feat: key-contacts

This change introduces a new type of contacts
identified by their public key fingerprint
rather than an e-mail address.

Encrypted chats now stay encrypted
and unencrypted chats stay unencrypted.
For example, 1:1 chats with key-contacts
are encrypted and 1:1 chats with address-contacts
are unencrypted.
Groups that have a group ID are encrypted
and can only contain key-contacts
while groups that don't have a group ID ("adhoc groups")
are unencrypted and can only contain address-contacts.

JSON-RPC API `reset_contact_encryption` is removed.
Python API `Contact.reset_encryption` is removed.
"Group tracking plugin" in legacy Python API was removed because it
relied on parsing email addresses from system messages with regexps.

Co-authored-by: Hocuri <hocuri@gmx.de>
Co-authored-by: iequidoo <dgreshilov@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: B. Petersen <r10s@b44t.com>
This commit is contained in:
link2xt
2025-06-26 14:07:39 +00:00
parent 7ac04d0204
commit 416131b4a2
84 changed files with 4735 additions and 6338 deletions

View File

@@ -3153,6 +3153,18 @@ pub unsafe extern "C" fn dc_chat_is_protected(chat: *mut dc_chat_t) -> libc::c_i
ffi_chat.chat.is_protected() as libc::c_int
}
#[no_mangle]
pub unsafe extern "C" fn dc_chat_is_encrypted(chat: *mut dc_chat_t) -> libc::c_int {
if chat.is_null() {
eprintln!("ignoring careless call to dc_chat_is_encrypted()");
return 0;
}
let ffi_chat = &*chat;
block_on(ffi_chat.chat.is_encrypted(&ffi_chat.context))
.unwrap_or_log_default(&ffi_chat.context, "Failed dc_chat_is_encrypted") as libc::c_int
}
#[no_mangle]
pub unsafe extern "C" fn dc_chat_is_protection_broken(chat: *mut dc_chat_t) -> libc::c_int {
if chat.is_null() {
@@ -4303,6 +4315,7 @@ pub unsafe extern "C" fn dc_contact_get_verifier_id(contact: *mut dc_contact_t)
.context("failed to get verifier")
.log_err(ctx)
.unwrap_or_default()
.unwrap_or_default()
.unwrap_or_default();
verifier_contact_id.to_u32()