Prefer encryption for the peer if the message is encrypted or signed with the known key (#3844)

Note that if the message is encrypted, we don't check whether it's signed with an attached key
currently, otherwise a massive refactoring of the code is needed because for encrypted messages a
signature is checked and discarded first now.

.gitattributes

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 # This directory contains email messages verbatim, and changing CRLF to
 # LF will corrupt them.
-test-data/* text=false
+test-data/** text=false
 
 # binary files should be detected by git, however, to be sure, you can add them here explicitly
 *.png  binary

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 - Fix cargo clippy and doc errors after Rust update to 1.66 #3850
 - Don't send GroupNameChanged message if the group name doesn't change in terms of
   improve_single_line_input() #3852
+- Prefer encryption for the peer if the message is encrypted or signed with the known key #3849
 
 
 ## 1.103.0

src/decrypt.rs

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ pub async fn try_decrypt(
     decryption_info: &DecryptionInfo,
 ) -> Result<Option<(Vec<u8>, HashSet<Fingerprint>)>> {
     // Possibly perform decryption
-    let public_keyring_for_validate = keyring_from_peerstate(&decryption_info.peerstate);
+    let public_keyring_for_validate = keyring_from_peerstate(decryption_info.peerstate.as_ref());
 
     let encrypted_data_part = match get_autocrypt_mime(mail)
         .or_else(|| get_mixed_up_mime(mail))
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ fn has_decrypted_pgp_armor(input: &[u8]) -> bool {
 ///
 /// Returns `None` if the part is not a Multipart/Signed part, otherwise retruns the set of key
 /// fingerprints for which there is a valid signature.
-fn validate_detached_signature(
+pub(crate) fn validate_detached_signature(
     mail: &ParsedMail<'_>,
     public_keyring_for_validate: &Keyring<SignedPublicKey>,
 ) -> Result<Option<(Vec<u8>, HashSet<Fingerprint>)>> {
@@ -272,9 +272,9 @@ fn validate_detached_signature(
     }
 }
 
-fn keyring_from_peerstate(peerstate: &Option<Peerstate>) -> Keyring<SignedPublicKey> {
+pub(crate) fn keyring_from_peerstate(peerstate: Option<&Peerstate>) -> Keyring<SignedPublicKey> {
     let mut public_keyring_for_validate: Keyring<SignedPublicKey> = Keyring::new();
-    if let Some(ref peerstate) = *peerstate {
+    if let Some(peerstate) = peerstate {
         if let Some(key) = &peerstate.public_key {
             public_keyring_for_validate.add(key.clone());
         } else if let Some(key) = &peerstate.gossip_key {

src/mimeparser.rs

@@ -18,7 +18,10 @@ use crate::blob::BlobObject;
 use crate::constants::{DC_DESIRED_TEXT_LINES, DC_DESIRED_TEXT_LINE_LEN};
 use crate::contact::{addr_cmp, addr_normalize, ContactId};
 use crate::context::Context;
-use crate::decrypt::{prepare_decryption, try_decrypt, DecryptionInfo};
+use crate::decrypt::{
+    keyring_from_peerstate, prepare_decryption, try_decrypt, validate_detached_signature,
+    DecryptionInfo,
+};
 use crate::dehtml::dehtml;
 use crate::events::EventType;
 use crate::format_flowed::unformat_flowed;
@@ -64,7 +67,8 @@ pub struct MimeMessage {
     /// If a message is not encrypted or the signature is not valid,
     /// this set is empty.
     pub signatures: HashSet<Fingerprint>,
-
+    /// Whether the message is encrypted in a domestic (not Autocrypt) sense
+    pub encrypted: bool,
     /// The set of mail recipient addresses for which gossip headers were applied, regardless of
     /// whether they modified any peerstates.
     pub gossiped_addr: HashSet<String>,
@@ -232,91 +236,95 @@ impl MimeMessage {
         hop_info += &decryption_info.dkim_results.to_string();
 
         // `signatures` is non-empty exactly if the message was encrypted and correctly signed.
-        let (mail, signatures, warn_empty_signature) =
+        let (mail, signatures, encrypted) = match try_decrypt(context, &mail, &decryption_info)
-            match try_decrypt(context, &mail, &decryption_info).await {
+            .await
-                Ok(Some((raw, signatures))) => {
+        {
-                    // Encrypted, but maybe unsigned message. Only if
+            Ok(Some((raw, signatures))) => {
-                    // `signatures` set is non-empty, it is a valid
+                // Encrypted, but maybe unsigned message. Only if
-                    // autocrypt message.
+                // `signatures` set is non-empty, it is a valid
+                // autocrypt message.
 
