a27e84ad89 "fix: Delete received outgoing messages from SMTP queue"
can break sending messages sent as several SMTP messages because they have a lot of recipients:
`pub(crate) const DEFAULT_MAX_SMTP_RCPT_TO: usize = 50;`
We should not cancel sending if it is such a message and we received BCC-self because it does not
mean the other part was sent successfully. For this, split such messages into separate jobs in the
`smtp` table so that only a job containing BCC-self is canceled from `receive_imf_inner()`. Although
this doesn't solve the initial problem with timed-out SMTP requests for such messages completely,
this enables fine-grained SMTP retries so we don't need to resend all SMTP messages if only some of
them failed to be sent.
The bug was made in 44227d7b86. Sql::execute() with placeholders must
be used to escape strings, one never should escape them manually as strings themselves can contain
escape symbols. Thanks to @link2xt for noticing.
Some SMTP servers are running slow before-queue filters, most commonly Postfix with `rspamd` filter
which is implemented as a [before-queue Milter](https://www.postfix.org/MILTER_README.html). Some of
`rspamd` plugin filters are slow on large mails.
We previously had problems with timing out during waiting for SMTP response:
https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-core-rust/issues/1383. This is largely fixed by
https://github.com/async-email/async-smtp/pull/29 and currently we have 60-second timeout just for
reading a response but apparently it is not sufficient -- maybe connection gets killed by NAT while
we are waiting for response or `rspamd` takes more than 60 seconds for large messages.
As a result a message is resent multiple times and eventually fails with "too many retries" while
multiple BCC-self messages are received.
We should remove the message from the SMTP queue as soon as we receive it via IMAP as it is clear
the message was sent even if we did not manage to get actual SMTP server response.
First of all, it's just downloaded and hasn't been seen yet by the user. Also this changes nothing
as `msgs.state` isn't changed when replacing a message anyway.
Put a copy of Message-ID into hidden headers and prefer it over the one in the IMF header section
that servers mess up with.
This also reverts "Set X-Microsoft-Original-Message-ID on outgoing emails for amazonaws (#3077)".
As per the comment in `receive_imf.rs`, `chat.protected` must be maintained regardless of the
`Config::VerifiedOneOnOneChats`. The only thing that mustn't be done if `VerifiedOneOnOneChats` is
unset (i.e. for non-supporting UIs) is marking chats as "protection broken" because this needs
showing the corresponding dialog to a user.
Drafts mustn't affect sorting of any other messages, they aren't even displayed in the chat
window. Also hidden messages mustn't affect sorting of usual messages. But let hidden messages sort
together with protection messages because hidden messages also can be or not be verified, so let's
preserve this information -- even it's not useful currently, it can be useful in the future
versions.
Before in some places it was correctly calculated by passing the "sent" timestamp to
`calc_sort_timestamp()`, but in other places just the system time was used. In some complex
scenarios like #5088 (restoration of a backup made before a contact verification) it led to wrong
sort timestamps of protection messages and also messages following by them.
But to reduce number of args passed to functions needing to calculate the sort timestamp, add
message timestamps to `struct MimeMessage` which is anyway passed everywhere.
Ad-hoc groups don't have grpid-s that can be used to identify them across devices and thus wasn't
synced until now.
The same problem already exists for assigning messages to ad-hoc groups and this assignment is done
by `get_parent_message()` and `lookup_chat_by_reply()`. Let's reuse this logic for the
synchronisation, it works well enough and this way we have less surprises than if we try to
implement grpids for ad-hoc groups. I.e. add an `Msgids` variant to `chat::SyncId` analogous to the
"References" header in messages and put two following Message-IDs to a sync message:
- The latest message A having `DownloadState::Done` and the state to be one of `InFresh, InNoticed,
InSeen, OutDelivered, OutMdnRcvd`.
- The message that A references in `In-Reply-To`.
This way the logic is almost the same to what we have in `Chat::prepare_msg_raw()` (the difference
is that we don't use the oldest Message-ID) and it's easier to reuse the existing code.
NOTE: If a chat has only an OutPending message f.e., the synchronisation wouldn't work, but trying
to work in such a corner case has no significant value and isn't worth complicating the code.
- Remove "Detected Autocrypt-mime message" logs printed for every incoming Autocrypt message.
- Print only a single line at the beginning of receive_imf with both the Message-ID and seen flag.
- Print Securejoin step only once, inside handle_securejoin_handshake or observe_securejoin_on_other_device.
- Do not log "Not creating ad-hoc group" every time ad-hoc group is not created, log when it is created instead.
- Log ID of the chat where Autocrypt-Gossip for all members is received.
- Do not print "Secure-join requested." for {vg,vc}-request, we already log the step.
- Remove ">>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>" noise from securejoin logs.
Otherwise it looks like the message creating a protected group is not verified. For this, use
`sent_timestamp` of the received message as an upper limit of the sort timestamp (`msgs.timestamp`)
of the protection message. As the protection message is added to the chat earlier, this way its
timestamp is always less or eq than the received message's timestamp.
