_id;
|
|
|
|
assert!(get_securejoin_qr(&alice, Some(chat_id)).await.is_err());
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn test_unknown_sender() -> Result<()> {
|
|
let mut tcm = TestContextManager::new();
|
|
let alice = tcm.alice().await;
|
|
let bob = tcm.bob().await;
|
|
|
|
tcm.execute_securejoin(&alice, &bob).await;
|
|
|
|
let alice_chat_id = alice
|
|
.create_group_with_members(ProtectionStatus::Protected, "Group with Bob", &[&bob])
|
|
.await;
|
|
|
|
let sent = alice.send_text(alice_chat_id, "Hi!").await;
|
|
let bob_chat_id = bob.recv_msg(&sent).await.chat_id;
|
|
|
|
let sent = bob.send_text(bob_chat_id, "Hi hi!").await;
|
|
|
|
let alice_bob_contact_id = Contact::create(&alice, "Bob", "bob@example.net").await?;
|
|
remove_contact_from_chat(&alice, alice_chat_id, alice_bob_contact_id).await?;
|
|
alice.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
|
|
// The message from Bob is delivered late, Bob is already removed.
|
|
let msg = alice.recv_msg(&sent).await;
|
|
assert_eq!(msg.text, "Hi hi!");
|
|
assert_eq!(msg.error.unwrap(), "Unknown sender for this chat.");
|
|
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Tests that Bob gets Alice as verified
|
|
/// if `vc-contact-confirm` is lost but Alice then sends
|
|
/// a message to Bob in a verified 1:1 chat with a `Chat-Verified` header.
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn test_lost_contact_confirm() {
|
|
let mut tcm = TestContextManager::new();
|
|
let alice = tcm.alice().await;
|
|
let bob = tcm.bob().await;
|
|
for t in [&alice, &bob] {
|
|
t.set_config_bool(Config::VerifiedOneOnOneChats, true)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let qr = get_securejoin_qr(&alice.ctx, None).await.unwrap();
|
|
join_securejoin(&bob.ctx, &qr).await.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// vc-request
|
|
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
alice.recv_msg_trash(&sent).await;
|
|
|
|
// vc-auth-required
|
|
let sent = alice.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
bob.recv_msg_trash(&sent).await;
|
|
|
|
// vc-request-with-auth
|
|
let sent = bob.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
alice.recv_msg_trash(&sent).await;
|
|
|
|
// Alice has Bob verified now.
|
|
let contact_bob_id =
|
|
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&alice.ctx, "bob@example.net", Origin::Unknown)
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("Error looking up contact")
|
|
.expect("Contact not found");
|
|
let contact_bob = Contact::get_by_id(&alice.ctx, contact_bob_id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_bob.is_verified(&alice.ctx).await.unwrap(), true);
|
|
|
|
// Alice sends vc-contact-confirm, but it gets lost.
|
|
let _sent_vc_contact_confirm = alice.pop_sent_msg().await;
|
|
|
|
// Bob should not yet have Alice verified
|
|
let contact_alice_id =
|
|
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(&bob, "alice@example.org", Origin::Unknown)
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("Error looking up contact")
|
|
.expect("Contact not found");
|
|
let contact_alice = Contact::get_by_id(&bob, contact_alice_id).await.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_alice.is_verified(&bob).await.unwrap(), false);
|
|
|
|
// Alice sends a text message to Bob.
|
|
let received_hello = tcm.send_recv(&alice, &bob, "Hello!").await;
|
|
let chat_id = received_hello.chat_id;
|
|
let chat = Chat::load_from_db(&bob, chat_id).await.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(chat.is_protected(), true);
|
|
|
|
// Received text message in a verified 1:1 chat results in backward verification
|
|
// and Bob now marks alice as verified.
|
|
let contact_alice = Contact::get_by_id(&bob, contact_alice_id).await.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(contact_alice.is_verified(&bob).await.unwrap(), true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// An unencrypted message with already known Autocrypt key, but sent from another address,
|
|
/// means that it's rather a new contact sharing the same key than the existing one changed its
|
|
/// address, otherwise it would already have our key to encrypt.
|
|
///
|
|
/// This is a regression test for a bug where DC wrongly executed AEAP in this case.
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn test_shared_bobs_key() -> Result<()> {
|
|
let mut tcm = TestContextManager::new();
|
|
let alice = &tcm.alice().await;
|
|
let bob = &tcm.bob().await;
|
|
let bob_addr = &bob.get_config(Config::Addr).await?.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
tcm.execute_securejoin(bob, alice).await;
|
|
|
|
let export_dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
|
imex(bob, ImexMode::ExportSelfKeys, export_dir.path(), None).await?;
|
|
let bob2 = &TestContext::new().await;
|
|
let bob2_addr = "bob2@example.net";
|
|
bob2.configure_addr(bob2_addr).await;
|
|
imex(bob2, ImexMode::ImportSelfKeys, export_dir.path(), None).await?;
|
|
|
|
tcm.execute_securejoin(bob2, alice).await;
|
|
|
|
let bob3 = &TestContext::new().await;
|
|
let bob3_addr = "bob3@example.net";
|
|
bob3.configure_addr(bob3_addr).await;
|
|
imex(bob3, ImexMode::ImportSelfKeys, export_dir.path(), None).await?;
|
|
tcm.send_recv(bob3, alice, "hi Alice!").await;
|
|
let msg = tcm.send_recv(alice, bob3, "hi Bob3!").await;
|
|
assert!(msg.get_showpadlock());
|
|
|
|
let mut bob_ids = HashSet::new();
|
|
bob_ids.insert(
|
|
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(alice, bob_addr, Origin::Unknown)
|
|
.await?
|
|
.unwrap(),
|
|
);
|
|
bob_ids.insert(
|
|
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(alice, bob2_addr, Origin::Unknown)
|
|
.await?
|
|
.unwrap(),
|
|
);
|
|
bob_ids.insert(
|
|
Contact::lookup_id_by_addr(alice, bob3_addr, Origin::Unknown)
|
|
.await?
|
|
.unwrap(),
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(bob_ids.len(), 3);
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|