-                    mail_raw = raw;
+                mail_raw = raw;
-                    let decrypted_mail = mailparse::parse_mail(&mail_raw)?;
+                let decrypted_mail = mailparse::parse_mail(&mail_raw)?;
-                    if std::env::var(crate::DCC_MIME_DEBUG).is_ok() {
+                if std::env::var(crate::DCC_MIME_DEBUG).is_ok() {
-                        info!(context, "decrypted message mime-body:");
+                    info!(context, "decrypted message mime-body:");
-                        println!("{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&mail_raw));
+                    println!("{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&mail_raw));
-                    }
+                }
 
-                    // Handle any gossip headers if the mail was encrypted.  See section
+                // Handle any gossip headers if the mail was encrypted.  See section
-                    // "3.6 Key Gossip" of <https://autocrypt.org/autocrypt-spec-1.1.0.pdf>
+                // "3.6 Key Gossip" of <https://autocrypt.org/autocrypt-spec-1.1.0.pdf>
-                    // but only if the mail was correctly signed:
+                // but only if the mail was correctly signed:
-                    if !signatures.is_empty() {
+                if !signatures.is_empty() {
-                        let gossip_headers =
+                    let gossip_headers = decrypted_mail.headers.get_all_values("Autocrypt-Gossip");
-                            decrypted_mail.headers.get_all_values("Autocrypt-Gossip");
+                    gossiped_addr = update_gossip_peerstates(
-                        gossiped_addr =
-                            update_gossip_peerstates(context, message_time, &mail, gossip_headers)
-                                .await?;
-                    }
-
-                    // let known protected headers from the decrypted
-                    // part override the unencrypted top-level
-
-                    // Signature was checked for original From, so we
-                    // do not allow overriding it.
-                    let mut signed_from = None;
-
-                    // We do not want to allow unencrypted subject in encrypted emails because the user might falsely think that the subject is safe.
-                    // See <https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-core-rust/issues/1790>.
-                    headers.remove("subject");
-
-                    MimeMessage::merge_headers(
                         context,
-                        &mut headers,
+                        message_time,
-                        &mut recipients,
+                        &from.addr,
-                        &mut signed_from,
+                        &mail,
-                        &mut list_post,
+                        gossip_headers,
-                        &mut chat_disposition_notification_to,
+                    )
-                        &decrypted_mail.headers,
+                    .await?;
-                    );
+                }
-                    if let Some(signed_from) = signed_from {
-                        if addr_cmp(&signed_from.addr, &from.addr) {
-                            from_is_signed = true;
-                        } else {
-                            // There is a From: header in the encrypted &
-                            // signed part, but it doesn't match the outer one.
-                            // This _might_ be because the sender's mail server
-                            // replaced the sending address, e.g. in a mailing list.
-                            // Or it's because someone is doing some replay attack
-                            // - OTOH, I can't come up with an attack scenario
-                            // where this would be useful.
-                            warn!(
-                                context,
-                                "From header in signed part does't match the outer one"
-                            );
-                        }
-                    }
 
