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feat: experimental header protection for Autocrypt

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This change adds support for receiving
Autocrypt header in the protected part of encrypted message.

Autocrypt header is now also allowed in mailing lists.
Previously Autocrypt header was rejected when
List-Post header was present,
but the check for the address being equal to the From: address
is sufficient.

New experimental `protect_autocrypt` config is disabled
by default because Delta Chat with reception
support should be released first on all platforms.
This commit is contained in:
link2xt
2024-11-02 22:27:06 +00:00
committed by l
parent b96593ed10
commit faad576d10
10 changed files with 207 additions and 193 deletions
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13
src/receive_imf.rs
View File

@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn receive_imf_inner(
};
crate::peerstate::maybe_do_aeap_transition(context, &mut mime_parser).await?;
if let Some(peerstate) = &mime_parser.decryption_info.peerstate {
if let Some(peerstate) = &mime_parser.peerstate {
peerstate
.handle_fingerprint_change(context, mime_parser.timestamp_sent)
.await?;
@@ -356,8 +356,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn receive_imf_inner(
// Peerstate could be updated by handling the Securejoin handshake.
let contact = Contact::get_by_id(context, from_id).await?;
mime_parser.decryption_info.peerstate =
Peerstate::from_addr(context, contact.get_addr()).await?;
mime_parser.peerstate = Peerstate::from_addr(context, contact.get_addr()).await?;
} else {
let to_id = to_ids.first().copied().unwrap_or_default();
// handshake may mark contacts as verified and must be processed before chats are created
@@ -393,7 +392,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn receive_imf_inner(
if verified_encryption == VerifiedEncryption::Verified
&& mime_parser.get_header(HeaderDef::ChatVerified).is_some()
{
if let Some(peerstate) = &mut mime_parser.decryption_info.peerstate {
if let Some(peerstate) = &mut mime_parser.peerstate {
// NOTE: it might be better to remember ID of the key
// that we used to decrypt the message, but
// it is unlikely that default key ever changes
@@ -1006,7 +1005,7 @@ async fn add_parts(
)
.await?;
}
if let Some(peerstate) = &mime_parser.decryption_info.peerstate {
if let Some(peerstate) = &mime_parser.peerstate {
restore_protection = new_protection != ProtectionStatus::Protected
&& peerstate.prefer_encrypt == EncryptPreference::Mutual
// Check that the contact still has the Autocrypt key same as the
@@ -2662,7 +2661,7 @@ async fn update_verified_keys(
return Ok(None);
}
let Some(peerstate) = &mut mimeparser.decryption_info.peerstate else {
let Some(peerstate) = &mut mimeparser.peerstate else {
// No peerstate means no verified keys.
return Ok(None);
};
@@ -2735,7 +2734,7 @@ async fn has_verified_encryption(
// this check is skipped for SELF as there is no proper SELF-peerstate
// and results in group-splits otherwise.
if from_id != ContactId::SELF {
let Some(peerstate) = &mimeparser.decryption_info.peerstate else {
let Some(peerstate) = &mimeparser.peerstate else {
return Ok(NotVerified(
"No peerstate, the contact isn't verified".to_string(),
));