2 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Hocuri	5034449009	feat!: QR codes and symmetric encryption for broadcast channels (#7268) ... Follow-up for https://github.com/chatmail/core/pull/7042, part of https://github.com/chatmail/core/issues/6884. This will make it possible to create invite-QR codes for broadcast channels, and make them symmetrically end-to-end encrypted. - [x] Go through all the changes in #7042, and check which ones I still need, and revert all other changes - [x] Use the classical Securejoin protocol, rather than the new 2-step protocol - [x] Make the Rust tests pass - [x] Make the Python tests pass - [x] Fix TODOs in the code - [x] Test it, and fix any bugs I find - [x] I found a bug when exporting all profiles at once fails sometimes, though this bug is unrelated to channels: https://github.com/chatmail/core/issues/7281 - [x] Do a self-review (i.e. read all changes, and check if I see some things that should be changed) - [x] Have this PR reviewed and merged - [ ] Open an issue for "TODO: There is a known bug in the securejoin protocol" - [ ] Create an issue that outlines how we can improve the Securejoin protocol in the future (I don't have the time to do this right now, but want to do it sometime in winter) - [ ] Write a guide for UIs how to adapt to the changes (see https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-android/pull/3886) ## Backwards compatibility This is not very backwards compatible: - Trying to join a symmetrically-encrypted broadcast channel with an old device will fail - If you joined a symmetrically-encrypted broadcast channel with one device, and use an old core on the other device, then the other device will show a mostly empty chat (except for two device messages) - If you created a broadcast channel in the past, then you will get an error message when trying to send into the channel: > The up to now "experimental channels feature" is about to become an officially supported one. By that, privacy will be improved, it will become faster, and less traffic will be consumed. > > As we do not guarantee feature-stability for such experiments, this means, that you will need to create the channel again. > > Here is what to do: > • Create a new channel > • Tap on the channel name > • Tap on "QR Invite Code" > • Have all recipients scan the QR code, or send them the link > > If you have any questions, please send an email to delta@merlinux.eu or ask at https://support.delta.chat/. ## The symmetric encryption Symmetric encryption uses a shared secret. Currently, we use AES128 for encryption everywhere in Delta Chat, so, this is what I'm using for broadcast channels (though it wouldn't be hard to switch to AES256). The secret shared between all members of a broadcast channel has 258 bits of entropy (see `fn create_broadcast_shared_secret` in the code). Since the shared secrets have more entropy than the AES session keys, it's not necessary to have a hard-to-compute string2key algorithm, so, I'm using the string2key algorithm `salted`. This is fast enough that Delta Chat can just try out all known shared secrets. [^1] In order to prevent DOS attacks, Delta Chat will not attempt to decrypt with a string2key algorithm other than `salted` [^2]. ## The "Securejoin" protocol that adds members to the channel after they scanned a QR code This PR uses the classical securejoin protocol, the same that is also used for group and 1:1 invitations. The messages sent back and forth are called `vg-request`, `vg-auth-required`, `vg-request-with-auth`, and `vg-member-added`. I considered using the `vc-` prefix, because from a protocol-POV, the distinction between `vc-` and `vg-` isn't important (as @link2xt pointed out in an in-person discussion), but 1. it would be weird if groups used `vg-` while broadcasts and 1:1 chats used `vc-`, 2. we don't have a `vc-member-added` message yet, so, this would mean one more different kind of message 3. we anyways want to switch to a new securejoin protocol soon, which will be a backwards incompatible change with a transition phase. When we do this change, we can make everything `vc-`. [^1]: In a symmetrically encrypted message, it's not visible which secret was used to encrypt without trying out all secrets. If this does turn out to be too slow in the future, then we can remember which secret was used more recently, and and try the most recent secret first. If this is still too slow, then we can assign a short, non-unique (~2 characters) id to every shared secret, and send it in cleartext. The receiving Delta Chat will then only try out shared secrets with this id. Of course, this would leak a little bit of metadata in cleartext, so, I would like to avoid it. [^2]: A DOS attacker could send a message with a lot of encrypted session keys, all of which use a very hard-to-compute string2key algorithm. Delta Chat would then try to decrypt all of the encrypted session keys with all of the known shared secrets. In order to prevent this, as I said, Delta Chat will not attempt to decrypt with a string2key algorithm other than `salted` BREAKING CHANGE: A new QR type AskJoinBroadcast; cloning a broadcast channel is no longer possible; manually adding a member to a broadcast channel is no longer possible (only by having them scan a QR code)	2025-11-03 21:02:13 +01:00
Hocuri	51b9e86d71	Opt-in weekly sending of statistics (#6851) ... This way, the statistics / self-reporting bot will be made into an opt-in regular sending of statistics, where you enable the setting once and then they will be sent automatically. The statistics will be sent to a bot, so that the user can see exactly which data is being sent, and how often. The chat will be archived and muted by default, so that it doesn't disturb the user. The collected statistics will focus on the public-key-verification that is performed while scanning a QR code. Later on, we can add more statistics to collect. **Context:** _This is just to give a rough idea; I would need to write a lot more than a few paragraphs in order to fully explain all the context here_. End-to-end encrypted messengers are generally susceptible to MitM attacks. In order to mitigate against this, messengers offer some way of verifying the chat partner's public key. However, numerous studies found that most popular messengers implement this public-key-verification in a way that is not understood by users, and therefore ineffective - [a 2021 "State of Knowledge" paper concludes:](https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3558482.3581773) > Based on our evaluation, we have determined that all current E2EE apps, particularly when operating in opportunistic E2EE mode, are incapable of repelling active man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. In addition, we find that none of the current E2EE apps provide better and more usable [public key verification] ceremonies, resulting in insecure E2EE communications against active MitM attacks. This is why Delta Chat tries to go a different route: When the user scans a QR code (regardless of whether the QR code creates a 1:1 chat, invites to a group, or subscribes to a broadcast channel), a public-key-verification is performed in the background, without the user even having to know about this. The statistics collected here are supposed to tell us whether Delta Chat succeeds to nudge the users into using QR codes in a way that is secure against MitM attacks. **Plan for statistics-sending:** - [x] Get this PR reviewed and merged (but don't make it available in the UI yet; if Android wants to make a release in the meantime, I will create a PR that removes the option there) - [x] Set the interval to 1 week again (right now, it's 1 minute for testing) - [ ] Write something for people who are interested in what exactly we count, and link to it (see `TODO[blog post]` in the code) - [ ] Prepare a short survey for participants - [ ] Fine-tune the texts at https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-android/pull/3794, and get it reviewed and merged - [ ] After the next release, ask people to enable the statistics-sending	2025-10-21 15:29:21 +02:00