-                    (Ok(decrypted_mail), signatures, true)
+                // let known protected headers from the decrypted
-                }
+                // part override the unencrypted top-level
-                Ok(None) => {
+
-                    // Message was not encrypted.
+                // Signature was checked for original From, so we
-                    // If it is not a read receipt, degrade encryption.
+                // do not allow overriding it.
-                    if let Some(peerstate) = &mut decryption_info.peerstate {
+                let mut signed_from = None;
-                        if message_time > peerstate.last_seen_autocrypt
+
-                            && mail.ctype.mimetype != "multipart/report"
+                // We do not want to allow unencrypted subject in encrypted emails because the user might falsely think that the subject is safe.
-                        // Disallowing keychanges is disabled for now:
+                // See <https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-core-rust/issues/1790>.
-                        // && decryption_info.dkim_results.allow_keychange
+                headers.remove("subject");
-                        {
+
-                            peerstate.degrade_encryption(message_time);
+                MimeMessage::merge_headers(
-                            peerstate.save_to_db(&context.sql).await?;
+                    context,
-                        }
+                    &mut headers,
+                    &mut recipients,
+                    &mut signed_from,
+                    &mut list_post,
+                    &mut chat_disposition_notification_to,
+                    &decrypted_mail.headers,
+                );
+                if let Some(signed_from) = signed_from {
+                    if addr_cmp(&signed_from.addr, &from.addr) {
+                        from_is_signed = true;
+                    } else {
+                        // There is a From: header in the encrypted &
+                        // signed part, but it doesn't match the outer one.
+                        // This _might_ be because the sender's mail server
+                        // replaced the sending address, e.g. in a mailing list.
+                        // Or it's because someone is doing some replay attack
+                        // - OTOH, I can't come up with an attack scenario
+                        // where this would be useful.
+                        warn!(
+                            context,
+                            "From header in signed part does't match the outer one",
+                        );
                     }
-                    (Ok(mail), HashSet::new(), false)
                 }
-                Err(err) => {
+
-                    warn!(context, "decryption failed: {}", err);
+                (Ok(decrypted_mail), signatures, true)
-                    (Err(err), HashSet::new(), true)
+            }
+            Ok(None) => {
+                // Message was not encrypted.
+                // If it is not a read receipt, degrade encryption.
+                if let Some(peerstate) = &mut decryption_info.peerstate {
+                    if message_time > peerstate.last_seen_autocrypt
+                        && mail.ctype.mimetype != "multipart/report"
+                    // Disallowing keychanges is disabled for now:
+                    // && decryption_info.dkim_results.allow_keychange
+                    {
+                        peerstate.degrade_encryption(message_time);
+                    }
                 }
-            };
+                (Ok(mail), HashSet::new(), false)
+            }
+            Err(err) => {
+                warn!(context, "decryption failed: {}", err);
+                (Err(err), HashSet::new(), true)
+            }
+        };
 
         let mut parser = MimeMessage {
             parts: Vec::new(),
@@ -331,6 +339,7 @@ impl MimeMessage {
 
             // only non-empty if it was a valid autocrypt message
             signatures,
+            encrypted,
             gossiped_addr,
             is_forwarded: false,
             mdn_reports: Vec::new(),
@@ -385,7 +394,7 @@ impl MimeMessage {
         //         part.error = Some("Seems like DKIM failed, this either is an attack or (more likely) a bug in Authentication-Results checking. Please tell us about this at https://support.delta.chat.".to_string());
         //     }
         // }
-        if warn_empty_signature && parser.signatures.is_empty() {
+        if encrypted && parser.signatures.is_empty() {
             for part in parser.parts.iter_mut() {
                 part.error = Some("No valid signature".to_string());
             }
@@ -400,6 +409,13 @@ impl MimeMessage {
             peerstate
                 .handle_fingerprint_change(context, message_time)
                 .await?;
+            // When peerstate is set to Mutual, it's saved immediately to not lose that fact in case
+            // of an error. Otherwise we don't save peerstate until get here to reduce the number of
+            // calls to save_to_db() and not to degrade encryption if a mail wasn't parsed
+            // successfully.
+            if peerstate.prefer_encrypt != EncryptPreference::Mutual {
+                peerstate.save_to_db(&context.sql).await?;
+            }
         }
 
         Ok(parser)
@@ -852,6 +868,26 @@ impl MimeMessage {
                         .parse_mime_recursive(context, first, is_related)
                         .await?;
                 }
+                if let Some(peerstate) = &mut self.decryption_info.peerstate {
+                    let keyring = keyring_from_peerstate(Some(peerstate));
+                    match validate_detached_signature(mail, &keyring) {
+                        Ok(Some((_, fprints))) => {
+                            if fprints.is_empty() {
+                                warn!(context, "signed message is not signed with a known key");
+                            } else if peerstate.prefer_encrypt != EncryptPreference::Mutual {
+                                info!(
+                                    context,
+                                    "message is signed with the known key, setting \
+                                    prefer-encrypt=mutual for '{}'",
+                                    peerstate.addr,
+                                );
+                                Self::upgrade_to_mutual_encryption(context, peerstate).await?;
+                            }
+                        }
+                        Ok(None) => warn!(context, "not a 'multipart/signed' part??"),
+                        Err(err) => warn!(context, "signed message validation failed: {}", err),
+                    }
+                }
             }
             (mime::MULTIPART, "report") => {
                 /* RFC 6522: the first part is for humans, the second for machines */
@@ -929,6 +965,17 @@ impl MimeMessage {
         Ok(any_part_added)
     }
 
