fix: receive_imf: Look up key contact by intended recipient fingerprint (#7661)

For now, do this only for `OneOneChat` and `MailingListOrBroadcast`, this is enough to correctly
support messages from modern Delta Chat versions sending Intended Recipient Fingerprint subpackets
and single-recipient messages from modern versions of other MUAs.
This commit is contained in:
iequidoo
2026-01-28 07:52:06 -03:00
committed by iequidoo
parent cbd379fdf0
commit 61a8eff2ad
4 changed files with 61 additions and 11 deletions

View File

@@ -196,7 +196,13 @@ pub async fn pk_encrypt(
hashed.push(Subpacket::critical(SubpacketData::SignatureCreationTime(
chrono::Utc::now().trunc_subsecs(0),
))?);
// Test "elena" uses old Delta Chat.
let skip = private_key_for_signing.dc_fingerprint().hex()
== "B86586B6DEF437D674BFAFC02A6B2EBC633B9E82";
for key in &public_keys_for_encryption {
if skip {
break;
}
let data = SubpacketData::IntendedRecipientFingerprint(key.fingerprint());
let subpkt = match private_key_for_signing.version() < KeyVersion::V6 {
true => Subpacket::regular(data)?,

View File

@@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ use crate::events::EventType;
use crate::headerdef::{HeaderDef, HeaderDefMap};
use crate::imap::{GENERATED_PREFIX, markseen_on_imap_table};
use crate::key::{DcKey, Fingerprint};
use crate::key::{load_self_public_key_opt, self_fingerprint, self_fingerprint_opt};
use crate::key::{
load_self_public_key, load_self_public_key_opt, self_fingerprint, self_fingerprint_opt,
};
use crate::log::{LogExt as _, warn};
use crate::message::{
self, Message, MessageState, MessengerMessage, MsgId, Viewtype, rfc724_mid_exists,
@@ -386,8 +388,30 @@ async fn get_to_and_past_contact_ids(
// This is an encrypted 1:1 chat.
to_ids = pgp_to_ids
} else {
let ids = match mime_parser.was_encrypted() {
true => {
let ids = if mime_parser.was_encrypted() {
let mut recipient_fps = mime_parser
.signature
.as_ref()
.map(|(_, recipient_fps)| recipient_fps.iter().cloned().collect::<Vec<_>>())
.unwrap_or_default();
// If there are extra recipient fingerprints, it may be a non-chat "implicit
// Bcc" message. Fall back to in-chat lookup if so.
if !recipient_fps.is_empty() && recipient_fps.len() <= 2 {
let self_fp = load_self_public_key(context).await?.dc_fingerprint();
recipient_fps.retain(|fp| *fp != self_fp);
if recipient_fps.is_empty() {
vec![Some(ContactId::SELF)]
} else {
add_or_lookup_key_contacts(
context,
&mime_parser.recipients,
&mime_parser.gossiped_keys,
&recipient_fps,
Origin::Hidden,
)
.await?
}
} else {
lookup_key_contacts_fallback_to_chat(
context,
&mime_parser.recipients,
@@ -396,7 +420,8 @@ async fn get_to_and_past_contact_ids(
)
.await?
}
false => vec![],
} else {
vec![]
};
if mime_parser.was_encrypted() && !ids.contains(&None)
// Prefer creating PGP chats if there are any key-contacts. At least this prevents

View File

@@ -5111,9 +5111,9 @@ async fn test_dont_verify_by_verified_by_unknown() -> Result<()> {
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn test_recv_outgoing_msg_before_securejoin() -> Result<()> {
let mut tcm = TestContextManager::new();
let a0 = &tcm.alice().await;
let a1 = &tcm.alice().await;
let bob = &tcm.bob().await;
let a0 = &tcm.elena().await;
let a1 = &tcm.elena().await;
tcm.execute_securejoin(bob, a0).await;
let chat_id_a0_bob = a0.create_chat_id(bob).await;
@@ -5154,14 +5154,31 @@ async fn test_recv_outgoing_msg_before_securejoin() -> Result<()> {
chat_a1.why_cant_send(a1).await?,
Some(CantSendReason::ContactRequest)
);
let a0 = &tcm.alice().await;
let a1 = &tcm.alice().await;
tcm.execute_securejoin(bob, a0).await;
let chat_id_a0_bob = a0.create_chat_id(bob).await;
let sent_msg = a0.send_text(chat_id_a0_bob, "Hi").await;
bob.recv_msg(&sent_msg).await;
let msg_a1 = a1.recv_msg(&sent_msg).await;
assert!(msg_a1.get_showpadlock());
let chat_a1 = Chat::load_from_db(a1, msg_a1.chat_id).await?;
assert_eq!(chat_a1.typ, Chattype::Single);
assert!(chat_a1.is_encrypted(a1).await?);
assert_eq!(
chat::get_chat_contacts(a1, chat_a1.id).await?,
[a1.add_or_lookup_contact_id(bob).await]
);
assert!(chat_a1.can_send(a1).await?);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn test_recv_outgoing_msg_before_having_key_and_after() -> Result<()> {
let mut tcm = TestContextManager::new();
let a0 = &tcm.alice().await;
let a1 = &tcm.alice().await;
let a0 = &tcm.elena().await;
let a1 = &tcm.elena().await;
let bob = &tcm.bob().await;
tcm.execute_securejoin(bob, a0).await;
@@ -5174,9 +5191,9 @@ async fn test_recv_outgoing_msg_before_having_key_and_after() -> Result<()> {
assert!(!chat_a1.is_encrypted(a1).await?);
// Device a1 somehow learns Bob's key and creates the corresponding chat. However, this doesn't
// help currently because we only look up key contacts by address in a particular chat and the
// new chat isn't referenced by the received message. This should be fixed by sending and
// receiving Intended Recipient Fingerprint subpackets.
// help because we only look up key contacts by address in a particular chat and the new chat
// isn't referenced by the received message. This is fixed by sending and receiving Intended
// Recipient Fingerprint subpackets which elena doesn't send.
a1.create_chat_id(bob).await;
let sent_msg = a0.send_text(chat_id_a0_bob, "Hi again").await;
let msg_a1 = a1.recv_msg(&sent_msg).await;

View File

@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ impl TestContextManager {
.await
}
/// Returns new elena's "device".
/// Elena doesn't send Intended Recipient Fingerprint subpackets to simulate old Delta Chat.
pub async fn elena(&mut self) -> TestContext {
TestContext::builder()
.configure_elena()