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feat!: stop tracking contact verification

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Since V2 a contact is its key, there is no address-to-key binding left to verify.

The JSONRPC and FFI APIs are unchanged and report nothing as verified.

BREAKING CHANGE: the statistics JSON sent to the self-reporting-bot on Android changes: Contacts have `encrypted` instead of `verified` and lose `transitive_chain` properties and message stats have `encrypted` instead of `verified` and `unverified_encrypted`, and securejoin invites lose `already_verified`. The collecting bot stores incoming reports verbatim but analysis will have to make sense of older and newer reports.
This commit is contained in:
holger krekel
2026-08-29 23:41:13 +02:00
parent 373f1840a6
commit d8912a98ac
34 changed files with 203 additions and 1553 deletions
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34
src/aheader.rs
View File

@@ -43,13 +43,6 @@ pub struct Aheader {
pub addr: String,
pub public_key: SignedPublicKey,
pub prefer_encrypt: EncryptPreference,
/// Whether `_verified` attribute is present.
///
/// `_verified` attribute is an extension to `Autocrypt-Gossip`
/// header that is used to tell that the sender
/// marked this key as verified.
pub verified: bool,
}
impl fmt::Display for Aheader {
@@ -58,12 +51,6 @@ impl fmt::Display for Aheader {
if self.prefer_encrypt == EncryptPreference::Mutual {
write!(fmt, " prefer-encrypt=mutual;")?;
}
// TODO After we reset all existing verifications,
// we want to start sending the _verified attribute
// if self.verified {
// write!(fmt, " _verified=1;")?;
// }
// adds a whitespace every 78 characters, this allows
// email crate to wrap the lines according to RFC 5322
// (which may insert a linebreak before every whitespace)
@@ -114,8 +101,6 @@ impl Aheader {
.and_then(|raw| EncryptPreference::new(&raw).ok())
.unwrap_or_default();
let verified = attributes.remove("_verified").is_some();
// Autocrypt-Level0: unknown attributes starting with an underscore can be safely ignored
// Autocrypt-Level0: unknown attribute, treat the header as invalid
if attributes.keys().any(|k| !k.starts_with('_')) {
@@ -126,7 +111,6 @@ impl Aheader {
addr,
public_key,
prefer_encrypt,
verified,
})
}
}
@@ -145,7 +129,6 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(h.addr, "me@mail.com");
assert_eq!(h.prefer_encrypt, EncryptPreference::Mutual);
assert_eq!(h.verified, false);
Ok(())
}
@@ -243,7 +226,6 @@ mod tests {
addr: "test@example.com".to_string(),
public_key: SignedPublicKey::from_base64(RAWKEY).unwrap(),
prefer_encrypt: EncryptPreference::Mutual,
verified: false
}
)
.contains("prefer-encrypt=mutual;")
@@ -259,7 +241,6 @@ mod tests {
addr: "test@example.com".to_string(),
public_key: SignedPublicKey::from_base64(RAWKEY).unwrap(),
prefer_encrypt: EncryptPreference::NoPreference,
verified: false
}
)
.contains("prefer-encrypt")
@@ -273,24 +254,9 @@ mod tests {
addr: "TeSt@eXaMpLe.cOm".to_string(),
public_key: SignedPublicKey::from_base64(RAWKEY).unwrap(),
prefer_encrypt: EncryptPreference::Mutual,
verified: false
}
)
.contains("test@example.com")
);
// We don't send the _verified header yet:
assert!(
!format!(
"{}",
Aheader {
addr: "test@example.com".to_string(),
public_key: SignedPublicKey::from_base64(RAWKEY).unwrap(),
prefer_encrypt: EncryptPreference::NoPreference,
verified: true
}
)
.contains("_verified")
);
}
}