+    async fn upgrade_to_mutual_encryption(
+        context: &Context,
+        peerstate: &mut Peerstate,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        if peerstate.public_key.is_none() {
+            peerstate.public_key = peerstate.gossip_key.take();
+        }
+        peerstate.prefer_encrypt = EncryptPreference::Mutual;
+        peerstate.save_to_db(&context.sql).await
+    }
+
     /// Returns true if any part was added, false otherwise.
     async fn add_single_part_if_known(
         &mut self,
@@ -1106,7 +1153,13 @@ impl MimeMessage {
             if peerstate.prefer_encrypt != EncryptPreference::Mutual
                 && mime_type.type_() == mime::APPLICATION
                 && mime_type.subtype().as_str() == "pgp-keys"
-                && Self::try_set_peer_key_from_file_part(context, peerstate, decoded_data).await?
+                && Self::try_set_peer_key_from_file_part(
+                    context,
+                    peerstate,
+                    decoded_data,
+                    self.encrypted,
+                )
+                .await?
             {
                 return Ok(());
             }
@@ -1196,6 +1249,7 @@ impl MimeMessage {
         context: &Context,
         peerstate: &mut Peerstate,
         decoded_data: &[u8],
+        mail_is_encrypted: bool,
     ) -> Result<bool> {
         let key = match str::from_utf8(decoded_data) {
             Err(err) => {
@@ -1240,13 +1294,23 @@ impl MimeMessage {
                 return Ok(false);
             }
         }
-        info!(
-            context,
-            "will use attached PGP key for peer '{}' with mutual encryption", peerstate.addr,
-        );
         peerstate.public_key = Some(key);
-        peerstate.prefer_encrypt = EncryptPreference::Mutual;
+        if mail_is_encrypted {
-        peerstate.save_to_db(&context.sql).await?;
+            info!(
+                context,
+                "using attached PGP key for peer '{}' with prefer-encrypt=mutual as the mail is \
+                encrypted",
+                peerstate.addr,
+            );
+            peerstate.prefer_encrypt = EncryptPreference::Mutual;
+            peerstate.save_to_db(&context.sql).await?;
+        } else {
+            info!(
+                context,
+                "using attached PGP key for peer '{}'", peerstate.addr,
+            );
+            peerstate.prefer_encrypt = EncryptPreference::NoPreference;
+        }
         Ok(true)
     }
 
@@ -1624,6 +1688,7 @@ impl MimeMessage {
 async fn update_gossip_peerstates(
     context: &Context,
     message_time: i64,
+    from: &str,
     mail: &mailparse::ParsedMail<'_>,
     gossip_headers: Vec<String>,
 ) -> Result<HashSet<String>> {
@@ -1641,7 +1706,7 @@ async fn update_gossip_peerstates(
 
         if !get_recipients(&mail.headers)
             .iter()
-            .any(|info| info.addr == header.addr.to_lowercase())
+            .any(|info| addr_cmp(&info.addr, &header.addr))
         {
             warn!(
                 context,
@@ -1649,6 +1714,14 @@ async fn update_gossip_peerstates(
             );
             continue;
         }
+        if addr_cmp(from, &header.addr) {
+            // Non-standard, but anyway we can't update the cached peerstate here.
+            warn!(
+                context,
+                "Ignoring gossiped \"{}\" as it equals the From address", &header.addr,
+            );
+            continue;
+        }
 
         let peerstate;
         if let Some(mut p) = Peerstate::from_addr(context, &header.addr).await? {

src/peerstate.rs

@@ -806,7 +806,6 @@ mod tests {
             verified_key_fingerprint: None,
             fingerprint_changed: false,
         };
-        assert_eq!(peerstate.prefer_encrypt, EncryptPreference::NoPreference);
 
         peerstate.apply_header(&header, 100);
         assert_eq!(peerstate.prefer_encrypt, EncryptPreference::Mutual);

src/receive_imf.rs

@@ -5359,7 +5359,13 @@ Reply from different address
 
         let raw = include_bytes!("../test-data/message/thunderbird_with_autocrypt_unencrypted.eml");
         receive_imf(&t, raw, false).await?;
+        let peerstate = Peerstate::from_addr(&t, "alice@example.org")
+            .await?
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(peerstate.prefer_encrypt, EncryptPreference::Mutual);
 