Allowing outgoing unencrypted messages in groups with 2 members
breaks the test
`python/tests/test_0_complex_or_slow.py::test_verified_group_vs_delete_server_after`
This centralizes all Securejoin/verification checks and updates in one
place right before add_parts() even before we assign the message to
the chat, so we can decouple chat logic from verification logic.
We already synchronise status/footer when we see a self-sent message with a Chat-Version
header. Would be nice to do the same for display name.
But let's do it the same way as for `Config::{MdnsEnabled,ShowEmails}`. Otherwise, if we sync the
display name using the "From" header, smth like `Param::StatusTimestamp` is needed then to reject
outdated display names. Also this timestamp needs to be updated when `Config::Displayname` is set
locally. Also this wouldn't work if system time isn't synchronised on devices. Also using multiple
approaches to sync different config values would lead to more code and bugs while having almost no
value -- using "From" only saves some bytes and allows to sync some things w/o the synchronisation
itself to be enabled. But the latter also can be a downside -- if it's usual synchonisation, you can
(potentially) disable it and share the same email account across people in some organisation
allowing them to have different display names. With using "From" for synchronisation such a
capability definitely requires a new config option.
If a message is encrypted, but unsigned:
- Don't set `MimeMessage::from_is_signed`.
- Remove "secure-join-fingerprint" and "chat-verified" headers from `MimeMessage`.
- Minor: Preserve "Subject" from the unencrypted top level if there's no "Subject" in the encrypted
part, this message is displayed w/o a padlock anyway.
Apparently it didn't lead to any vulnerabilities because there are checks for
`MimeMessage::signatures.is_empty()` in all necessary places, but still the code looked dangerous,
especially because `from_is_singed` var name didn't correspond to its actual value (it was rather
`from_is_encrypted_maybe_signed`).
If configured address is `Bob@example.net`,
but the message arrives adding `bob@example.net`,
Bob's device should still recognize it as addition of self
and fully recreate the group.
If the sender of the message in protected group chat
is not a member of the chat, mark the sender name with `~`
as we do it in non-protected chats and set the error
instead of replacing the whole message with
"Unknown sender for this chat. See 'info' for more details."
To send a message to a protected group this way
the sender needs to know the group ID
and sign the message with the current verified key.
Usually this is just a late message
delivered shortly after the user has left
the group or was removed from it.
Replacing the message with a single error text part
as done before this change makes it impossible
to access anything other than text, such as attached images.
Merge the code paths for verified and autocrypt key.
If both are changed, only one will be added.
Existing code path adds a message to all chats with the contact
rather than to 1:1 chat. If we later decide that
only 1:1 chat or only verified chats should be notified,
we can add a separate `verified_fingerprint_changed` flag.
Otherwise we will try to create an ad-hoc group
and failing because there are only two contacts
and then unblock a 1:1 chat just to assign
the message to trash in the end.
Looks like this doesn't fix anything currently, because a better message from
`apply_group_changes()` doesn't appear in a context with another better message, but why drop it if
it's possible to add it, moreover, messages about implicit member additions are never dropped while
looking less important.
An error while executing an item mustn't prevent next items from being executed. There was a comment
that only critical errors like db write failures must be reported upstack, but in fact it's hard to
achieve in the current design, there are no error codes or so, so it's bug-prone. E.g.
`ChatAction::Block` and `Unblock` already reported all errors upstack. So, let's make error handling
the same as everywhere and just ignore any errors in the item execution loop. In the worst case we
just do more unsuccessful db writes f.e.
Sync chat contacts across devices for broadcast lists and groups. This needs the corresponding chat
to exist on other devices which is not the case for unpromoted groups, so it fails for them now but
it's only a warning and will work once creation of unpromoted groups is synchronised too.
When a key is gossiped for the contact in a verified chat,
it is stored in the secondary verified key slot.
The messages are then encrypted to the secondary verified key
if they are also encrypted to the contact introducing this secondary key.
Chat-Group-Member-Added no longer updates the verified key.
Verified group recovery only relies on the secondary verified key.
When a message is received from a contact
signed with a secondary verified key,
secondary verified key replaces the primary verified key.
When verified key is changed for the contact
in response to receiving a message
signed with a secondary verified key,
"Setup changed" message is added
to the same chat where the message is received.
This message makes that partial messages do not change the group state.
A simple fix and a comprehensive test is added. This is a follow up to
the former #4841 which took a different approach.
This is another approach to provide group membership consistency for all members. Considerations:
- Classical MUA users usually don't intend to remove users from an email thread, so if they removed
a recipient then it was probably by accident.
- DC users could miss new member additions and then better to handle this in the same way as for
classical MUA messages. Moreover, if we remove a member implicitly, they will never know that and
continue to think they're still here.
But it shouldn't be a big problem if somebody missed a member removal, because they will likely
recreate the member list from the next received message. The problem occurs only if that "somebody"
managed to reply earlier. Really, it's a problem for big groups with high message rate, but let it
be for now.
