diff --git a/src/peerstate.rs b/src/peerstate.rs
index 00c640e04..c0d4c7e91 100644
--- a/src/peerstate.rs
+++ b/src/peerstate.rs
@@ -766,23 +766,65 @@ pub(crate) async fn maybe_do_aeap_transition(
 
     // If the from addr is different from the peerstate address we know,
     // we may want to do an AEAP transition.
-    if !addr_cmp(&peerstate.addr, &mime_parser.from.addr)
-            // Check if it's a chat message; we do this to avoid
-            // some accidental transitions if someone writes from multiple
-            // addresses with an MUA.
-            && mime_parser.has_chat_version()
-            // Check if the message is encrypted and signed correctly. If it's not encrypted, it's
-            // probably from a new contact sharing the same key.
-            && !mime_parser.signatures.is_empty()
-            // Check if the From: address was also in the signed part of the email.
-            // Without this check, an attacker could replay a message from Alice
-            // to Bob. Then Bob's device would do an AEAP transition from Alice's
-            // to the attacker's address, allowing for easier phishing.
-            && mime_parser.from_is_signed
-            // DC avoids sending messages with the same timestamp, that's why `>` is here unlike in
-            // `Peerstate::apply_header()`.
-            && info.message_time > peerstate.last_seen
-    {
+    if !addr_cmp(&peerstate.addr, &mime_parser.from.addr) {
+        // Check if it's a chat message; we do this to avoid
+        // some accidental transitions if someone writes from multiple
+        // addresses with an MUA.
+        if !mime_parser.has_chat_version() {
+            info!(
+                context,
+                "Not doing AEAP from {} to {} because the message is not a chat message.",
+                &peerstate.addr,
+                &mime_parser.from.addr
+            );
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+
+        // Check if the message is encrypted and signed correctly. If it's not encrypted, it's
+        // probably from a new contact sharing the same key.
+        if mime_parser.signatures.is_empty() {
+            info!(
+                context,
+                "Not doing AEAP from {} to {} because the message is not encrypted and signed.",
+                &peerstate.addr,
+                &mime_parser.from.addr
+            );
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+
+        // Check if the From: address was also in the signed part of the email.
+        // Without this check, an attacker could replay a message from Alice
+        // to Bob. Then Bob's device would do an AEAP transition from Alice's
+        // to the attacker's address, allowing for easier phishing.
+        if !mime_parser.from_is_signed {
+            info!(
+                context,
+                "Not doing AEAP from {} to {} because From: is not signed.",
+                &peerstate.addr,
+                &mime_parser.from.addr
+            );
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+
+        // DC avoids sending messages with the same timestamp, that's why messages
+        // with equal timestamps are ignored here unlike in `Peerstate::apply_header()`.
+        if info.message_time <= peerstate.last_seen {
+            info!(
+                context,
+                "Not doing AEAP from {} to {} because {} < {}.",
+                &peerstate.addr,
+                &mime_parser.from.addr,
+                info.message_time,
+                peerstate.last_seen
+            );
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+
+        info!(
+            context,
+            "Doing AEAP transition from {} to {}.", &peerstate.addr, &mime_parser.from.addr
+        );
+
         let info = &mut mime_parser.decryption_info;
         let peerstate = info.peerstate.as_mut().context("no peerstate??")?;
         // Add info messages to chats with this (verified) contact