+        let raw = include_bytes!("../test-data/message/thunderbird_signed_unencrypted.eml");
+        receive_imf(&t, raw, false).await?;
         let peerstate = Peerstate::from_addr(&t, "alice@example.org")
             .await?
             .unwrap();

test-data/message/thunderbird_signed_unencrypted.eml

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From - Thu, 15 Dec 2022 14:45:17 GMT
+X-Mozilla-Status: 0801
+X-Mozilla-Status2: 00000000
+Message-ID: <db254c95-c23e-2ad5-14db-11ad1f374dbf@example.org>
+Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2022 11:45:16 -0300
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101
+ Thunderbird/102.5.1
+Content-Language: en-US
+To: bob@example.net
+From: Alice <alice@example.org>
+Subject: test message 15:53
+X-Mozilla-Draft-Info: internal/draft; vcard=0; receipt=0; DSN=0; uuencode=0;
+ attachmentreminder=0; deliveryformat=0
+X-Identity-Key: id3
+Fcc: imap://alice%40example.org@in.example.org/Sent
+Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256;
+ protocol="application/pgp-signature";
+ boundary="------------iX39J1p7DOgblwacjo0e7jX7"
+
+This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156)
+--------------iX39J1p7DOgblwacjo0e7jX7
+Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------WD4DG7TcI4p4lbzyM4toRaDw";
+ protected-headers="v1"
+From: Alice <alice@example.org>
+To: bob@example.net
+Message-ID: <db254c95-c23e-2ad5-14db-11ad1f374dbf@example.org>
+Subject: test message 15:53
+
+--------------WD4DG7TcI4p4lbzyM4toRaDw
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
+
+DQo=
+
+--------------WD4DG7TcI4p4lbzyM4toRaDw--
+
+--------------iX39J1p7DOgblwacjo0e7jX7
+Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="OpenPGP_signature.asc"
+Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature
+Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="OpenPGP_signature"
+
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+wsD5BAABCAAjFiEEFKs/ZfwnS721+naMJfAHJFnkeuIFAmObMvwFAwAAAAAACgkQJfAHJFnkeuLM
+TgwAnAADX93HE5vXmuBcAbRN2HKIwMzBtRtUF4FNPKchffUvvhSNpHkW2jW7A4hOHNgVSDQdqIUn
++62NgkaKrT1bZqozOZNHXMECHtKBwXWTkIAVqcBdvscCztVIgGby56OPnzZ5y09BsRaqqE5AhDgN
+wGCLa6ipu5FYSF6+KzdO0GIPMY5aGRgVhtl4N01v4S3+r/Yu60MkN87nd15Eaqsrs60P9RmKJTt4
+hDie35kKvHnPzLNs8+xLfqPuO/P7ZbPQgkgCwMAMsMDRUYOv+k5c/bL3PKiOENuDpQ7dkKJ2OzSn
+nTcg8qhDf17vWe26C/QBhFiGEsrHNBQ1KW5by+cqjIUBJgXElFnPl35S5L3fn6JHZLcz6q+wQuJu
+vGT1mJuP//jLFkMHSexukFIVXzn41rWPLd05rBqMgwRcOHMIyzE9zaO1aa8MF2TirPaZ5lH9rx/y
+9DCU/d2sqbbYt8TGqj4hM3pqg5K22eq4KT1W7y8+28I5QfjZumLLrHBdYTnR
+=6JTB
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+--------------iX39J1p7DOgblwacjo0e7jX7--

