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Don't parse the message again after detached signatures validation

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If we move the detached signatures validation code out of try_decrypt(), we don't need to convert an
already parsed signed message part to Vec and then parse it back. Also this simplifies the
try_decrypt() semantics and return type. It can't make a good coffee anyway.
This commit is contained in:
iequidoo
2022-12-23 21:30:14 -03:00
committed by iequidoo
parent 7d62df6f1a
commit 6dc790f447
3 changed files with 92 additions and 109 deletions
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142
src/mimeparser.rs
View File

@@ -18,7 +18,10 @@ use crate::blob::BlobObject;
use crate::constants::{DC_DESIRED_TEXT_LINES, DC_DESIRED_TEXT_LINE_LEN};
use crate::contact::{addr_cmp, addr_normalize, ContactId};
use crate::context::Context;
use crate::decrypt::{prepare_decryption, try_decrypt, DecryptionInfo};
use crate::decrypt::{
keyring_from_peerstate, prepare_decryption, try_decrypt, validate_detached_signature,
DecryptionInfo,
};
use crate::dehtml::dehtml;
use crate::events::EventType;
use crate::format_flowed::unformat_flowed;
@@ -234,87 +237,88 @@ impl MimeMessage {
hop_info += "\n\n";
hop_info += &decryption_info.dkim_results.to_string();
let public_keyring = keyring_from_peerstate(decryption_info.peerstate.as_ref());
let (mail, mut signatures, encrypted) =
match try_decrypt(context, &mail, &private_keyring, &decryption_info) {
Ok(Some((raw, signatures, encrypted))) => {
// Only if `encrypted` and `signatures` set is non-empty, it is a valid
// autocrypt message.
match try_decrypt(context, &mail, &private_keyring, &public_keyring) {
Ok(Some((raw, signatures))) => {
mail_raw = raw;
let decrypted_mail = mailparse::parse_mail(&mail_raw)?;
if std::env::var(crate::DCC_MIME_DEBUG).is_ok() {
info!(context, "decrypted message mime-body:");
println!("{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&mail_raw));
}
if encrypted {
// Handle any gossip headers if the mail was encrypted. See section
// "3.6 Key Gossip" of <https://autocrypt.org/autocrypt-spec-1.1.0.pdf>
// but only if the mail was correctly signed:
if !signatures.is_empty() {
let gossip_headers =
decrypted_mail.headers.get_all_values("Autocrypt-Gossip");
gossiped_addr = update_gossip_peerstates(
context,
message_time,
&from.addr,
&mail,
gossip_headers,
)
.await?;
}
// let known protected headers from the decrypted
// part override the unencrypted top-level
// Signature was checked for original From, so we
// do not allow overriding it.
let mut signed_from = None;
// We do not want to allow unencrypted subject in encrypted emails because the
// user might falsely think that the subject is safe.
// See <https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-core-rust/issues/1790>.
headers.remove("subject");
MimeMessage::merge_headers(
context,
&mut headers,
&mut recipients,
&mut signed_from,
&mut list_post,
&mut chat_disposition_notification_to,
&decrypted_mail.headers,
);
if let Some(signed_from) = signed_from {
if addr_cmp(&signed_from.addr, &from.addr) {
from_is_signed = true;
} else {
// There is a From: header in the encrypted &
// signed part, but it doesn't match the outer one.
// This _might_ be because the sender's mail server
// replaced the sending address, e.g. in a mailing list.
// Or it's because someone is doing some replay attack
// - OTOH, I can't come up with an attack scenario
// where this would be useful.
warn!(
context,
"From header in signed part does't match the outer one",
);
}
}
}
(Ok(decrypted_mail), signatures, encrypted)
(Ok(decrypted_mail), signatures, true)
}
Ok(None) => (Ok(mail), HashSet::new(), false),
Err(err) => {
warn!(context, "decryption failed: {}", err);
(Err(err), HashSet::new(), true)
(Err(err), HashSet::new(), false)
}
};
let mail = mail.as_ref().map(|mail| {
let (content, signatures_detached) = validate_detached_signature(mail, &public_keyring)
.unwrap_or((mail, Default::default()));
signatures.extend(signatures_detached);
content
});
if let (Ok(mail), true) = (mail, encrypted) {
// Handle any gossip headers if the mail was encrypted. See section
// "3.6 Key Gossip" of <https://autocrypt.org/autocrypt-spec-1.1.0.pdf>
// but only if the mail was correctly signed:
if !signatures.is_empty() {
let gossip_headers = mail.headers.get_all_values("Autocrypt-Gossip");
gossiped_addr = update_gossip_peerstates(
context,
message_time,
&from.addr,
&recipients,
gossip_headers,
)
.await?;
}
// let known protected headers from the decrypted
// part override the unencrypted top-level
// Signature was checked for original From, so we
// do not allow overriding it.
let mut signed_from = None;
// We do not want to allow unencrypted subject in encrypted emails because the
// user might falsely think that the subject is safe.
// See <https://github.com/deltachat/deltachat-core-rust/issues/1790>.
headers.remove("subject");
MimeMessage::merge_headers(
context,
&mut headers,
&mut recipients,
&mut signed_from,
&mut list_post,
&mut chat_disposition_notification_to,
&mail.headers,
);
if let Some(signed_from) = signed_from {
if addr_cmp(&signed_from.addr, &from.addr) {
from_is_signed = true;
} else {
// There is a From: header in the encrypted &
// signed part, but it doesn't match the outer one.
// This _might_ be because the sender's mail server
// replaced the sending address, e.g. in a mailing list.
// Or it's because someone is doing some replay attack
// - OTOH, I can't come up with an attack scenario
// where this would be useful.
warn!(
context,
"From header in signed part does't match the outer one",
);
}
}
}
if signatures.is_empty() {
// If it is not a read receipt, degrade encryption.
if let (Some(peerstate), Ok(mail)) = (&mut decryption_info.peerstate, &mail) {
if let (Some(peerstate), Ok(mail)) = (&mut decryption_info.peerstate, mail) {
if message_time > peerstate.last_seen_autocrypt
&& mail.ctype.mimetype != "multipart/report"
// Disallowing keychanges is disabled for now:
@@ -366,7 +370,7 @@ impl MimeMessage {
}
None => match mail {
Ok(mail) => {
parser.parse_mime_recursive(context, &mail, false).await?;
parser.parse_mime_recursive(context, mail, false).await?;
}
Err(err) => {
let msg_body = stock_str::cant_decrypt_msg_body(context).await;
@@ -1637,7 +1641,7 @@ async fn update_gossip_peerstates(
context: &Context,
message_time: i64,
from: &str,
mail: &mailparse::ParsedMail<'_>,
recipients: &[SingleInfo],
gossip_headers: Vec<String>,
) -> Result<HashSet<String>> {
// XXX split the parsing from the modification part
@@ -1652,7 +1656,7 @@ async fn update_gossip_peerstates(
}
};
if !get_recipients(&mail.headers)
if !recipients
.iter()
.any(|info| addr_cmp(&info.addr, &header.addr))
{