test-data/message/thunderbird_with_autocrypt_unencrypted.eml

@@ -1,142 +1,142 @@
-From - Fri, 09 Dec 2022 13:16:11 GMT
+From - Wed, 14 Dec 2022 18:53:03 GMT
 X-Mozilla-Status: 0801
 X-Mozilla-Status2: 00000000
-Message-ID: <0c8e3ffc-99ae-eb68-15b5-15c4d85a5c12@example.org>
+Message-ID: <87d75c7e-0f52-1335-e437-af605c09f954@example.org>
-Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2022 10:16:11 -0300
+Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 15:53:03 -0300
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101
  Thunderbird/102.5.1
 Content-Language: en-US
 To: bob@example.net
 From: Alice <alice@example.org>
-Subject: test message 10:15
+Subject: test message 15:52
 Autocrypt: addr=alice@example.org; keydata=
- xsDNBGOTM3UBDADZ819boOPXK/ZPO1EepYUBve2psYO3rZkPu3uhyn7qpI8c0U5IbR+mAXPH
+ xsDNBGOaGzQBDADCFtBNMHRDJQRkd2tNm7CJm1Yo3Y5r3qP6v0FSwP1BIHbiIf0E/jFiKZWj
- FkKfvSwTtGiPpXaP6/vx0OjTs1aR7We9MrP+1EckbsyQnnDmDGsGxxyn3+a3ar0FcgOBi/kS
+ 1uL68J2mGUuUu+Qi4ovf1l9/QQYzg/DCaLZxlbc0LKu2LXcpUL5DPu37mdw+DKs0YvNIlc+A
- j0fPB1tX92/z3MWtOSXYtYOlMotRdIxt/L8CYQSBe8wWpoOKQPNmtvnEuDlJwSlrhRPx6PDm
+ RjyFUwd3rsZN3k58inf1mYzKuKU6NpbdXULbOEYwnVEwzQsrtS2JgJ+tLSYUvNJeMJXm/cDL
- BgoKv1qi5UOrAoyUPbdnINnSgj14KBNMgiuJQz6+AwVaYitVJ37N6lrCfhWRPZAVDRW5ajLx
+ XKJSApAyvVVdxxteG8uWcDqWV/HcXuopXLILf3yJF0De11/7G62dHNHuhmtgRLsTN4Q372Q9
- W+DuuYUW675xzi2bLlb4jGeFePvS9Rhw2CpkG608cFVFrUCBH91mfb0UnmxIDMcc6JSn0Uqf
+ KNdYEFLHaN91jEzyD/+aHNskATxtcGhppI8OQsU3NzNgHyd8Smzx5oTyZ/6NdhYoh0pKB8yf
- PESC+0wK9xokzi07/FZtXyf925oiMpA7ZQ7aSNW6J7kk618xNQRivLhEV1+QofynAzfwAB+C
+ VAyA69t5fctQRb4+bTwL+sS9KDobQOvcyOMUSccDfUhsWMghwsMCwU4Sz9hIY6dCAfroDAiL
- vqY+VjNZbGKGW7aba84Nx9Wa7g8rbZ5ZvsQmrn38fpWu+2GcUvnGOxn8lYEljnfCthSigjCg
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- q3T90aSUwDQfedJej9nzM98AEQEAAc0ZQWxpY2UgPGFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUub3JnPsLBDQQT
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 X-Mozilla-Draft-Info: internal/draft; vcard=0; receipt=0; DSN=0; uuencode=0;
  attachmentreminder=0; deliveryformat=0
 X-Identity-Key: id3
 Fcc: imap://alice%40example.org@in.example.org/Sent
 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256;
  protocol="application/pgp-signature";
- boundary="------------FFBOG29BVxcOkoFV1hnc0RaY"
+ boundary="------------x6XEHrf0vHmVgEo6f9bMGGUy"
 
 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156)
---------------FFBOG29BVxcOkoFV1hnc0RaY
+--------------x6XEHrf0vHmVgEo6f9bMGGUy
-Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------4cwiD0i5NnTXNSfPNpFwrv6V";
+Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------pePWGfS6inyAJsaJRFnx5r9s";
  protected-headers="v1"
 From: Alice <alice@example.org>
 To: bob@example.net
-Message-ID: <0c8e3ffc-99ae-eb68-15b5-15c4d85a5c12@example.org>
+Message-ID: <87d75c7e-0f52-1335-e437-af605c09f954@example.org>
-Subject: test message 10:15
+Subject: test message 15:52
 
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 Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
 
-MTIzDQoNCg==
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+--------------bG3L0s709hFHGhT5ybFZLKLf
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-Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="OpenPGP_0xE0D506661947F47C.asc"
+Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="OpenPGP_0x25F0072459E47AE2.asc"
 Content-Description: OpenPGP public key
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
 
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 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
 
---------------fbNEFvfS22YOKnkTd1oAl0ak--
+--------------bG3L0s709hFHGhT5ybFZLKLf--
 
---------------4cwiD0i5NnTXNSfPNpFwrv6V--
+--------------pePWGfS6inyAJsaJRFnx5r9s--
 
---------------FFBOG29BVxcOkoFV1hnc0RaY
+--------------x6XEHrf0vHmVgEo6f9bMGGUy
 Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="OpenPGP_signature.asc"
 Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature
 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="OpenPGP_signature"
 
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
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+=wlaI
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
---------------FFBOG29BVxcOkoFV1hnc0RaY--
+--------------x6XEHrf0vHmVgEo6f9bMGGUy--